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Abstract 
With the rising popularity of social media in the last decade and a half, young women in 
Saudi Arabia have been utilising these platforms to negotiate values and norms in relation 
to issues such as veiling, work, their place within the private sphere, and their 
relationships with the opposite-sex. The aim of this thesis is to understand how the rise of 
social media engagement is impacting long-held traditions and values about Saudi 
women, and how their social media use is impacting on their public national image. The 
research addresses the interplay between Saudi conservative nationalists, who wish to 
preserve a traditional image of femininity that is highly tied to notions of piety and 
deference, and the Saudi women who, through social media, are actively challenging 
these longstanding views on how women should behave in society. Drawing on Nancy 
Fraser’s notion of counterpublics (Fraser 1991), this research argues that the democratic 
potential of social media platforms, independent of cultural and state laws that serve to 
direct, control and determine the attitudes and behaviour of young Saudi women, has 
facilitated the emergence of a counterpublic in which alternate contemporary identities are 
expressed and represented. By employing a triangulation approach for collecting data 
within a constructivist research paradigm, this research draws on four sets of data. Firstly, 
it uses netnography to observe the public accounts of seven female social media 
influencers. Secondly, it observes the personal accounts of nine Saudi women. A third set 
of data consists of six one-to-one interviews. Finally, a fourth set of data entails seven 
focus groups involving an overall sample of 36 participants. Using thematic analysis, this 
research argues that Saudi women, particularly younger women, using social media are 
adopting a more critical view of traditional customs surrounding femininity and women’s 
place in a society constructed through a collectivist ideology towards more individualistic 
values, norms and social ties that emphasise agency and autonomy (Giddens, 1991). I also 
argue that Saudi women active on social media are modernising the national public image 
of Saudi women. By engaging with Dobson’s (2015) study of post-feminist digital 
culture, I explore the contemporary ideals of Saudi femininity that are portrayed on social 
media by the young Saudi women I observe in this research and I document the complex 
and many ways these women can now be in the world. I find that women’s engagement 
with social media is challenging traditional values and norms and performing a vanguard 
role in reimagining the public national image of Saudi women today.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1. 1 Introduction 
As I was going through the timeline on one of my many social media applications, I came across 
a meme shared by Sarah, a high school friend: “They used to cover their laptop cameras with 
stickers, and now they publicly dance on Snapchat.” The words were pasted on a photograph of 
actor Leonardo DiCaprio raising a glass to toast. She commented on her own post: “I’m one of 
them, I confess”, with the emoji of a laughing face. Internet memes are virtually transmitted 
cultural symbols or social ideas, often in a humorous tone, with the aim of ridiculing human 
behaviour. This particular meme is referring to a notable shift in the attitudes of young Saudi 
women towards notions of reputation, piety, honour and its relation to their visibility in public 
areas, veiling and place within the private sphere. During the early days of Internet engagement 
between 2000 and 2010, it was common practice for many young Saudi women to cover laptop 
cameras with a sticker for fear of someone hacking the camera and being able to see them on the 
other side of the screen, or, worse still, record their image.  
In the early 2000s, Saudi Arabian culture and society were still influenced by the values 
of the Sahwa movement, a religious Wahabi doctrine that rose to prominence in the 1980s in the 
aftermath of the Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca in 1979 (ICG, 2004; Lacroix, 2004; Le Renard, 
2008). In the early internet years (early 2000’s), veiling and strict gender segregation were central 
signifiers of the pious woman and a breach of these cultural codes was considered eyb (shameful) 
and a disgrace not only to the woman involved but to the honour of her entire family. Therefore, 
women were very protective of their personal photographs, opting not to share them online as 
they were hyperaware of the risks of them falling into the wrong hands. Today, however, nearly 
two decades later, as the meme noted above suggests, this thesis will argue that a shift in 
women’s attitudes, values and norms is detectable in their social media activity not only in 
relation to veiling and visibility, but also in relation to work, romance and other socio-cultural 
practices.   
Today the Sahwa movement’s influence is decreasing, with the movement being criticised 
by government officials and blamed for the ultra-conservatism of state and society over the last 
three decades. The new crown prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, publicly stated in October 2017 
that he intends to “obliterate the remnants of Sahwa extremism” immediately and shift the 
country to a more ‘moderate’ Islam (Meredith, 2017). This statement was accompanied by 
		2	
several new laws that facilitated wider access for women to public spaces in the country, such as 
lifting the ban on women driving, establishing a sexual harassment law, as well as granting 
women access to football stadiums for the first time.   
The changing values and norms of Saudi women is the subject that has inspired this 
research interest in exploring the contemporary identities of young Saudi women on social media 
networks and the cultural implications of these changes, changes which are embedded within a 
broader project of examining the reconstruction of the national public image of Saudi women.  
 
1.2 Research Context 
With 147 million users of social media in the Arabian region and the growth of Internet use 
continuing to accelerate around the world (We Are Social, 2017), digital media is a growing 
study field within the disciplines of media & communication and social sciences alike. I started 
this project with the aim of researching the contemporary understandings and interpretations of 
femininity amongst young Saudi women on social media networks and trying to assess whether 
their increased social media engagement has impacted their values and norms in relation to issues 
of public visibility, veiling and mixed-gender relationships. It is important here to define what is 
meant by femininity throughout this research. It comprises a set of attributes, behaviours, and 
roles generally associated with girls and women. Femininity is partially socially constructed, 
being made up of both socially-defined and biologically-created factors (McRobbie, 2009). 
However, not to confuse femininity with being female, my focus is on the socially-defined 
factors that construct and shape the ideal feminine identity which varies depending on location 
and context, and is influenced by a variety of social and cultural factors. As indicated by the title 
of this thesis the focus here will be on the ideals of femininity expressed within the Saudi cultural 
context and the many, and rather complex, ways of being a Saudi woman today. 
 
What I have seen on the various social media platforms these past two years is very different 
from what I used to know about young Saudi women before I moved abroad in 2012. Young 
Saudi female social media celebrities with millions of followers started to appear on my feed, 
unveiled and often in rather revealing outfits. I suddenly started seeing my Saudi female friends 
nonchalantly share their photographs unveiled publicly on Instagram and Snapchat, yet I 
distinctly recalled that this was a public disgrace that would smear a young woman’s reputation 
and besmirch her family’s name less than a decade ago.  At a barbeque during one of my visits 
home, a young woman was complaining about a boy that would not text her back, and I found 
		3	
myself wondering is it no longer dishonouring for a young Saudi girl to have a boyfriend? 
Conversations like this used to be whispered between the most intimate of friends, not casually 
discussed at a barbeque with 15 other women.  
But perhaps the most remarkable incident from my visits home was when my sister gifted 
me a new Abaya (the traditional – and traditionally black – over-garment that Saudi women wear 
over their clothes when in public) to welcome me back. We were going to attend a public event, 
which was shocking enough in itself for me as it was a mixed-gender event, a new trend in Saudi 
that I was not familiar with. Public events in Saudi used to be strictly gender-segregated. In fact, 
you needed a special permit to host a mixed-gender event, I remember because I was in charge of 
obtaining the permits when I was an event-manager in my previous job seven years ago. Today, 
mixed-gender events are popular in Saudi and are a common occurrence, with at least one every 
week, some even on a national level such as the Saudi National Day celebrations in September 
2017 (StepFeed, 2017; DAWN.COM, 2017). For instance, in one week in March, 2018 there 
were 12 different mixed-gender events taking place in various cities around Saudi Arabia, from 
plays to fun fairs and comedy shows (Gea.gov.sa, 2018), all funded and organised by the recently 
created General Entertainment Authority. I opened the packaging expecting to see the 
traditionally black garment, but to my surprise it was a pastel blue. Isn’t an Abaya always black? 
One of the most iconic national symbols of Saudi women – the Abaya - was getting a makeover 
and I wanted to understand how and why. I wanted to research these new emerging identities of 
Saudi women. 
Hence, this project has expanded its initial research focus from mainly looking at how 
social media usage is impacting the norms and values of Saudi women, to include an exploration 
of national identity and the role gender plays in national projects. This research sees Saudi 
feminine identity and the ideals of femininity within the Saudi culture not as a fixed, bounded, 
stable notion but as constantly changing through interaction, practises and processes. Thus, this 
research is situated within the inquires of cultural studies which investigate contemporary culture 
and how cultural practices relate to wider systems of power associated with or operating through 
social phenomena such as the micro-celebrity explored in this study. This is why constructivism 
was found to be the most suitable ontological approach to this research. A constructivist 
paradigm asserts that there is no single reality. It considers reality (social phenomena and their 
meaning) to be continually revised through social interaction, in which individuals in groups 
create and recreate culture rather than culture being a pre-given and fixed phenomenon (Bryman, 
2012). In terms of this research, the Saudi female, her identity and role within the nation, is 
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something that is imagined, constructed and renegotiated over time, and the activity of women on 
social media networks, which this research documents, is generating the necessary processes and 
dialogue for this renegotiation. In order to assess how interaction on social media platforms is 
impacting Saudi women’s understanding and negotiation of their reality, an epistemological 
stance that recognises the changing nature of culture is adopted. Thus, given the research 
questions, this research is positioned within the constructivist paradigm. This is an important 
moment in the history of women in Saudi Arabia and is worthy of observation and close 
examination, which is what makes this research significant.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The aims of this study are twofold, it aims to explore the impact of social media engagement on 
the values and norms of Saudi women in relation to veiling, gender-segregation, work, romance, 
and other socio-cultural relations, as well as assess how these changes are subsequently 
reconstructing contemporary Saudi femininity, its public image and its relation to the nation.  
 
Thus, the key overriding research questions are: 
 
1. How is the rise in social media use in Saudi Arabia influencing the values and norms of young 
Saudi women and their attitudes towards romance and mixed-gender friendships? 
 
2. In what ways is social media use in Saudi Arabia contributing to changes in the public image 
of young Saudi women? 
 
3. What are the social and cultural implications of these changes in 1) and 2)? 
 
The theoretical contribution of this research is an advancement of contemporary understandings 
of Saudi femininity. It is the first study of its kind to use netnography (Kozinets, 2015) as a 
method to investigate and analyse Saudi women’s social media activities and therefore it provides 
unique and outstanding empirical data that is interesting to examine and interpret. Other 
qualitative studies on Saudi women have resorted only to focus groups or interviews to collect 
their data (Al-Saggaf, 2011; Hayat, 2014; Guta and Karolak, 2015) but I believe that the 
originality of this research methodologically is that it actually observes Saudi women in their 
natural setting without interfering and disrupting their activity. It is also a pioneering study on the 
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trending issue of Saudi female micro-celebrities and the way in which this trend in public self-
presentation on social media networks is impacting contemporary Saudi femininity. Moreover, 
the research is amongst the first to document the tensions found online between conservative 
nationalists who wish to preserve a classical image of the nation and its members, and those who 
are seeking to modernise it. While other studies (for example, Al-Rasheed, 2013) might have 
acknowledged these tensions, they have not examined the manifestation of them on the feeds of 
social media networks, which is where the counterpublic largely exists and is the sphere where 
substantive change could actually be generated from. Instead, Al-Rasheed’s study focused on 
literature by Saudi women and did not examine their digital activities on social media networks. 
Other studies on social media and Saudis, such as Guta and Karolak (2015) and Al-Saggaf 
(2004), which are reviewed in this research, does not consider the association between what they 
observe and the reimagining of the public image of the Saudi women. 
 
1.4 Situating the Research 
The research builds on a fundamental idea popularised by Goffman (1959) which views identity 
as an act of self-presentation. In particular, Judith Butler’s (1990) recognition of gender identity 
as a performance is relevant to this research. Saudi women’s femininity has been constructed 
through discourse and social processes for decades in which women ‘performed’ and imitated a 
femininity that was defined by conservative practises such as veiling or virtual 
confinement/seclusion to the private sphere of their own homes. In a similar manner to how 
Giddens (1991) views identity as a reflexive project, this research will explore Saudi feminine 
identity as a performance and as a project that is being negotiated and reconstructed on 
networked publics (Boyd, 2010; Ito, 2008). Networked publics are understood in this research as 
modern communities as they hold many of the characteristics of modernity that were identified 
by scholars such as Giddens (1991), Bauman (2000) and Beck (2002) in their studies of modern 
societies, particularly the fact that such communities are defined by individualism rather than 
collectivism. It is, however, important to highlight that the term ‘modern’ and ‘modernity’ as 
used throughout this thesis in reference to Saudi society is distinct from the use of these terms in 
the Anglo-Western context. While ‘modernity’ and ‘modern’/’late modern’ in an Anglo-Western 
sense refers to the post-war period (scholars for example such as Bauman and Giddens refer to 
the UK as ‘late modern’), modernity in relation to Saudi Arabia in this thesis is concerned with a 
particular set of developments that are observed in relation to traditions and customs. Similarly, 
scholars such as Giddens (1991), Bauman (2000) and Beck (2002) have noted that a trend of 
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individualisation as a process within modern communities is responsible for their 
detraditionalisation. The influence of a promoted sense of individualism within networked 
publics on mixed-gender relationships, collective values and norms of Saudi women as well as on 
the public image of the Saudi female in relation to the nation is yet to be considered in an 
academic study. By examining the activity of Saudi women on social media networks, it is 
anticipated that a process of individualisation will likely be observed, one which might connote 
the emergence of non-traditional identities amongst Saudi women.  The study will thus build on 
the existing literature pertaining to individualisation, feminism as well as literature on the links 
between gender and the imagined nation.  
 This thesis extends existing research in that it does not only evaluate social media’s 
impact on changing norms and values, but it also considers how this engagement is impacting the 
public image of Saudi women and their relation to the nation and their role within it. Women’s 
social media activity is not only seen as a visible manifestation of changing values towards 
veiling, gender segregation and work, and to a certain extent as a modern catalyst of further 
change, but also facilitates an in-depth investigation of the research questions with a historical 
dimension. 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 constitute the literature review and the theoretical foundation for the research 
design. Chapter 5 aims to explain the research design itself and the methodology used to collect 
the data, while chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 form the analysis in this research. Specifically, and based on 
the evolution of the research emphasis, Chapter 2 is concerned with the idea of the nation and its 
relation to gender. This chapter will map the necessary theoretical framework for understanding 
the role that Saudi women play in representing the nation and how it might interrupt their efforts 
to perform a feminine identity that is true to who they are. This is an important chapter for the 
reader to fully understand Saudi culture in relation to women, and to familiarise herself with the 
norms and values that are being challenged through social media engagement, i.e., veiling, 
gender segregation, and work. This will be achieved through reviewing Mona Almunajjed’s 
(1997) study which explores the values of Saudi women in relation to veiling, gender 
segregation, and work during the late 1990s, just before the arrival of the Internet in Saudi 
Arabia. Exploring the relation between the nation and gender in Saudi Arabia specifically 
through a review of Madawai Al-Rasheed’s work on Saudi religious nationalism sets up the 
theoretical framework needed to understand the backlash Saudi women receive on social media 
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networks when they go against traditions. Finally, a review of individualism and its role in 
detraditionalizing societies (Giddens, Beck and Bauman) informs the analysis of how Saudi 
women’s efforts on social media are successfully modernising the public image of the Saudi 
woman as a national symbol and what it means to be a ‘true’ Saudi, which I argue in Chapter 8.  
Chapter 3 starts by reviewing the literature on digital networks themselves and what 
constitutes a network public, before moving on to review key literature on identity. These two 
subject matters are central within the process of exploring young Saudi women’s modern 
identities on social media networks, which is a key objective of this research. It starts by drawing 
on the work of dana boyd (2010) to explain and frame what network publics are. More relevantly, 
it reviews Nancy Fraser’s (1990) work on counterpublics, the spaces where subordinated social 
groups cluster and formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs. 
This concept is central for understanding how social media networks can serve as places of 
unconventional/non-traditional identity expression for young Saudi women. The second part of 
this chapter focuses on identity itself as a process of self-representation. It starts by presenting an 
overview of key work on identity (Goffman, 1959; boyd, 2014; Butler, 1990; Giddens, 1991).  
Then it specifically considers Dobson’s work on postfeminist identities on digital networks 
(2015), which will provide the necessary theoretical framework to explore and analyse Saudi 
women’s identities on social media networks and to analyse modern illustrations of Saudi 
femininity on social media. Alongside this, a review of the paramount role of images within 
identity construction on social media networks will be conducted and the key literature on the 
emerging trend of micro-celebrities on these networks will be reviewed. Therefore, it justifies the 
methodological approach of netnography, detailed in Chapter 5, to study images of Saudi women 
on Instagram given that they comprise a central part of their gender identity expression online. 
Since the exploration of how the rise of social media engagement is impacting Saudi 
women’s attitudes towards romance and wider intimacy practices is a main objective of this 
research, Chapter 4 is concerned with reviewing the important literature on romantic and personal 
relationships on social media networks. In the polymedia context in which our digital 
communication and relationships exist (Madianou & Miller, 2012), the issue of privacy is central 
to avoid a context collapse (boyd, 2014). This is of high importance to Saudi women considering 
the sensitivity of pre-marital romance in the conservative, shame-honour culture of Saudi Arabia. 
Thus, this chapter will explore these notions as well as review the concept of ‘scalable sociality’ 
(Miller et al, 2016) which, as Chapter 9 will argue, organises the dynamics of romantic 
relationships on social media platforms. In addition, the chapter reviews the networked 
		8	
individualism approach by Wellman and Rainie (2012) and its influence on collectivities and 
kinship systems in conservative communities. The approach is necessary to understand how 
Saudi women on social media networks are bypassing family and societal control of their 
movement and sociality, which I examine in Chapter 9. 
 Chapter 5 identifies the philosophical position and methodological approaches used to 
explore how young Saudi women’s engagement with social media is impacting their norms and 
values as well as their national public image. As a socially constructed reality, the national public 
image of the young Saudi woman, as well as her values and norms in relation to the above-
mentioned points, are examined through a constructivist paradigm that recognises the changing 
nature of culture. The chapter details the methods chosen in the triangulation process of data 
collection. Specifically, a netnogpraphy approach is used to collect the data from four different 
social media platforms, because of its high compatibility with the study of social media networks 
and its capacity to observe images of Saudi women, which is central to the analysis of the 
updated image of the national Saudi woman. Focus groups and semi-structured one-to-one 
interviews via Skype were used to accurately interpret the behaviour and actions observed 
netnographically online by discussing them directly with the respondents and to cross-validate 
the data. The method of analysis, as well as practical issues regarding data collection data, 
including sampling, validity and reliability, and ethical considerations are also discussed in detail 
in this chapter.  
Chapter 6 considers the changing values and norms of Saudi women, particularly in 
relation to veiling and work, and considers how social media networks can produce ideal spaces 
for challenging traditions. It examines the use of ‘identity separation’ by some Saudi women to 
overcome limitations set on them by their families and to protect their privacy when presenting 
themselves online in an unconventional manner. The chapter also recodes the emergence of 
micro-celebrity as a new trend in self-presentation online amongst young Saudi women.  
Chapter 7 follows to further analyse the emergence of contemporary feminine identities 
amongst Saudi women through the observation of the activities of female micro-celebrities on 
digital networks. The chapter analyses the ways in which this type of public self-presentation is 
challenging the traditional values of veiling and confinement to the private sphere. By 
understanding this type of self-presentation as what Dobson (2015) labels postfeminist identities, 
the argument is made at the end of the chapter on how these female micro-celebrities can be 
considered vanguards of change amongst women in Saudi and examples of an emerging trend of 
an aspirational femininity that is marked with new ideals, individualism and neo-liberal qualities.  
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Chapter 8 acknowledges the backlash of associating non-traditional individualistic 
identities with the Saudi label in these women’s expressions of identity on social media. It aims 
to conceptualise the ways in which Saudi women are regarded by conservatives as symbolic 
border guards of culture and as the markers of a unique and pious nation that is distinct from 
other ‘ungodly’ nations, as argued by Madawi Al-Rasheed (2013). Following Benedicit 
Anderson’s notion of the nation as an imagined community and outlining a constructivist 
ontological stance, this chapter will argue the possibility of reimagining the nation and women’s 
identities and roles within it. This will highlight the importance of social media networks as tools 
for reconstructing and reimagining the Saudi nation and gender identity in relation to it, moving it 
away from collective ideologies to embrace a more individualistic identity. This argument 
concurs with Giddens’ (1991) notion of individualism’s close links with the detraditionalisation 
of communities.   
While chapters 6 and 7 consider the changing values and norms in relation to veiling, 
work and seclusion in the private sphere, Chapter 9 focuses on exploring the changing values, 
norms and attitudes of Saudi women, specifically in relation to romance and friendships with the 
opposite sex. The chapter makes the argument that Saudi women’s engagement with social media 
networks has impacted romantic communication in four ways: democratisation, re-spatialisation, 
changing temporality, and shifts in gender etiquette. Notions of scalable sociality (Miller et al, 
2016) and polymedia (Madianou & Miller, 2012) are used to make this argument. The chapter 
then explores the dynamics of romance amongst young Saudis on social media networks and the 
significance of distinguishing public spaces from private spaces on social media platforms to 
negotiate romance with low risks. The chapter also aims to recognise and conceptualise a 
condition of ‘accountability suspension’: a strategy employed by young Saudis to engage in 
somewhat public displays of affection while still avoiding reprimand or shame in a constant 
effort to reclaim agency and achieve privacy on social media platforms. Finally, the chapter 
suggests that intimacy is becoming disconnected from its traditional romantic/sexual meanings. 
Instead, social media is opening up the possibility of other forms of intimacy to emerge amongst 
young Saudis based on mixed gendered friendships.  
 Chapter 10 concludes this thesis by providing a synthesis of the research findings and 
answering the research’s original questions, as well as highlighting a number of 
recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 2. Nation and Women in Saudi Arabia 
2.1 Introduction 
An issue that emerged from the data collected through netnography in my research was the issue 
of nation and its relation to gender. A key objective of this chapter is to assess the traditional 
classical role and image/identity of the Saudi woman (traditional ideal Saudi femininity) in order 
to be able to understand how Saudi women’s participation on social media and their online 
practices might be negotiating it and redefining the public image of the Saudi woman. This 
chapter will begin with an inquiry into the ways women have been linked to nationhood and 
representing the nation by addressing the work of Yuval-Davis (1997). This will then be linked to 
the emergence of ‘religious nationalism’ in Saudi Arabia (Al-Rasheed, 2013), an ideology which 
regards women as symbols of national identity and authenticity that are controlled by society and 
state to be markers of a pious religious community/nation, engendering a particular monitoring of 
their social role that I refer to as the ‘regulatory gaze’.  Following that, I will move on to discuss 
the cultural values and norms that constitute the traditional ideal femininity within the framework 
of this ‘religious nationalism’. I shall draw on and engage with the classical study by Mona 
Almunajjed (1997) on Saudi women, which will serve as a historical reference for Saudi 
women’s values and norms as well as their public national image during the height of religious 
nationalism before Internet usage and social media engagement took off in the early 2000’s. I 
then move on to review recent studies on Saudi women’s online engagement to construct an 
informative review of Saudi women’s gender identity and their role as carriers of family name 
and honour, particularly the work of Guta and Karolak (2015) on social media as sites of identity 
negotiation among Saudi women. Next, I shall draw on the concepts of individualism and 
detraditionalisation of communities developed by Giddens, Beck and Bauman as characteristics 
of modernity to explain the key social changes occurring in contemporary Saudi society 
concerning gender, intimacy and family life in late modern digital society. The discussion of 
individualisation and detraditionalisation will inform the analysis of contemporary images of 
Saudi women on social media and their changing attitudes, values and norms. I shall explain how 
Saudi women on social media are moving away from the traditional ideals of femininity 
determined by religious nationalism, and instead are negotiating modern/contemporary feminine 
identities. This chapter will enable me to answer the second question of this research regarding 
the ways in which social media usage in Saudi Arabia is contributing to changes in the public 
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image of young Saudi women, as well as addressing the social and cultural implications of these 
changes. 
 
2.2 Women as symbolic border guards of culture and embodiments of the nation 
In her book, Gender and Nation (1997), Nira Yuval-Davis’ examination of the relation between 
women’s gendered identity and the nation that they are part of considers the arrangement of 
processes, practices, images, ideologies, and distribution of power in national society 
differentiated between women and men, usually to the disadvantage of the former. Yuval-Davis 
highlights three dimensions to the intersection between gender and nation: the genealogical 
dimension, the cultural dimension, and the civic dimension. The genealogical dimension focuses 
on the notion of ‘genetic pools’ to imagine the nation. In this dimension, gender plays a 
significant role in which women, as bearers of children, are the biological reproducers of the 
nation. This necessitates the regulation of their sexual practices and their matrimony choices to 
ensure that the nation’s breed remains genetically pure and homogenous, and to avert any foreign 
interference with the national genetic pool. The civic dimension focuses on the civic rules and 
regulations to determine who can ‘actively’ be part of the nation. Yuval-Davis argues that in 
religiously orthodox nations, civic rights are marked by patriarchy. Women in such nations are 
expected to occupy the private domain while men reside in the public domain. Rules, regulations 
and laws are implemented by the state to regulate and control women in such societies on behalf 
of male relatives. Finally, the cultural dimension (which is of direct relevance to this research) 
revolves around the traditions and heritage that are often partially composed of a specific religion 
and/or a specific language. Yuval-Davis argues the mythical unity of a nation is preserved and 
ideologically reproduced by an entire system of what John Armstrong dubbed ‘symbolic border 
guards’ in his 1982 book Nations Before Nationalism. The book was very influential and inspired 
scholars of ethnosymbolism (a school of thought in the study of nationalism that emphasises the 
centrality of symbols, myths, values and traditions in the structuring and endurance of the modern 
nation state) such as Anthony D. Smith and John Hutchinson. According to Armstrong (1982), 
the role of symbolic border guards is to identify individuals as members or non-members of a 
certain collectivity depending of their adherence to specific cultural codes in terms of behaviour, 
style of dress as well as a wider set of customs and practices.  
Yuval-Davis’ argument goes on to identify the positioning of women themselves as 
symbolic border guards. Kobena Mercer (1994) argues that women are often adjured to carry the 
“burden of representation” as they have historically been established as ‘the symbolic bearers’ of 
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the collectivity’s identity and honour, whether this collectivity is the family or, by extension, the 
nation as a whole (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.45). Women, in their ‘proper’ conduct and their ‘proper’ 
attire, embody the border that signifies the collectivity’s boundaries and differentiates ‘us’ from 
‘others’.  Similarly, shame-honour cultures in Middle Eastern societies tie the honour of the 
family with the reputation of the family’s women, and this notion has persisted in the imagining 
of the Saudi nation, as I shall detail next. Ruth Benedict (1947) first conceptualised the term 
shame-honour culture in her anthropological study of Japan. However, this type of society/culture 
exists in several other regions of the world, especially within Bedouin tribal societies of the 
Middle East such as Saudi Arabia (Abu-Lughod 1986; Abu-Lughod 1993; Meeker, 1979). In 
shame- honour culture/society, shame is a reaction to other people’s criticism, and is highly based 
on meeting the expectations others have of us (Hiebert, 1986, p.212). Particularly in Middle 
Eastern societies (including Saudi Arabia), any act that deviates from what is considered 
honourable is regarded as eyb, a very specific Arabic word that could be translated as ‘shameful’ 
or ‘disgraceful’.  In this type of society, each person has a role within the culture and their actions 
do not only reflect on them but on the whole group (what I refer to throughout as the 
‘collectivity’), whether it is the family, the tribe, or even the nation in whole. The implication of 
this is that people in such a society do not operate and make decisions based on what is right or 
wrong, but rather on what is accepted or not: it is not a guilt society but a shame society 
(Peristiany, 1966; Bedford, 2004). The notion of eyb in Middle Eastern communities is especially 
prevalent when it comes to issues concerning women and their reputation (see Afshar, 1993, p. 
118-119).  
Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) pointed out the importance of differentiating between 
cultural discourse, identity narratives and ethnic processes. Conflating these notions would lead 
to questions of ‘authenticity’ when performing identity, what Amrita Chhanchhi (1991) refers to 
as ‘forced identities’. The implication of women representing the nation, its culture, and its 
honour is that women’s individualism is compromised in this process as they are primarily 
thought of as representatives of the collectivity. Anderson (1983) views the nation as an 
‘imagined community’ in the sense that you can never meet all members of the nation face-to-
face and thus, to a degree, this community has to be imagined by those who perceive themselves 
to be members of it. Therefore, the symbolic guards themselves and the customs and traditions 
that relate to them are also a construct of the members’ imagining. This means that citizenship is 
not only a matter of legal rights and responsibilities but also of participation, identity, and a sense 
of belonging. Hence, a growing group of scholars studies citizenship as a subjective experience 
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of being included or excluded and as a process where people continuously affirm or contest their 
belonging to the imagined community through various practices (Yuval-Davis, 2011; Roseneil, 
Halsaa, and Sümer, 2012; Nyhagen and Halsaa, 2016). Here we should note the role that the 
media plays in producing images and illustrations of what this imagined nation is, and what 
members in it should look/act/talk/be like to form this imagined collectivity (Anderson, 1983). 
This suggests that today social media platforms could be useful in reimagining the idealised 
femininity and developing contemporary national representations of Saudi women. 
The next section will examine the imagined nation of Saudi Arabia - a nation defined by 
religion and piety - and how this affects Saudi women. This frames the literature to explain why 
issues of nationalism arise in relation to Saudi women’s portrayals of identities that challenge 
traditional values and norms of femininity on social media networks. 
 
2.3 Saudi Arabia’s religious nationalism  
In her book A Most Masculine State (2013), Madawi Al-Rasheed addresses how the 
absence of secular and anti-colonial nationalism in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was 
compensated by the emergence of a specific type of nationalism instead, which she terms 
‘religious nationalism’. Stemming from the strict Wahabbiyah interpretations of Islamic texts, Al-
Rasheed details how a religious nationalism was developed by the state to unify the different 
fragmented tribes of the Arabian Peninsula and create a homogenous identity across much of the 
landmass, one which saw itself as a ‘godly community’ (Al-Rasheed, 2013, p.16). Wahabbi 
religious nationalism was central for the Saudi state to assert its legitimacy across the burgeoning 
kingdom and to differentiate itself from other post-colonial Arab countries by the way it upholds 
the piety of the nation. Politically, this piety became increasingly characterised by excluding 
women from political and economic authority, minimising their public appearances, and 
restricting their citizenship rights and participation.  
The state has thus turned personal piety into a public project, and Saudi women became 
boundary markers that visibly and structurally distinguish the pious Saudi nation from other 
ungodly nations in the way that Yuval-Davis argued in her book Gender and Nation (1997). 
AlRasheed maintains that them being turned into boundary markers is the reason behind the 
obsession with “women’s bodies, appearance, segregation, purity, and sexuality” in Saudi Arabia, 
which tends to reflect “the process whereby women have become signals marking the boundaries 
of the nation” (Al-Rasheed, 2013, p.17). This obsession was at its peak in the 1980s and 1990s as 
the Sahwa (Awakening) movement swept the kingdom and much of the wider region. The Sahwa 
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movement claimed that Saudi Arabia was not Islamic enough and that people had started to 
deviate from the true teachings of Islam (Lacroix and Holoch, 2011). The movement was 
concerned with reversing what it deemed as western influences in the region. This was done 
through emphasising ideologies and practises that reflected the distinct Islamic identity and tying 
them to Saudi Arabia as a nation and a state, thereby branding Saudi Arabia an Islamic nation 
(Chaudhry, 2014). There were gendered expressions of this revival that manifested in practises 
such as veiling and adopting a certain style of dress, as well as prioritising a woman’s role as a 
wife and a mother over the role of a professional, for example mainly secluding her within the 
domestic sphere and limiting her public presence (Hilde Granås Kjøstvedt, 2016). As Le Renard 
(2008) observed, women in Saudi Arabia were turned into a symbol and were ascribed a uniform 
identity.  
Beginning in Mecca, the geographic and spiritual heart of Islam, this movement had a 
ripple effect in the region.  In 1980 Juliette Minces found that in some areas of the Arab world 
the act of veiling was perceived as a means of defiance against Western values, specifically 
against what is perceived by Arabs as the loose morals of Western women (Minces, 1980, p.70). 
Saudi women were supposed to be a – perhaps the central – symbol of the country's virtuous 
implementation of Islam through being veiled in public spaces and deferring from interacting 
with men who were not immediate relatives (Le Renard, 2008, p. 612). A close review of the 
Sahwa movement or Wahhabism and Islamists in Saudi Arabia is beyond the scope of this 
research (more can be read in ICG, 2004; Lacroix, 2004; Le Renard, 2008). But what matters 
here is that practices such as veiling and the seclusion of women became Islamic national 
signifiers of the Saudi Muslim woman because of this movement, and that the female Saudi 
identity was ultra-religious. 
As a result of international pressure on the Kingdom in the period after 9/11, the state 
sought to advance the image and position of Saudi women by granting them more rights and 
further mobility within the public sphere. However, despite these sudden actions in the state’s 
national agenda and its slight move away from heavy restrictions on women, my data shows that 
some Saudi women have been left behind. The implication of this is that Saudi women often 
conjure up contradictory images, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 9. In Al-Rasheeds words, 
they are either “excluded, heavily veiled victims of their own religion and society, or wealthy 
glamorous cosmopolitan entrepreneurs” (2013, P. I).  
Like other forms of religious nationalism, Wahabbi religious nationalism is focused on 
the family, as opposed to the autonomous individual, as the central unit of which the social is 
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composed. In essence, Al-Rasheed argues, “The foundation of the Saudi state depended on the 
perpetuation of a social order in which the pious woman was celebrated while the defiant one was 
subjected to punishment, control and purgation” (2013, p.75). People who hold such views are 
referred to in this research as ‘conservative nationalists’. Conservative nationalists in this 
research refers to Saudi individuals (both men and women) who maintain and assert traditional 
religious Wahhabi gender roles, identities and stereotypes and uphold them as signifiers to 
distinguish members from non-members of the nation (a detailed review of what this traditional 
religious identity entails follows later in this chapter). Women’s observance of traditions and 
customs and their ‘performance’ of a traditional conservative Saudi feminine identity is viewed 
by conservative nationalists as a way to differentiate ‘our’ culture and our nation from ‘other’ 
nations and cultures. In a sense, a woman’s failure to adhere to these cultural codes is viewed by 
conservative nationalists as a betrayal to the nation, and it is causing the nation to lose its 
distinctive identity, which necessities a specific form of monitoring Saudi women’s socio-cultural 
online practices that I call the ‘regulatory gaze’. 
 
2.4 The ‘regulatory gaze’ 
On social media platforms, the policing of Saudi women’s behaviour results in viewing their 
practises online with a ‘regulatory gaze’ by conservative nationalist members of the collectivity. 
This entails the supervision of women’s behaviour, regulating it, assessing it, and making sure 
that it is always aligned with what the traditionalists deem to be the behaviour of a ‘proper’ Saudi 
female. The gaze is a doctrine that is used in media studies to analyse the visual culture and how 
the audience views the people that are being featured. Many scholars have addressed the concept 
of the gaze (Sartre, 1956; Derrida, 2008; Kaplan,1997; Said,1978), classifying it mainly by who 
is doing the observing. 
Foucault detailed his discussion on the term ‘gaze’ to highlight a distinct dynamic in 
power relations and disciplinary mechanisms. He discussed surveillance and its relation to self-
regulation and its use as a ‘contrivance of power’ to refer to how people adjust their behaviour 
when believing that they are being watched, even if they are unable to directly see who is 
watching them. The potential surveillance, whether real or unreal, has self-regulating effects. 
Sturken and Cartwright (2009) maintain that the gaze is not an object that one has or uses, but is 
rather a relationship between the one doing the looking and the one being observed. They state 
that: "The gaze is integral to systems of power and ideas about knowledge.” (2009, p.94). Laura 
Mulvey introduced the ‘male gaze’ in 1975 to explain the objectifying of women in films. Even 
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though it was originally produced as a theory in film specifically, the term is often applied in 
media studies in general. In this study, ‘the regulatory gaze’ is used to refer to a distinct type of 
community gaze that Saudi women are experiencing on social media platforms. Conservative 
nationalists’ placement of women as representative of the nation and symbolic border guards of 
culture ensures their subjection to scrutiny, through the regulatory gaze, on social media, where 
their performance of self and practises are being recorded and circulated amongst members of the 
collectivity. This modifies women’s behaviour online by pressuring them to follow a specific set 
of cultural codes to attain what the nationalist members of the Saudi collectivity regard as the 
proper image of the Saudi woman. 
At this point it is appropriate to detail this classical/traditional Saudi feminine identity and 
what is entailed in notions of the ‘proper’ behaviours and the ‘proper’ appearance that Saudi 
women are asked to abide by in order to preserve the honour of the collectivity and ‘truly’ 
represent it.  
 
2.5 The Traditional Identity of Saudi Women (Ideal Femininity) 
What is considered to be ideal femininity differs from culture to culture, and it is based on what 
that specific culture considers valuable. A key objective of this chapter is to assess the traditional 
classical role and image of the Saudi woman, or the ideal femininity, in order to be able to 
understand how Saudi women’s participation in social media today might be renegotiating it and 
developing new trends in the ideals of contemporary Saudi femininity. To do so, I will review 
Mona Almunajjed’s 1997 informative and detailed study on Saudi women and their traditional 
role as wives, mothers and homemakers.  Appearing just before the arrival of the Internet in 
Saudi Arabia in the year 2001, Almunajjed’s study is an important documenting of a period prior 
to social media engagement, enabling a fascinating comparison between what it meant to be a 
Saudi Arabian woman in the 1990s and what it is being reshaped to mean today. Almunajjed 
conducted intensive interviews with 100 Saudi women from various social, economic and 
educational backgrounds to assess their quality of life in the conservative traditional society of 
the 1990s as well as the meaning-making of their social reality. Social issues such as segregation, 
the veil, education and work were examined closely and Saudi women’s attitudes and practices in 
relation to these issues were documented. Even though the study does not include any interviews 
with male Saudis, the women’s answers and discussions were telling in relation to the views and 
stances of the men in their lives. However, the strength of this study stems from the fact that it 
combines empirical data with women's own voices, their feelings, ideas and conceptions about 
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what their role is and how they should act. The next sections review the traditional ideal Saudi 
feminine identity in relation to three themes: the veil, gender segregation and work. 
 
2.5.1 The veil 
In many Muslim countries, women are required to wear the Hijab, which is considered a symbol 
of feminine modesty and morality (Esposito, 2003). Veiling is intimately connected with notions 
of the self, the body and community, as well as with the cultural construction of identity, privacy 
and space. The main academic debate around the veil is whether it is a form of patriarchal 
oppression or a symbol of identity and in fact a manifestation of Islamic feminism. Abu-Lughod, 
in her book Do Muslim women need saving? (2013), warns against simplistic westernised 
analysis that confuses the veil as a lack of agency. She asserts that people wear the appropriate 
clothes for their social communities and their social classes, and that people are guided in this 
process by socially shared standards, signals of social status, and by religious beliefs and moral 
ideals. The choice of whether to veil or not, and to which degree to veil, are not simple ones and 
are indeed guided and complicated by all the above-mentioned factors. Similarly, Leila Ahmed 
(2011) finds that Muslim women in America wear the veil to protest discrimination against 
Muslims or to express their solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and not for reasons of piety at 
all.  Myra Macdonald (2006) discusses how expressions of surprise that veiled women can be 
athletes, feminists, politicians, models, actresses or musicians “underline the tenacity of beliefs 
that Islamic veiling in intrinsically incompatible with women’s agency in the construction of their 
identities” (2006, p.19). The veil is one of the key items within expressions of the traditional 
Saudi female image, and it is a main issue in conservative nationalists’ regulatory gaze at Saudi 
women on social media. Conservative nationalists are attacking and publicly denouncing Saudi 
women on social media who are renouncing the veil in the images they share of themselves 
online. First, I begin by identifying the many degrees of veiling among Saudi women today. Then 
I move on to examining the veil as a national symbol of Saudi women. 
 
Types of Veiling 
There are different types and degrees of veiling that can be seen on Saudi women today, whether 
outside on the streets of Saudi Arabia or online. Women’s veiling practices range from the most 
moderate to being fully covered. A moderate form of veiling is when women cover their hair with 
the Hijab, and wear an over-garment on top of their clothes known as the Abayah while showing 
their faces. In some cases, especially amongst younger women under 30, the Hijab on top of the 
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head is missing when in public and only the Abayah is worn. While Abayahs were customarily 
black, in the past 2-3 years coloured - white, blue, pink and multi-coloured - Abayahs have made 
their way to the streets of the bigger Saudi cities and in the online images of young Saudi women.  
The extreme style of veiling amongst Saudi women consists of covering the face as well by the 
use of the Niqab while keeping the eyes uncovered. Generational differences in veiling are seen 
in the fact that the majority of young women in Saudi are more likely to fall on the lenient end on 
the spectrum. For many women in Saudi Arabia, the veil in all of its forms has moral, religious 
and cultural connotations. Regardless of women’s convictions on why they should be veiled, the 
veil has become a customary element in the image of the Saudi woman and a staunch ‘symbolic 
border guard’ that identifies their membership to the collectivity.  It is important to note that 
Almunajjed has only questioned the practise of wearing the Niqab (covering the face) in her 
study, since wearing a Hijab (covering one's hair) at the time of her study was taken for granted 
to be mandatory and no women would have stepped out of their houses without at least a Hijab. 
Comparatively, today and in this research, many young Saudi women (whether interviewed or 
observed online) do not wear a Hijab at all, and they only wear the Abayah without covering their 
hair when they are out in public spaces in Saudi. For this reason, Almunajjed never examined or 
questioned the practices of veiling as a whole (wearing an Abayah, Hijab and Niqab) but only the 
practice of covering the face, and whenever she mentioned the word veil, she was referring 
specifically to the Niqab.  Whenever veiling is mentioned in this study in relation to her findings, 
it too refers only to the Niqab. 
Before moving on with the discussion, it is worth noting that women in Saudi Arabia are 
mandated by law to wear an Abayah, the long garment which covers their body over their clothes, 
although it is not specified what colour it should be or whether or not they have to cover their 
face or hair.  Nonetheless, under the law, all women are expected to dress ‘modestly’ when in 
public spaces. When Malak Alshehri went out in the streets of Riyadh without an Abayah in 
December, 2016, she got into legal trouble for ‘breaking the law’ (Embury-Dennis, 2016). I will 
later refer to this incident in my analysis to discuss the backlash of her posting a photo of herself 
on Twitter that day in the street not wearing an Abayah. The degree to which a woman chooses to 
cover herself is influenced by many factors, such as age, the family she comes from and her 
education. Almunajjed (1997) found that the choice of whether or not to veil in Saudi depended 
greatly on the decision of her male guardian. The male guardian could be a woman’s husband, 
father, or brother, depending on who heads the household she lives in at the time. In an interview 
from Almunajjed’s study when asked about the Niqab (covering the face), a 34-year-old, 
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uneducated Saudi woman stated that she only wears the Niqab out of habit as a result of being 
born in it and growing up with it. A 40-year-old married woman with an elementary level of 
education and two children outspokenly expressed her hatred of the Niqab and wished for her 
daughters to never have to wear it, yet she herself did not stop wearing it. And even though some 
of the women in Almunajjed’s study expressed feelings of resentment towards the extreme act of 
covering the face with the Niqab, no real objections were voiced towards veiling in general 
(wearing a Hijab or an Abayah), and definitely no acts of challenging this practice were carried 
out. Even though wearing a Niqab today is not as common as it was in the 1980s and 1990s, 
some women still uphold this tradition today when outside the home. However, the vast majority 
of these women who wear a Niqab discard it when traveling abroad in favour of the more 
moderate Hijab. Many women who wear a Hijab in Saudi discard it completely when abroad 
(Bowen, 2007, p.12). Similarly, some of the participants in my study reported that they wear a 
Hijab on the streets of Saudi Arabia yet share photos of themselves online completely unveiled 
for both men and women to see. This provokes one of my study’s key questions: How is the rise 
in social media use in Saudi Arabia influencing the values and norms of young Saudi women?  
 
The Veil as a National Symbol  
Alongside the veil symbolising ‘the virtues of conduct’ and having religious connotations 
(Almunajjed, 1997. p.47), one of the interesting findings of Almunnajed’s study was that for 
some women wearing the veil was a “symbol of an Islamic nationalist trend” in Saudi Arabia. 
She argues that this finding “reflects an ideological choice” and a “quest for a more meaningful 
Saudi identity” (1997, P.56). She highlights that during this period (1990s) the veil signified the 
defiant traditional, cultural and Islamic values, and a call for the revival of an Islamic Saudi 
identity against cultural incursions from ‘the West’, even though exposure to Western culture at 
that time was minor in comparison to today’s globalised and digitally interconnected reality. The 
Sahwa movement mainly influenced the nationalistic significance that was assigned to the veil. 
Powell (1982) argues that the veil is used by Saudi women as a form of identifying as Muslim. 
He observes that the veil is functional in forming a cohesive unit amongst the members of an 
Islamic collectivity as it is an apparent and immediately recognisable attire that distinguishes the 
collectivity’s women from others. Wagner et al (2012) noted that when Muslims are submerged 
in a community where they are the minority (such as European countries) the veil becomes even 
more central to the Muslim women as it turns to an affirmation of their cultural identity. 
Similarly, ElGunidi (2003) asserts the veil is embraced by many Arab women as both an 
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affirmation of cultural identity and as a strident feminist statement as it represents an expression 
of liberation from colonial legacies. Thus, it is understandable how such relations between veiling 
and the Saudi female image came to exist in Saudi Arabia due to the political/religious Sahwa 
movement, which successfully equated expressions of piety such as veiling for women or gender 
segregation with the ‘imagined’ Saudi nation (Anderson, 1983, 2006).  
One interviewee in Almunajjed’s study was asked about why she wears the veil, and the 
35-year-old married woman with two children said: “Wearing a veil is part of one's identity of 
being a Saudi woman. It is definite proof of one's identification with the norms and the values of 
the Saudi culture ... and I will teach my daughter to wear it” (Almunajjed, 1997, p.56). It can be 
observed from her statement how the veil at that time had turned into a signifier of the Saudi 
female’s identity. Scholars of social theories of late modern identity (discussed in Chapter 3) such 
as Giddens (1991) argue that people construct their identities through what they choose to read or 
watch on TV and theatres, the clothes they buy, and the way they dress (Giddens, 1991, p.81). 
Individuals regard these items (in this case the veil) as symbolic markers that communicate 
something about who they are, (in this case a Saudi woman). Another young, single woman who 
grew up outside Saudi Arabia stated in her interview that she started to wear the Niqab once she 
moved back to Saudi: “I felt I had to wear a veil. It becomes part of your identity” (Almunajjed, 
1997, p.56). The implication of equating the act of veiling with national identity is that when a 
Saudi woman does not practice it, her national affiliation would be questioned and contested. 
Indeed, many of the observed Saudi women on social media in this study were criticised over 
their choice of attire when appearing unveiled, were called ‘non-Saudis’, and, even when able to 
prove that they were in fact Saudi citizens, they were dubbed as ‘not true’ Saudis. One of the 
comments under a social media user’s post of herself wearing a swimsuit reads: “She is not a real 
original Saudi, her dad just got a citizenship, and now they count them on us as Saudis, they will 
never be real Saudis”.  
Tying the liberation of women from such social practices to a broader inclination towards social 
change and modernity and the equation that often occurs between modernity and westernisation 
(Kandiyoti, 1991; Chatterjee, 1990) has led to a strong backlash by conservative nationalists 
against the gradual renouncement of such cultural codes. This is due to the conservative 
nationalist and fundamentalist belief that women are being used as tools of westernising their 
community. Alternatively, a fundamentalist conservative construction of ‘the true’ cultural 
essence of the collectivity comes to be imposed, even though many aspects of this conservative 
construction are in fact outdated and no longer compatible with the needs and demands of society 
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today. Once again, women are assigned a critical function in the collectivity: instead of being 
perceived as symbols of modernity and change, women around the world are cast in the role of 
‘carriers of tradition’. In Iran for instance, Iranian women’s unveiling as a symbolic act of 
emancipation was surpassed by campaigns of forced veiling in the post-revolutionary Iranian 
nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.61). 
It is not only the case in Islamic communities, but can be seen in western ones as well, that the 
veil has become the centre of a debate involving nationalism and citizenship, albeit in a reverse 
manner (McCrone & Kiely, 2000, p.31; Park, 2013; Meer et al, 2010). While in Islamic 
communities it is ‘not wearing’ the veil that might result in questioning the women’s membership 
to the nation or citizenship, in western societies it is ‘wearing’ the veil that causes women’s 
commitment to membership to be suspected. Margaretha A. van Es (2017) finds that women with 
a Muslim background in the Netherlands and Norway are depicted in the public media discourse 
of the two countries as oppressed, and stereotypically portrayed as housewives, uneducated and 
unintegrated in society. She goes on to discuss how these women with Muslim backgrounds are 
actively trying to affirm their belonging to these societies by breaking stereotypes around Muslim 
women and by linking their Islamic identity to the Dutch or Norwegian identity through activities 
such as skiing, for example.  
 
2.5.2 Gender Segregation 
Veiling plays an important part in relations between men and women and it is intricately bound 
up with the norm of gender segregation until today (Doumato 2009; Hamdan 2005; Le Renard 
2008, 2014).  For example, women in Saudi today have their own waiting rooms in hospitals 
mainly so that they can feel comfortable without having to think about men watching them. 
Because of veiling (which is mainly obscuring oneself from the gaze of men), gender-segregated 
waiting rooms made sense so that women could feel at ease while they wait. Just like veiling, 
severe gender segregation was a result of the Sahwah movement that was concerned with re-
awakening Islam in Saudi Arabia, and it remains implemented until today. While there was a 
sense of segregation between men and women prior to the Sahwah movement, it was much 
milder and society was progressing towards a natural merge between the two sexes that was 
suddenly halted by the rise of the movement that sensationalised the issue of segregation along 
with many other issues that relate to women. In crown prince’s Mohammad Bin Salman own 
words about Saudi Arabia during a global conference in Riyadh in October 2017: “Saudi Arabia 
was not like this before 1979. We want to go back to what we were, the moderate Islam that's 
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open to all religions. We want to live a normal life” (The National, 2017). The conservatism that 
was popularised at that time often targeted women as culture bearers, and consequently women 
were directed to dress more conservatively, their access to public spaces was reduced and 
women-only spaces started to develop in the public domain (DeLong-Bas, 2009, p.19). Even the 
ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia (which was lifted in September 2017) was a manifestation 
of the cultural drive to limit the mobility of women in public and assume their confinement 
primarily within the private domain. In the 1990s, Almunajjed found that wearing a Niqab 
(covering the face) was synonymous with being a decent, demurring, respectable ‘Saudi’ woman, 
mainly because it indicated that the woman wearing it did not mingle with men.  
 
As a general law in Saudi Arabia, gender segregation touches on nearly every aspect of Saudi 
social and public life, from the 1980s until today. Deeply rooted in strongly held traditional 
values that do not allow the merging of unrelated men and women, segregation in every sphere of 
life - education, working, healthcare, and socialising - was until very recently unquestioned. Even 
though social norms around gender segregation are slowly loosening (for example more ‘public 
spaces’ have been opened to women for the first time, such as at football stadiums (Lovett, 2018), 
there is still a strong sense in Saudi Arabia of what is public and what is private. Although written 
60 years ago, Lipsky’s words hold very true today: “Women belonged in the private world” 
(Lipsky, 1959, p.298). This stems, as Almunajjed (1997) argues, from the high value that the 
Saudi society assigns to family honour within a wider shame-honour culture. In Middle Eastern 
shame-honour cultures, the honour of a man is tied to the sexual conduct of the women in his 
family, whether he is a father, a brother or a husband (Abu-Lughod 1986; Abu-Lughod 1993; 
Meeker, 1979). Consequently, gender segregation laws were developed as an institutional 
mechanism designed to regulate women in order to protect the honour of the family. Of course, 
these social norms and practices are derived from certain interpretations of religious Islamic 
texts, but it is beyond the scope of this research to review them and debate their inaccuracy.  
 
2.5.3 Work 
During the time of Almunajjed’s study, some professions were considered inappropriate for 
women, especially if they required mixing the two genders. A Saudi woman’s 
naturalised/expected role at that time was the domesticity of mother and homemaker. Even 
though education was granted to women at the time of Almunajjed’s study, it was hard for 
women to pursue a career after graduation for two main reasons. Firstly, only a limited number of 
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professions were considered suitable/appropriate for women. These were usually jobs that did not 
require the woman to communicate with men, such as education since the educational system was 
(and still is) highly segregated. Secondly, it was hard for women to pursue a career because 
demanding careers would mean deviation from caring for her house, husband and children. The 
prioritisation of her role as a career woman rather than the naturalised/expected role of a 
mother/housewife was heavily frowned upon. However, mainly, integration with men was the 
main obstacle to women's employment opportunities at that time. Women who were not 
employed but were seeking employment reported that the reason for their inability to pursue a 
career was the male guardian's disapproval of her working, or that her desired profession was 
presumed to be eyb (shameful) for a woman to do. Almunajjed reported that most families had 
‘traditional opinions’ around professions, such as nursing or being a doctor, and regarded them as 
a “servile occupation not suitable for a girl of good reputation” (Almunajjed, 1997, p.90) because 
it forces her to mix with men and work late hours/night shifts. The majority of women who 
participated in Almunajjed’s study expressed strong objections to mixing with men or being 
exposed to an environment that includes males. Some 60% of women who were interviewed 
refused to work in a non-segregated environment. They referred to customs and traditions when 
asked why, and asserted that mixing with men is regarded a violation of the customs established 
by society, displays a contempt for proper ethical conduct, and might open the door for illicit 
sexual behaviour. Gradual changes in women’s employment were observed in the 1990s 
compared to the era of the 1970s, yet change is slow and haphazard, and the classical gender role 
for women in Saudi remained primarily the role of a wife and a mother.  
Today, the above-mentioned notions around veiling, gender segregation and the accepted 
proper conduct from a Saudi woman form the identity that conservative nationalists deem proper, 
ideal or representative of the ‘true’ Saudi woman. This term – the ‘true’ Saudi woman - is an 
interesting term that emerges from the netnographic data collected in this research. Conservative 
nationalists reference it upon monitoring and regulatory gazing at Saudi women on social media 
to demote some women to a subcategory of ‘Saudiness’. In an effort to denounce the 
unconventional images and behaviours of some Saudi women online, conservative nationalists 
insinuate that these women should not be considered ‘truly’ Saudi. Yet, Saudi women’s activities 
on social media are continuously renegotiating and reimagining what it means to be a Saudi 
woman today and this is producing contemporary images that challenge the 
stereotypical/customary notions around femininity that were explained above. The next section 
will review recent literature on Saudi women’s engagement online and the persistence of the 
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notion that a Saudi woman carries her family’s name and represents its honour, and that, by 
extension, she represents the nation’s honour, a subject which drives conservative nationalists to 
police young Saudi women’s behaviour on social media.  
 
2.6 Recent literature on Saudi women’s engagement online and the representation of the 
family name 
This chapter has already referred to Kobena Mercer’s (1994) argument around women being 
often adjured to carry the ‘burden of representation’ as historical ‘symbolic bearers’ of the 
collective's identity and honour. Recent literature indicates that this ‘burden of representation’ is 
still imposed on Saudi women today upon engaging with social media, and that they are still 
thought of by some traditional/conservative Saudis as representatives of their families’ honour 
who carry their families’ name. In 2011 a study on Saudi women using Facebook, Yeslam Al-
Saggaf linked women’s behaviour to their family’s reputation, further perpetuating them as the 
carriers of the collectivity’s name and honour. Discussing Saudi women’s awareness of privacy 
settings on Facebook and their reluctance to share personal photos of themselves on the platform, 
Al-Saggaf notes that the consequences of these photos falling into the wrong hands would be 
“damaging” to the families’ reputations” (Al-Saggaf, 2011, p.11). The implication of this 
statement is that social structures, particularly the thought of women as representations of the 
collectivity, is restricting Saudi women’s agency, which in return is influencing their actions, 
values and behaviour and adapting it to what the collectivity deems acceptable/appropriate. 
  Even studies as recent as one conducted in 2014 by Afnan Hayat have found that 
women’s online behaviour is linked to their family’s image within the community. Women who 
were interviewed in this study reported that their “presentation was not limited to themselves 
only; they affected their families as well” (Hayat, p.17), and were very concerned about their 
unveiled photos going viral due to the potential harm to their family’s reputation. The participants 
were also mindful of other people’s judgment, which they were quick to pass on. The study 
concludes that culture dictates the way Saudi women present themselves online, and that it allows 
judgment to be passed on women according to their online presentation and behaviour.  
In 2015, Hala Guta and Magdalena Karolak published a study on the use of social media 
as sites of identity negotiation and expression amongst Saudi women. Through in-depth 
interviews with seven Saudi bloggers, the study found that Internet usage among Saudi women is 
influenced by established social rules, particularly by the belief that a woman represents not only 
herself, but her whole family as well as her extended family. Guta and Karolak explain that a 
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Saudi woman carries the family’s reputation on her shoulders, and that her individual actions 
reflect upon the whole family. If these actions are deemed inappropriate by the larger society, 
they bring shame and dishonour to all family members and especially to the men of the family. 
As a way to overcome this, Guta and Karolak found that the Saudi women they interviewed 
resorted to concealing their names and, in doing so, were able to disassociate themselves from the 
collectivity of the family and thus reclaim their agency. Guta and Karolak also found that Saudi 
women negotiated cultural norms online in terms of relations with the opposite sex. Even though 
the study does not particularly investigate online romantic relationships between Saudi men and 
women, it does recognise a newly discovered possibility for women to network with unknown 
men and women alike. The ability for women to communicate freely with unknown men 
regardless of the context of their relationship is in itself a negotiation of cultural norms in the 
heavily gender-segregated community of Saudi Arabia.  
In addition, Guta and Karolak found that the idea of women representing the whole family 
and not just themselves has led them to practice self-censorship. Sharing and distributing 
personal photos of women or engaging socially/romantically with men is particularly regulated in 
Saudi society and thus the study found that women self-censor the photos that they share as well 
as their practices online to make sure that they abide by cultural norms in terms of veiling and not 
mingling with unknown men. However, the study overlooks the heavy use of uncensored 
photographs by female Saudi micro-celebrities, particularly fashionistas, as well as regular Saudi 
women on platforms such Instagram and Snapchat. The acknowledgment of Saudi women’s 
recently increasing practice of sharing personal photographs of themselves online would have 
undermined the study’s central thesis of the Internet as a space of disembodied identities or 
anonymous engagement. The limitations in the study’s findings could be due to the low number 
of participants, which makes it hard to generalise its findings.  
 While I agree with Guta and Karolak’s finding that Saudi women use social media to 
renegotiate their identity, their study does not address the ‘regulatory gaze’ that women are 
subjected to online from the wider Saudi society. They fail to address the conservative 
nationalistic judgment that exists online and pushes back in the face of Saudi women’s efforts to 
negotiate their gender identity, and instead focus only on family restrictions.  This study will 
advance the research undertaken by Guta and Karolak to deliver an understanding of Saudi 
women’s engagement with social media, and to uncover the complexities of negotiating gender 
identity and the challenges faced by Saudi women upon exhibiting contemporary and non-
traditional types of femininity while still identifying as Saudi women. Guta and Karolak, in 
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addition to the two studies noted previously (Al-Saggaf, 2011; Hayat, 2014), only focus on 
women representing the family.  However, my study observes that Saudi women are also 
burdened with representing a much larger collectivity - the nation. Just as Saudi women are 
expected to carry the family’s name, conservative nationalists expect them to carry the nationality 
itself and represent it in a way they deem appropriate (see analysis in Chapter 8).  This brings us 
to the detraditionalisation of the Saudi community on networked publics. The next section 
reviews the process of individualisation that is prominent on social media networks as it is central 
to explain the detraditionalisation of modern communities such as the communities formed online 
on networked publics. 
 
2.7 Individualisation 
The collectivism of Saudi society means that women’s individualism is undermined by their 
ascribed role to represent the collectivity through the way they dress and behave, irrespective of 
whether this collectivity is the family or the wider nation. Corresponding with the work of Yuval-
Davis (1992), this has meant that Saudi women are exploited as ‘symbolic border guards’ of the 
culture and representatives of the family and nation. The perseverance of culture and the religious 
Saudi identity was dependant on preserving traditions and the social norms of veiling and 
segregation and traditional gender roles. In order to understand how tradition is being challenged 
on social media, this thesis identifies social network sites as networked publics that form part of 
modern communities which promote processes of individualisation. A number of prominent 
scholars (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2000; Beck, 2002) have made a link between modernity (with 
its endorsement of individualism) and the detraditionalisation of communities. Therefore, 
reviewing the concept of individualism is important for assessing how social media networks 
could facilitate a negotiation of the traditional ideals of Saudi femininity that are defined by 
conservativeness, and promote modern ideals that constitutes an aspirational femininity which 
searches for agency within the site of popular culture and heterosexual romance.  (detailed in 
Chapter 3).  
 Prominent social theorists (such as Mauss, Marx, Simmel, Tonnies, Weber, and, more 
recently, Giddens, Beck, and Baumann) may disagree about when to demarcate modernity from 
pre-modernity and the exact nature and magnitude of the changes associated with this epochal 
transformation, but there is a general agreement that the modern era is massively distinct from 
traditional societies in how societies in which people traditionally lived in systems of acute, close 
social relations within collectivities based on some form of kinship have been transformed by the 
		27	
forces of industrialisation, urbanisation, capitalism, and the integration of modern technological 
innovations into our daily lives. Over the last two centuries an array of forces integral to these 
developments have led to a weakening in the fabric of these social communities, providing a 
context for personal autonomy and individualism to rise and become centre-stage in our 
perceptions of the world around us. This process of individualisation posed a challenge to custom 
and tradition as people start to venture outside the collectivity and adopt more individualistic sets 
of values and ideas. People began to attempt to learn and discover what their own interests and 
values were on a personal basis, without a presumed following of the general interests and values 
of the collectivity (Giddens, 1991). Indeed, what individualism means is to think independently 
from the collectivity and develop your own ideas upon critical self-examination and exploration, 
instead of following the ideas, prescriptions and conventions handed to you by your community. 
It is important to note though that while the terms ‘modernity’ and ‘late modernity’ in Anglo-
Western literature refer to the post-WWII period (for example, the UK now is referred to as a 
‘late modern’ society), the term modernity is used here in the context of Saudi Arabia in a 
slightly different manner. In this research, and within the context of Saudi Arabia, the terms 
modern/modernity refer to the period following the introduction of the Internet and the waning 
influence of the Sahwa that began from the early 2000s and continues apace today. Still, I 
observe that processes of individualisation, and correspondingly detradtionalisation, exist in 
Saudi modernity as they do in late modern communities within the context of Anglo-Western 
literature.   
The implication of processes of individualisation in shame-honour communities such as 
Saudi is two-fold. Firstly, the association between women’s conduct and the family/nation name 
weakens as the focus is on the individual rather than on the collective. The rise of individualism 
entails that every person is representing herself, which means that Saudi women would stop 
thinking (and being thought of) as representatives of the collectivity’s honour, whether that be the 
family or the nation. The notion that women’s actions reflect on the family’s/nation’s honour and 
reputation results in the policing of women’s actions because once this notion is contested, Saudi 
women enjoy more liberty to choose how to appear, behave and who to connect with. This leads 
to the second implication of the individualisation process, namely, that the processes of 
individualisation are expressed through a rise in people’s desire for autonomy and through 
growing confidence and agency. Therefore, if women are no longer satisfied with conforming to 
the customary model of femininity that has been established through tradition, they are inclined 
to discover and adopt new and alternate gender roles/identities.  
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The term ‘reflexive modernisation’ is used by Giddens (1991) to describe a set of 
processes associated with late modernity. Giddens focuses on the contrast between traditional 
(pre-modern) culture and post-traditional (modern) culture. In traditional communities, individual 
actions do not need to be thoroughly contemplated and calculated since the offered choices are 
formally made, determined and resolved in the form of traditions and customs. However, in post-
traditional communities and in contrast to traditional ones, individuals are much less concerned 
with the paradigms developed by and handed down from earlier generations. Individuals in post-
traditional communities are offered more choices thanks to an abundance of (often cross-border) 
information available about the plethora of lifestyle and workplace opportunities on offer in the 
modern world, and thus they become disembedded from the fixity of a narrowly local life.  
Nonetheless, this encouragement to conceive of the world in a different way entails that more 
analysis and examination is required prior to taking an individual action, which means that 
society is more reflexive and aware.  According to Giddens, in late modern societies self-
identities are constructed as part of a constantly revised reflexive project that offers a wide 
multitude of options and choices through an abstract system which is detached from both time 
and space (Giddens 1991, p.5).  The more tradition loses its grip, the more individuals tend to 
negotiate their lifestyle choices from a variety of options that are being offered to them not only 
due to the ‘pluralism’ (Berger, 2014) that characterises modern societies, but also through the 
globalised media that packages these lifestyle choices in appealing and glamorous ways. The way 
this relates to this study is that in a modern environment such as what can be observed on social 
media platforms, the image of the Saudi woman could be ‘adopted’ instead of ‘handed down’. 
This might explain why the classical/traditional ideal of Saudi femininity reviewed above is being 
contested and challenged in social media networks. Saudi women are reflexively approaching 
self-identity through their lifestyle choices that are being portrayed on these networks, adopting 
new choices and a modern femininity that redefines what the Saudi woman looks like and how 
she behaves today (see Chapter 3). 
Giddens notes that “A lifestyle can be defined as a more or less integrated set of practices 
which an individual embrace, not only because such practices fulfil utilitarian needs, but because 
they give material form to a particular narrative of self-identity” (Giddens, 1991, p.81).  For 
example, the rhetoric of self-branding employed by fashionistas and micro-celibrities (discussed 
in detail in Chapter 3) depicts the post-feminist ideal of ‘having it all’ (Duffy and Hund, 2015) 
through sharing images that show a glamorous lifestyle of autonomy and entrepreneurship that is 
part of a carefully constructed self-brand/identity. Giddens notes how the term ‘life style’ does 
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not have much applicability in traditional communities, as it implies choice, and ‘adoption’ rather 
than a ‘hand-down’. The lifestyle choices made by an individual comprise the very core of her 
self-identity in this post-traditional setting. In traditional settings, identity is externally shaped by 
the authority of customs, family and religion; by contrast, in late modern societies, individuals 
self-reflexively embark on a project of self-development and construction. Giddens argue that 
modern identity is thus a reflexively organised endeavour.  
 Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2002) builds on Giddens argument of 
individualisation and focus specifically on women as they argue that women in late modern 
societies are gaining independence and a sense of autonomy, interpreted by these social theorists 
as no longer living for others as wives, mothers and caregivers. The authors argue that the 
changes in women’s lives are not necessarily revolutionary, grand or systematic, but rather 
exemplified in small steps in the fields of education, work and family. It is a process that is not 
linear, but rather complex and in some cases irregular and even contradictory. The small choice 
of a Saudi woman to be unveiled in her profile picture is a form of individualism in which she 
moves away from thinking of herself as the daughter, the wife or the sister of the male figure in 
her life. Sets of experiences of this nature and modes of identity are manifestations of the agency 
and autonomy that comes with processes of individualisation in which a woman is moving away 
from the notion that unveiling might bring men in her life shame, towards thinking of herself as a 
detached entity from the family and a responsible individual.   
Saudi women are aware, however, that this show of autonomy entails a degree of social 
and personal level risk that goes hand in hand with choice. The ‘own life culture’ or the ‘self-
culture’, as the authors refer to it, is a characteristic of individualisation that positions us in a ‘risk 
society’ (Beck, 1992). In this risk society, women are offered new possibilities, but 
simultaneously they are faced with new incertitude, conflict and pressures. Indeed, Saudi women 
in my research are being targeted regulated and their national affiliation is being questioned as a 
result of their increased agency on social media networks. They are, as the authors describe, in an 
‘intermediate stage’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p.56), and their individualisation is still 
being negotiated. Even with acts of emancipation that are seen on social media platforms in terms 
of lifestyle choices, issues such as male guardianship, segregation, the complexity of pre-marital 
romantic relationships and veiling are still potentially explosive questions.  This 'no-longer-and-
not-yet' situation is causing much ambivalence and many contradictions and inconsistencies in 
the life of the modern Saudi woman (this will be explored in detail in the analysis chapters).    
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2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter detailed the traditional customary ideals of Saudi femininity in relation to veiling, 
working and gender segregation. It examined the positioning of Saudi women as symbolic border 
guards of the nation and its culture. It also reviewed the shame-honour culture of Saudi Arabia 
and the role of women in it as representatives of the family’s honour and reputation. The review 
of these notions highlights the singular way of being a Saudi woman at that time, which will 
frame the analysis of the challenges facing Saudi women on social media networks upon 
depicting a modern image of the Saudi femininity that is unconventional or non-traditional. The 
review of the traditional way of being a Saudi woman will also highlight the complexity of Saudi 
women’s contemporary identities and the different ways in which Saudi women claim their 
identities in online and (offline) spaces. It will also underpin my development of the notion of the 
‘regulatory gaze’ upon examination of the backlash women are subjected to upon depicting such 
images and identities. Women’s positioning as symbolic border guards of the collectivity (the 
nation) compels their adherence to traditional gender roles and identities that are perceived to be 
functional in distinguishing ‘us’ from ‘others’. Therefore, a ‘regulatory gaze’ emerges from 
conservative nationalists on social media networks. 
 The chapter also sketched Saudi woman’s traditional gendered identity/femininity through 
a review of AlMunajjed 1997 study. It found a conservative gendered identity/femininity defined 
by veiling and virtual confinement to occupancy of the private sphere away from the male gaze 
which is a necessary outcome of strict enforcement of gender segregation. Finally, the work of 
key authors on the process of individualisation and its role in de-traditionalizing communities 
was reviewed. What we take away from this is that the images and realities of Saudi women 
which was at a time dictated by traditions and submerged in notions of piety and modesty while 
being closely tied to the imagined nation, is probably impacted by the increased trend of 
individualisation on digital networks that is part of a greater shift towards individualisation in 
modern cultures and society. This shall be fully explored in the analysis chapters.  
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Chapter Three. Networked Publics and Online Identity 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Social media networks are arenas in which it is possible for people to communicate and engage 
with one another. For social media connections to take place, individuals need to construct an 
online identity of themselves and therefore self-represent. The objective of this chapter is to 
review literature on online identity and self-representation online as well as frame the context in 
which these representations take place, the networked public (boyd, 2010). The networked public 
is a term that is used to “describe the way in which social media audience can be thought of as 
members of a public, bound together by their use of a common platform” such as Instagram or 
Twitter (Dobson, 2015, p.10). The review of online identities will pin down my discussion in the 
analysis of how a new type of femininity/gender identity is developing online amongst young 
Saudi women that is contesting some of the norms and values of the Saudi community that were 
reviewed in the previous chapter. An understanding of networked publics will ground my 
argument around social media platforms being counterpublics to the Saudi public sphere that 
marginalises women. This will answer my research question about how the rise in social network 
use is contesting the values and norms of the Saudi community and how it is changing women’s 
attitudes towards these customs/norms. The chapter will start with a discussion on what 
constitutes a public, before drawing on the work of danah boyd to frame networked publics and 
their features and affordances. Next, key identity theories will be presented before moving on to 
discuss specifically online identity and the role images and photographs that users share online 
play in online identity construction and self-representation. Finally, the notion of micro-
celebrities on social media platforms will be explored and how self-representation and identity 
construction online could turn into a business and a commodity, giving rise to paradigms such as 
the Fashionista and social media influencers.  
 
3.2 The Networked Public  
Social network sites have gained an immense amount of popularity and attracted an enormous 
amount of people who use them as online ‘hangout spaces’, turning them into a modern-day 
agora (Turkle 1995, p.249) in which people gather, converse, exchange ideas and form 
relationships. However, this trend has particular resonance in a country where gender segregation 
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between men and women is the norm, and women in particular are mainly positioned within the 
private sphere away from the male gaze. Acknowledging social media networks as publics is 
central to understanding the impact social networks have on the modern identity of Saudi women 
(see chapters 6 and 7), their public national image (see Chapter 8), and their sociality (see 
Chapter 9). The aim of this section is to assess social network sites as networked publics, as well 
as to review their features and their affordances. This is because the design and the affordances of 
social networks is influencing users’ sociality, as will be demonstrated later.  
 
3.2.1 What is a Public 
In order to understand how social networks have detached Saudi women from the private sphere 
and given them access to public areas of the community, we need firstly to examine the 
conceptual separation between the terms ‘public’ and ‘private’. The distinction between these two 
terms is multi-layered and complex but can be summed up in three different ways:  
society/collective vs. individual/personal, visibility vs. concealment, and openness/acceptability 
vs. closure (Rabotnikof 1998: p. 3; Rabotnikof 1997). Fixing women in the private sphere would 
necessitate restricting their accessibility to open areas in the community and therefore their 
exclusion from collective debate, as well as limiting their visibility and keeping them concealed 
within the private sphere.  
Scholars who are more interested in the civic action and participation within collectivities 
often focus more on the accessibility of publics and the circulation of information to the society, 
as evident in Habermas’s definition of the public sphere (1991) as well as Frasier’s framing of 
‘counterpublics’ (1992) in response. Habermas public sphere theory describes the public sphere 
as a figurative body or practice in which public opinion on matters of public interest is shaped, 
mediated with private interests, and expressed by responsible members of the citizenry. It is an 
area of social life where elite individuals freely converse and identify their community’s 
problems and reach a common judgment which is later distributed in conclusion to the masses, 
and it is these discussions within the public sphere that influence governments to take political 
action. Importantly, he argues that the mass media has control over the public sphere, thereby 
challenging the legitimacy of any other cultural, non-political publics that are engrossed “with 
consumption of culture” (Habermas, 1991, p. 177).  
Habermas’s theory of the bourgeoisie public sphere has been thoroughly discussed in 
academic literature, and even revised by Habermas himself (Callhoun, 1992; Crossley & Roberts, 
2004; Forester, 1985; Goode, 2005; Kelly, 2005; Kogler, 2005).  Rather that seeing it as a 
		33	
weakness, the numerous ways in which this theory has been criticised is an indication of how 
useful it is for understanding the structural transformation of the public sphere. However, the 
shortcomings of this theory do need to be addressed and the theory needs to be revised in order to 
understand the increasing complexity of the public sphere in modern societies, specifically in 
societies that are undergoing immense structural transformation from traditional to modern, as is 
the case in Saudi Arabia. Firstly, Habermas’s analysis of the public sphere is criticised by 
scholars such as, among others, Garnham (1992), Calhoun (1992), and Fraser (1992) for its 
somewhat exclusive centring on the bourgeois public life. This reduction of the complex nature 
of the modern public sphere to a single bourgeois public sphere means that we overlook the 
significance of an alternate ‘plebeian’ public sphere that is developing alongside and in 
opposition to the bourgeois one (Garnham, 1992: 359). These collective spaces that are formed 
and occupied by social classes and groups outside the dominant class of the bourgeoisies are 
playing a pivotal role in constructing modern public life and therefore cannot be neglected or 
excluded from analysis. 
Another area of criticism of Habermas’s theory is his idealistic picture of the bourgeois 
public sphere even though it is imbued with power relations, something which Habermas himself 
later acknowledged (Habermas, 1992). The discourses generated in the bourgeois public sphere 
are that of educated, wealthy, mostly white and predominantly male elites, and are therefore a 
reflection of the specific interests of this privileged social group (Thompson, 1995). This 
particular critique can be linked to the objections raised by feminist critics on the patriarchal 
character of the public sphere. Even though Habermas’s original account of the public sphere is 
gender-blind, feminist critics pointed out how gender inequality is a central element of modern 
public spheres, and how the public sphere cannot elude the pervasiveness of materially and 
discursively constructed forms of patriarchy (Brettchneider, 2007; Cameron, 1998, Moor, 2003; 
Rendall, 1999).  The institutional criteria mentioned in Habermas’s original view of the bourgeois 
public sphere were subjected to criticism by Fraser (1990), who states that while claiming 
‘inclusivity’, the bourgeois public sphere has failed to include women and the lower classes of 
society. Fraser references scholars Landes, Ryan and Eley, pointing out that the clubs and 
associations in which people gather to form the ideas later produced in the public sphere are not 
accessible to everyone. She asserts that these clubs are limited to bourgeois men who view 
themselves as a universal class and emphasise their eligibility to govern. This, in her opinion, has 
resulted in a male bourgeois public sphere dominating at the expense of other publics, thereby 
excluding lower classes, other ethnicities and, most importantly, women. In the same vein, Fraser 
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draws on these criticisms of Habermas’s problematic assumption of a single public sphere – a 
bourgeois public sphere - and argues for the existence of what she terms ‘counterpublics’. Fraser 
defines counterpublics as “Parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social 
groups invent and circulate counter-discourses, which in turn permit them to formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (1997, p.81). The 
empowering potential of counterpublics resides in their ability to challenge the legitimacy of 
dominant discourses and the practices they engender by creating counter-hegemonic realms based 
on alternative discourses. While these feminist critics are concerned mainly with the political 
public sphere, this study is concerned with what Habermas terms the ‘literary public sphere’, 
expanded and redefined by McGuigan (2005) as the ‘cultural public sphere’.  The cultural public 
sphere is not entirely disconnected from the political public sphere. In fact, the existence of a 
cultural public sphere is a prerequisite for the emergence of a political public sphere. In the 
cultural public sphere, the media plays a significant role. Firstly, the media represents the 
platform for debate. Secondly, it is the main source of information. Thirdly, it constitutes a space 
that aggregates public opinion. Finally, media is where the output of the debates is promoted. 
That said, this study focuses on new media’s (i.e. social media) potential role within the cultural 
public sphere of Saudi Arabia and how it can form a ‘counterpublic’ where Saudi women can 
produce, negotiate and reconstruct cultural discourse around gender roles and national public 
image.   
 
3.2.2 Publics in the Age of Social media 
Many scholars argue that there is not just one single public but rather several publics existing 
simultaneously to which some individuals are included while others are excluded (boyd, 2014; 
Ito,2008; Warner, 2002). Today, with the heavy dissemination of communicative technologies, 
publics have started to emerge in the various social media networks people engage with. 
Livingstone (2005, p. 9) understands publics with a focus on who they consist of, defining them 
as groups of people who share “a common understanding of the world, a shared identity, a claim 
to inclusiveness, a consensus regarding the collective interest”. According to this definition, the 
immediate social circle of friends, family and peers could be understood as a public, as well as 
broader collectivities such as the members of the nation or the country. In her approach, 
Livingstone addresses how the media helps shape the collective by providing a common context, 
thereby synonymising the notion of the ‘public’ with that of the ‘audience’. The audience formed 
by media is by its very nature a public, but it is not necessarily passive. For instance, Jenkins 
		35	
(2006) maintains that producing and consuming media are two processes that are highly 
interconnected with and affected by each other.  Ito (2008) pushes this idea further to contend 
that “publics can be reactors, (re)makers and (re)distributors, engaging in shared culture and 
knowledge through discourse and social exchange as well as through acts of media reception” 
(Ito, 2008, p. 3).  
This understanding of public stands in direct contrast to the political theorists’ position, 
such as that of Habermas, which disputes the validity of any depoliticised public “preoccupied 
with consumption of culture” (Habermas, 1991, p. 177). However, some political theorists, such 
as Fraser (1992), assert the cultural significance of publics when she argues that they are not only 
spaces of discourse and opinion, but also “arenas for the formation and enactment of social 
identities” (Fraser, 1992). Likewise, Calhoun (1992) points out a weakness in Habermas’s 
simplistic assumption that “identities and interests [are] settled within the private world and then 
brought fully formed into the public sphere” (Calhoun, 1992, p. 35).  
Against this backdrop, networked publics came to exist on social media networks. Ito 
defines a networked public as “a linked set of social, cultural, and technological developments 
that have accompanied the growing engagement with digitally networked media” (Ito, 2008, p.2). 
boyd’s definition of networked publics as publics that are restructured by networked technologies 
extends Ito’s definition to include “the resultant spaces and collectives that emerge because of 
these developments” (boyd, 2010, p.16). They are both the space formed by networked 
technology and the imagined collective that develops as a consequence of the intersection of 
people, technology and practice. Networked publics function in a similar way to most other 
publics in allowing users to gather and connect for social, cultural and even civic objectives as 
well as helping the users to reach out beyond their immediate circle of friends and relatives. For 
these reasons, Senft acknowledges social networks as cultural counterpublics in relation to 
women in the same way that Fraser argues that counterpublics emerge in response to the 
exclusivity of the public sphere, whether cultural or political.  Senft’s argument is documented in 
her 2008 book Camgirls: Celebrity and Community in the Age of Social Networks (2008), which 
I shall return to in this chapter. This argument is particularly useful in the context of this research 
as it helps to understand how social media platforms (as networked publics) can function as 
cultural counterpublics where Saudi women debate and negotiate their national public image and 
gender role by producing cultural content that features an aspirational femininity which challenge 
traditional and classical images and discourses of the Saudi woman - how she looks, what she 
does, and where she resides. 
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However, the technology that structures these networked publics introduces a particular set of 
affordances that shape the way people engage socially within these settings. These affordances do 
not dictate social behaviour but the practices that unfold on these networks are informed by the 
affordances, producing new dynamics that shape participation and social engagement. In sum, the 
architecture of networked publics, as boyd argues, distinguishes them from the classical notion of 
publics. Therefore, these affordances are important to review in order to fully grasp and structure 
a valuable framework for understanding social practices on social media networks. Please refer to 
the appendix for a detailed account of four main affordances that are common between most 
social media sites and which play a significant role in configuring networked publics and in the 
development of an online self-identity: persistence, replicability, scalability and searchability. As 
well as the main building blocks of these networked publics; profiles, friends or contact lists, 
public communicating tools, and update feed (boyd and Ellison, 2007) in order to understand 
how features of networked publics are being used to construct an online identity that represent 
people on social networks. It is also important to consider these features as I will later draw on 
them to explain issues that arise from socialising on social media networks such as privacy, the 
imagined audience and context collapse.  
 
3.3 Online identities 
In relation to online identity, the majority of studies centre on self-presentation (Wynn and Katz 
1997; Papacharissi 2002; Baym 2010; boyd 2010). In order to take part in a networked public, 
one must contemplate and create a networked self. This is done through creating social media 
profiles on different platforms. Given the relatively few identity questions online when compared 
to offline social interaction, Marwick (2015) suggests that every piece of digital information a 
person provides, from her choice of nickname or handle to her shared photos, can be and is used 
by audiences to form a conclusion about her and who she is. In addition, Lincoln & Robards 
(2016) argue that young people are actively and continuously marking out their identities on 
social media platform as personal spaces in which they exercise control (probably for the first 
time in their lives), in the same way that bedrooms are central spaces for identity expression for 
teenagers. In this section, I will address the main theories of identity and explain how they relate 
to online identity and self-representation on social media networks, before specifically reviewing 
Dobson’s (2016) distinct post-feminist identity that is emerging on these networks. 
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3.3.1 Identity Theories  
Even though we might think of identity as a singular, fixed and static notion that does not change 
throughout our lives, it is hardly the case. Most people experience identity as flexible and 
mutable. Goffman (1959) studied the act of self-presentation closely, describing it as impression 
management: controlling or guiding the impression that other people make of us through 
adjusting our setting, appearance or manner. His work has underpinned key debates about the 
construction of online self-presentation and the acknowledgment of social media practices as 
‘identity performance’ (boyd and Ellison, 2007; Buckingham, 2008; Cover, 2012; Liu, 2007; 
Westlake, 2008). Goffman takes into account the (audience) as well as the (context) on which this 
presentation takes place, arguing that, just like an actor on stage, a social actor adjusts his/her 
performance according to where they are and who is watching them. He concludes that we 
present ourselves in ways that differ according to these two factors. Our behaviour at a party, for 
example, would differ from our behaviour at work in a professional setting. Indeed, research on 
‘symbolic interaction’ indicates that we present ourselves in different ways to different 
individuals according to their status and the social context (Mead and Morris, 1934; Blumer, 
1986).  
 Similarly, boyd (2014) notes how choices of self-representation by the same user might 
not be uniform across all online activities and social media profiles. As participants in social 
media platforms usually use a plethora of services and not just one platform (Miller and 
Madianou, 2012), their identity work might vary from one platform to another (Turkle, 1995, 
p.180; boyd, 2012. p.38). A user might wish to present herself using her first and last name on a 
certain profile while choosing to present herself with a nickname on another, and while she might 
choose to share her personal photo as a profile picture on Instagram, she might choose a photo of 
her favourite actress to be her Facebook profile picture (boyd, 2012. p.38). Sometimes these 
profiles are linked to each other in order to create an overall, somewhat homogeneous, networked 
identity that spreads across all platforms. In other cases, these profiles are separate, each 
communicating a different aspect of a person’s identity or connecting with a different imaginary 
audience in mind. The latter, multiple identities, creates the basis of what I identify in Chapter 6 
as the practice of ‘identity separation’ that some Saudi women resort to in order to handle 
surveillance, privacy issues, and to avoid shaming while negotiating an unconventional feminine 
identity. Identity is pliable and adapted according to social context, and people are highly skilled 
in shifting their self-presentation to suit their needs, a fact which renders identity a social 
construct. The variation in identity performance according to the context is perhaps explained by 
		38	
the notion of ‘pluralism’ by scholars such as Hall (1987) and McRobbie (1994). This multiplicity 
of identity performance should not be interpreted as dishonesty, but rather as an inherent property 
of identity (Baym, 2010). However, it raises issues about false identities and levels of 
‘authenticity’ in self-representation. 
 The ability to recognise and to outline social context, or the ‘frame’, as Goffman calls it 
(1956), is important when analysing self-presentation and social behaviour, as the context is a 
central issue in identity construction online. Framing or context helps to establish rules and 
expectations to guide behaviour. boyd (2012) observes that users make choices to represent 
themselves in different ways on each platform according to the audience that the users have in 
mind for that specific platform and in accordance to the context as well as the norms of that 
platform. The context of a particular platform is not determined mainly by its technical features, 
but is rather socially constructed through the interplay between users and the platform itself. boyd 
notes that people go on a certain platform to “connect to people they know, observe how observe 
how those people are using the site, and then reinforce or challenge those norms through their 
own practices” (boyd, 2014, p.39). This results in the creation of the norms of that particular 
platform, which define the context and therefore provoke a certain image or representation choice 
and certain patterns of behaviour by its users. This is not to say that collapsing contexts does not 
occur sometimes; it most certainly does, and it be closely reviewed in Chapter 4. 
 The focus on categories such as gender, ethnicity or nationality is very common is 
expressions of identity. A key theory concerning identity as a social construct was presented by 
Butler’s (1990) focuses on gender and sexuality, in which she asserts that these concepts are 
constructed completely through discourse and social processes. Rather than thinking of gender as 
an inherent feature that comes naturally to a person, Butler argues that gender is ‘performative’ 
on account of the fact that it is composed through millions of individual actions. We see other 
people do it and thus we end up performing it by imitating them. What can be drawn from this is 
that race and gender is something that operates in societies ideologically in order to maintain 
certain balances of power or to further them, in this instance they are structural sexism or racism 
(Omi and Winant, 1993).  Chapter 8, which addresses the issue of gender roles and representation 
in relation to nationalist affiliation, draws on Butler’s ‘performative’ theory to explain women’s 
attempts to renegotiate Saudi female gender identity and reimagine it through social media 
engagement. 
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 3.3.2 Postfeminist identities on social networks  
As this is mainly a study of Saudi women and their performance of a contemporary 
feminine identity on social media, it is central to review the relevant literature on feminism, or 
rather ‘post-feminism’, and the performance of it in digital contexts. Especially considering that 
postfeminism is regarded as a critical way of understanding the changed relations between 
feminism, pop culture, and femininity, which is analogous to what this research is trying to 
achieve in relation to Saudi women. Reviewing postfeminism will help to analyse the way in 
which Saudi women are negotiating and reconstructing the image/identity of the Saudi woman 
through their social media practices, which is a key question in this research.  
Even though the structure of the term postfeminism invokes a sense of progression 
emphasising a time ‘after’ feminism, the context and meaning of the prefix ‘post’ in the term are 
disputable amongst scholars. When young western feminist scholars speak about post-feminism, 
‘post’ is meant to describe a complete rupture, a period ‘after’ or anti second wave feminism 
(Hawkesworth, 2004; Gillis & Munford, 2003). They refer to what has also been termed a ‘third 
wave’ of feminism that neglects the second wave’s emphasis on equality in favour of a focus on 
women’s sexuality, sexual expression and extreme femininity. In opposition to this viewpoint on 
the meaning of the prefix ‘post’ as anti or after, another group of feminists consider that the 
prefix ‘post’ denotes a lineage that entails revision, resemblance and continuation. While the third 
perspective is locating the ‘post’ in a middle area that is neither marking a simple break from 
what precedes it nor a continuity of it (Gamble, 2001). What makes the interpretation of what 
postfeminsim means even more of a challenge, is the fact that feminism itself has never had a 
universally accepted agenda or a single ideology that’s is clearly defined and upon which we can 
measure the advantages and/or shortcomings of its spin-off postfeminism (Harris, 1999). In the 
words of Stéphanie Genz: 
 “At best, feminism can be said to have a number of working definitions that are always 
relative to particular contexts, specific issues and personal practices. It exists on both local and 
abstract levels, dealing with specific issues and consisting of diverse individuals while promoting 
a universal politics of equality for women” (Genz, 2009). 
   
Instead of being fixed within a specific contextual and epistemological framework, 
postfeminism develops from the interchange and hybridization of feminism, postmodern theory, 
consumerism, neo-liberal politics, and mainstream media. It can be argued that postfeminism’s 
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biggest challenge is that it takes the gains of the second wave (specifically gender equality) for 
granted (Baumgardner & Richards, 2010) and embraces raunchy culture and pornography as a 
form of empowerment and autonomy. This is in stark contrast to ‘second wave’ feminists, who 
considered pornography as acts of violence against women. Postfeminisim is in fact quite critical 
of classical feminism’s gender binary and essentialism, and can be regarded as a critical way of 
recognising the altered relations between feminism, pop-culture and femininity. In addition to 
this, postfeminism commercial appeal and its consumerist implication is another reason for the 
confliction between postfeminists and second-wave feminists who view popular strands of 
postfeminisim such as Girl Power and Chick-lit as retrogressive due to the implication of creating 
what Imelda Whelehan calls a “free market feminism” that functions through “capitalism and is 
based on competitive choices in spite of social conditions being stacked against women as a 
whole” (Whelehan, 2005, p.159). Commonly, postfeminist expressions that are documented 
academically arise in a Western context are marked by the propagation and increase in “media 
images and communication technologies and a neo-liberal consumerist ideology that replaces 
collective action and activism with more individualistic assertions of consumer choice and self-
rule” (Genz, 2009, P.9). In addition, postfeminisim is often criticised for its exclusion in relation 
to class, race and age in which the ideal postfeminist is portrayed as white, middleclass girl. I do 
not agree with second-wave feminists’ dismissal of postfeminism as regression from the 
principles and foundations of the feminist movement, Instead I align my self with the likes of 
Anne Brooks, Julie Ewington and Charlotte Brunsdon who view postfeminisim as a healthy 
rewriting of feminism and a rejuvenation of the movement recognising it as a continues process 
that is constantly transforming and changing itself. However, I refrain from using the term to 
describe my findings on Saudi women for reasons that I detail in the below paragraphs.   
 In her book Postfeminist Digital Cultures (2015), Ashley Dobson assesses the 
performance and negotiation of femininity by young women on social networks. In agreement 
with feminist poststructuralist epistemology (Butler, 1990; Barad, 2003; Cover, 2012) and much 
like Butler’s (1990) recognition of gender identity as a performance and a social construct, 
Dobson sees girls and young women on social media today as cultural producers who are 
‘producing’ a postfeminist femininity while trying to navigate its sometimes contradictory 
demands. Dobson (2015), concurring with other feminist scholars (Gill, 2007; Hopkins, 2002; 
Aapola, Gonick, and Harris, 2005; Harris, 2004; McRobbie, 2007; Banet-Weiser, 2012; 
Ringrose, 2013) observes a shift in representations of femininity in today’s postfeminist digital 
culture to one in which attributes such as energy, vitality, confidence, independence, an 
		41	
entrepreneurial spirit, along with public visibility and self-exposure, are central aspects in the 
expression of modern femininity. In western cultures, and within the digital media context, Sarah 
Banet-Weiser (2012) points out that young women are increasingly urged to make themselves 
publicly visible through digital media production and ‘brand’ their presentation in a manner that 
is aligned with these new postfeminist attributes, thereby creating a postfeminist brand of 
femininity.   
Scholars have documented the gender-typical attractiveness of most of these modern 
postfeminist depictions and narratives (Gill, 2007) as well as the intense focus on consumption 
(McRobbie, 2009). In addition, Dobson notes that in performing postfemininity online, key 
aspects of traditional femininity that are tied to fashion, style and consumption are retained and 
confirmed as pleasurable (Zaslow, 2009). This is aligned with postfeminist (‘girl-powered’) 
versions of femininity that Zaslow (2009) describes when stating that “Some elements of 
traditional femininity (beauty, sexiness, and care) are retained while others (passivity, weakness, 
and dependence) are met with a feminist reimagining so that girls are repositioned as active 
choice-making agents” (Zaslow, 2009, p.158). Zaslow then critiques ‘girl-power’ concluding that 
at its core is merely a commodification and commercialisation of opposition to traditional 
femininity, and that what it does, is that it makes feminist ideas and discourse more accessible yet 
sometimes less potent (Zaslow, 2009. p.159). The notion of entanglement of feminist and anti-
feminist ideas within the broad term of ‘post-feminist culture’ has caused scholars such as 
Mcrobbie (2009) and Gill & Scharff (2011) to critique the term and how it is being used to 
analyse a very restricted number of media texts, centralised on the experiences of largely white, 
middle-to-upper class Western women.  
When young women express/display a post-feminist self within digital cultures, Dobson 
notes that many of them are met with harsh and hostile reactions on social media sites of ‘incited 
judgment’ as Nukra dubs them (Nukra, 2014). Dobson (2015) notices several textual 
performances of self-confidence and acceptance that she suggests are being used by young 
women as a self-protective measure against the heavy judgment they face on digital cultures 
(p.129). Harris notes that it is a way of coping with the demand for excessive self-exposure 
(‘discourse and display’) on social media and the counter judgment of a gaze that is scrutinising 
and often sexualising (2004, p. 8). Dobson agrees with Nurka (2014) that the constructions of 
postfeminine selves on social media networks/networked publics must be understood as 
“performances created in relation and response to the assumption of a judging and judgmental 
gaze from peers and others” (Dobson, 2015, P.129). She notes (2014b) how a high sense of self-
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revelation is normalised in digital social media culture amongst the youth. Whether it is in terms 
of information revealed about one’s self, the number of photographs and personal videos shared, 
or even the capacity of communication, commenting and ‘liking’ is required to maintain social 
connections and friendships. Similarly, Bollmer asserts that ‘networked citizens’ today must 
accept “the demand to connect and expose oneself, maintaining flows of information to others” 
(2012, p.8).  
This is however, an argument that is very particular to western societies. In fact, 
‘postfeminism’ in its entirety as a term and as it is used by Dobson is limited by this exact detail; 
its fixation on particularly western women. In relation to Saudi women in my research, one needs 
to consider the complexity of the situation in a rather conservative society where women are 
expected to remain veiled and away from the eyes of strangers, and self-revelation and excessive 
visibility for women is yet to be fully normalised. Conservative traditions -veiling and remaining 
obscure- on one hand, are challenged by the contemporary push towards visibility and self 
revelation in digital context which is expected to create tension and therefore produce a type of 
femininity that is very particular to the Saudi society and is not accurately conceptualised by 
Dobsons term (postfeminism). There is the added weight of judgment and pressure considering 
the shame-honour culture of Saudi Arabia and the demand that women uphold the burden of 
representing the honour of the family, and by extension the honour of the nation. Preserving the 
honour of the family is closely tied to notions of visibility, veiling and seclusion to the private 
sphere. Therefore, upon engaging with social media and posting photographs of themselves, 
Saudi women are not only judged aesthetically in terms of attractiveness or sexiness, but they are 
also policed in terms of how much they reveal and how they behave. Therefore, I suggest that 
young Saudi women on networked publics are not only subjected to a judging gaze, as Dobson 
argues, but also to a ‘regulatory gaze’ that it is quite distinct and particular to conservative 
Islamic societies/Saudi society, as detailed in the previous chapter.  
The above highlights the term’s (postfeminism) limitation to encompass avant-garde 
activities of non-western women who are not feminists in the traditional sense since they are not 
particularly political. What is meant by “feminist” in this thesis is believing and actively 
engaging in feminism as an ideology and a political movement that calls for equality between 
men and women (see Hannam, 2007, Schott, 2003 Stanley, 1990). While postfeminism or post-
feminist identities in Dobson’s work are intended to capture a moment in western feminism, the 
terms do not accurately describe what is taking place amongst Saudi women online for two main 
reasons. Firstly, the Saudi society did not move through the waves of feminism in the same 
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manner that western societies have. Instead, what is taking place in Saudi society is more 
complex, young women are showing signs of empowerment and autonomy, while still 
negotiating legislative and societal restrictions. In addition, the online activity that I have 
documented in this research is far from the conscious organised social and political effort which 
defines feminist movements. While such organised effort does exist online and offline amongst 
some groups of Saudi women, it is not the focal point of this research. Instead, what I document 
here is individualistic digital depictions of a modern/contemporary femininity that is imprinting 
on wider culture, but it is not intentionally designed or organised to do so in the way that women 
in feminist movements collectively campaign for societal change.  This adds to my reluctance in 
using the label of “feminism” to describe these cultural changes/their online practices. The 
second reason why the term ‘feminist’ is not fitting here is that these online activities are 
retaining key aspects of traditional expressions/modes of femininity that conflicts with feminist 
ideologies. These expressions/modes of femininity are articulated through a vivid immersion in 
consumption, the preoccupation with male-guardian approval and the fixation on beauty, which is 
shown in the analysis. These practices pose serious questions about whether the contemporary 
portrayals of Saudi femininity should be considered and labelled as ‘feminist’. And while I 
sought in the beginning to develop a term that can encompass these varied and somewhat 
contradicting aspects of contemporary identity amongst young Saudi women, it has been pointed 
out to me by my supervisors and examiners that such a “catch all” term would be inaccurate. 
What I view here is not a singular way of being a Saudi woman that can be conceptualised in a 
term, instead, I examine the complex way in which Saudi women today are grappling with the 
conflicting demands of contemporary post-feminism and the expectations of a conservative 
society that is still ‘traditional’ in many ways. This complexity arises from two factors that set the 
contemporary context in which Saudi women grapple with expressions of identity and self-image 
in the digital age. The first is the overt contradiction between contemporary aspirational 
femininity and the the traditional, overly religious, Sahwa-inspired femininity that has been 
articulated and promoted since the 1980s and 1990s which ‘froze’ social relations for Saudi 
women in time. The second is the quite sudden appearance of digital technologies just 20 years 
ago and their now routine use, increasingly by young women who were brought up using them. 
Taken together, these two factors mean that Saudi women have been thrust from an era of strict 
marginalisation directly into an age – the digital context – which has rapidly and radically altered 
how humans relate to one another and how they re-imagine their identities. Thereby resulting in 
the emergence of contemporary ideals of femininity that are sometimes distinctively different 
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from Saudi’s traditional ideals of femininity, and in other times they are very much the same, and 
this is what will be documented here in this research.  
These significant patterns of expression and changing values among the women I 
observed online, resemble ‘postfeminist’ identities in their incorporation of neo-liberal 
characteristics of modern society and the promotion of agency amongst women. However, while 
both my research and scholarly work on postfeminism discuss and assess visibility and body 
sexualisation/exposing, the level of visibility referred to in Dobson’s work on digital post-
feminism and in the critique of McRobbie and Gill & Scharff is far more prevalent and intense 
than what I observe from Saudi women online. What is meant by visibility in this research is 
significantly less sexualised images of women when compared to the visibility that post-
feminism work identifies and studies.  The emphasis here is on social/cultural representation 
through visibility rather than sexual display. Moreover, Saudi women are developing a sense of 
agency and self-confidence through the recently provided opportunities to be visible culturally 
and socially online. Therefore, while Dobson, along with other feminist scholars (Phelan, 1993, 
Wolf, 1991; Mulvey, 1975/1989), argue that women’s visibility in western cultures might not 
necessarily lead to self-actualisation and empowerment, I argue differently for the case with 
Saudi women. The level of visibility associated with contemporary expressions of femininity 
online within the conservative, shame-honour culture of Saudi Arabia might actually translate 
into self-actualisation and empowerment amongst Saudi women. 
 In today’s networked society, where textual communication is receding and giving way to 
photography and video sharing, the images that we share online have become a central 
component in our self-presentation. The next section considers this.  
3.4 The power of the image 
As noted, photographs and images have become a central component of our expression of 
identity online and thus worthy of closer attention. For Saudi women, and as I shall argue in the 
analysis, personal photographs are turning into an influential tool for negotiating and re-
imagining what the national image of the Saudi woman looks like. Several anthropological 
studies have explored the relationship between photographs and images as a form of 
representation and the people who generate them (Ginsburg, 1995; MacDougall, 2005; Sprague, 
1978; Edwards, 1992; Pinney, 2011). Mendelson and Papacharissi (2010) use methods based in 
visual anthropology as well as semiotics to examine the use of imagery specifically within the act 
of self-presentation on Facebook. They argue that the photographs that users share on a certain 
platform present a series of performances strategically chosen by an individual to communicate 
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identity and belonging. They cite Holland's (1991) argument that personal photographs can be 
influenced by and entangled with larger cultural notions of community, family and gender. 
Chalfen looked at how photographs that users share online might reaffirm culturally structured 
values through what they portray (1987, p.98). Moreover, Mendelson and Papacharissi (2010) 
note how relationships are also the main aspects of imagery on social media, demonstrating 
significant bonds between family and friends which communicate information about a user’s 
‘image’ so that they are key blocks in the presentation of the self online. This section reviews the 
emergence of a selfie culture on social networks and explores the use of imagery by women in 
the city of Marden to present ideals of femininity and to display family ties (Costa, 2016). 
 
3.4.1 Selfie Culture 
Marwick documents the rise in the ‘selfie culture’ as the newest form of participation on social 
media platforms. In taking selfies, users actively craft the impression they want to give to others, 
which makes selfies a significant mode of self-expression, as well as a substantial genre to 
consider issues of identity, aspiration and social expectations. Used for self-presentation and self-
branding by micro-celebrities, the selfie has been studied and examined by several scholars 
(Madden et al, 2013; Schwarz, 2010; Winston 2013; Twange and Campbell 2009; Lee, 2005). 
Although they are often criticised (and subsequently dismissed) as narcissistic acts (Cosslett and 
Baxter, 2013, Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014), Miller et al (2016) concluded that such generalisations 
are often inaccurate. The work of Miller et al (2016) explores the use of photographs and imagery 
in presenting the self online and its relation to gender performances and cultural conformity. The 
aim of the research was to study and report on the use and consequences of social media for 
people around the world. It was conducted over for 15 months in eight different field sites 
(Brazil, Chile, China, England, India, Italy, Trinidad and Turkey), with each field site producing 
its own monograph. In addition to the eight books designated to each field site, a ninth book was 
written to serve as an overall comparative book titled How the World Changed Social Media 
(2016). It finds that in many of these field sites, participation on social media platforms is highly 
visual, affording photography an unprecedented pervasiveness as part of daily life, especially 
with the popularity of smartphones, which feature often good quality cameras and connect us to 
social media platforms 24/7. The issue with the term narcissism is that it implies a self-indulgent 
orientation towards the self, whereas Miller et al (2016) document several occasions when the 
selfie is used to cultivate social relations. They maintain that there are many types of selfie which 
can be employed to convey group sentiment and affiliation rather than individual narcissism. This 
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has been seen in the case of the field site of the English village in which the participants shared 
five times as many ‘group selfies’ as ones which featured only themselves. Moreover, Miller et al 
(2016) point out that as an aspect of social media, selfies are de facto meant for sharing and 
circulation, which makes them representational of a more socially focused activity rather than an 
individually oriented one as the accusations of narcissism might imply. Nonetheless, the study 
does not dismiss the fact that images on social media and selfies in particular mainly represent 
idealised selves, which underlines their use by micro-celebrities for self-branding. In the Italian 
field site, Nicolescu (2016) observes the tendency of young women to spend hours ‘staging’ the 
perfect selfie. They end up taking multiple shots, which they scrutinise before selecting the one(s) 
they wish to upload online.  
 What is meant by idealised images differs from one country to another and is a matter of 
context and historicity. Ideals are reassessed and changed regularly, and what might have been 
ideal a number of decades ago might not be so today, and certainly what is considered ideal in the 
U.S. might not be viewed in the same way in Saudi Arabia, for example. This is why the 
observance of selfies is so relevant to this study, as they are turning into tools for promoting a 
new idealised self amongst young Saudi women. The contradictory findings in a comparison 
between Miller et al’s industrial Chinese location and the rural Chinese location were very 
revealing in relation to how context might influence the ‘idealised’ self. While the poor financial 
situation in the first one conjured up an inclination towards posts which portrayed an aspiration 
around consumption and wealth, in the second economic aspirations intersected with 
conservative traditions, with photographs that featured parental relationships and family life. In 
some instances, the normative rules of self-presentation are not about ‘looking your best’, but 
rather simply about presenting the self in accordance with social expectations. In a small English 
village, for example, selfies were often taken with no makeup and in casual attire, portraying an 
unpretentious modesty (Miller, 2016). Adults in the same village only posted selfies when they 
were related to charitable causes such as the ‘#nomakeup selfie’ challenge, which helped them to 
fend off accusations of narcissism that are often associated with selfies. Similarly, in the northern 
Chile field site, a standard selfie taken in a user's home or at a friend’s house or even on a regular 
outing was devoid of glamour and the aesthetics were erased (Haynes, 2016). Young users would 
post several photos a day of often mundane things all conveying a sense of monotony in everyday 
life, pairing them with hashtags such as #bored. A common form of the selfie in Chile was found 
to be the ‘footie’, in which only the feet of the photographer are shown, often while in a lounging 
position in front of the TV or playing a videogame, all in an effort to appear unassuming and 
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casual, and to trivialise the act of posing. The way users utilise this genre, ‘footie’, to 
communicate the mundane and to appear inconspicuous and unassuming is very peculiar to that 
region/community. When ‘footies’ appeared in other communities such as Italy, for example, 
they were again utilised to portray an idealised self with a spectacular natural setting such as a 
beautiful beach. In relation to my study, selfies will be looked at using netnography to assess 
young Saudi women’s modern/contemporary idealised public self, and to determine whether any 
changes have occurred in the traditional values and norms. In addition, the observance of the 
comments and reactions from other Saudi users on these selfies will help assess the cultural 
implications of the newly emerging identities.  
 
3.4.2 Women’s ideals of femininity in the Turkish community of Mardin through imagery 
More relevantly to my study on Saudi women’s engagement with social media, Costa (2016) 
researched a conservative Islamic community in southeast Turkey as part of Miller’s comparative 
study. The results that emerged from that site will be highly informative throughout this literature 
review due to the similarities between this community and the traditional Islamic community of 
Saudi Arabia in terms of social conservatism and Islamic belief systems, as well as Arab ethnicity 
since a high percentage of Mardin inhabitants are Arabs. On public facing social media, Costa 
(2016) found that young adults from both genders in Mardin construct and present idealised 
selves, taking advantage of the high level of visibility offered by social media in order to achieve 
a degree of local fame and popularity. Driven by the desire to attain this status and popularity, 
Costa observed that traditional boundaries between private and public were disrupted in this 
conservative community even though these boundaries had hitherto been strictly controlled and 
monitored. Naturally, public facing media is a place where users share what they know is going 
to be viewed publicly by others, and thus it is where they perform a self that is suspected to be 
scrutinised by other members in the community. Therefore, users in Mardin are caught between 
two contradictory driving forces: preserving reputation and pursuing popularity. Regarding the 
use of photography and visual images to present the self amongst female users in Mardin, Costa 
found that the models of femininity are variable and contradictory, changing dramatically 
according to age and social background. Identifying two ideals of femininity/gender image, Costa 
observed that women on social media in Mardin portray either a pious modest self or a more 
liberal image concerned with fashion, makeup and aesthetics.     
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In the first case, where women define their public selves through a declaration of piety and 
modesty, photos portraying the female's face or body are entirely or partially absent from public 
facing profiles. Instead, women use images of children or pictures of natural landscapes as profile 
pictures. Anonymous profile pictures were found to be more common amongst young women 
from rural backgrounds and with a lower level of education who are not necessarily ‘choosing’ 
anonymity but rather forced to adopt it in order to avoid conflict with their male relatives. In 
some cases, religious motives were behind the choice to withhold sharing personal photographs. 
Costa found that religious Arab females in urban areas deliberately choose to express their piety 
and modesty through withholding personal photos of themselves that depict their face or body. 
Instead, they share abstract photos or photos of babies or religious images as profile pictures and 
on public facing areas of social media. Often, in such profiles photos of prepared tables of food 
and feasts in restaurants or at house gatherings would be very common as they are perfect images 
to communicate a rich sociality without having to feature people in the photograph. The aim of 
such postings is again to impress others and obtain their admiration and envy. However, they 
reaffirm classical notions about veiling and limiting women to the private sphere away from the 
male gaze.   
 
The second type of the ideal woman in Mardin is presented in the photos of young women from 
urban areas and less conservative backgrounds who share recognised photos of themselves which 
emphasises style, beauty and aesthetics through attention to clothes, accessories and makeup. 
Costa notices that not only secular, liberal women opt for recognition as opposed to anonymity 
when presenting themselves online, but some slightly more religious women might also choose to 
post photos of themselves (although their hair is covered in them). Social media has become the 
place where female users who are interested in fashion, makeup and beauty, can display these 
interests and compete for distinction within their community. Nonetheless, Costa asserts that in 
the generally conservative community of Mardin, even these photographs, which slightly push 
the boundaries in terms of women’s visibility and image projection, “still always follow norms of 
respectability and decorum, and they never attempt to pose with original, strange or weird 
expressions or display alternative aesthetics” (2016, p.59).  
 
Costa further documents a rather interesting practice involving women’s presentation of 
themselves through photographs. She observes that women in Mardin often present images of 
themselves with important family members, including their parents and brothers if unmarried and 
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with their spouse and children if they are. I also observed this practice in my study of Saudi 
women (see Chapter 7). And while the intention documented by Costa in the case of Turkish 
women was the fear of misappropriation and the possibility of photoshopping of images by 
internet trolls, in the case of Saudi women this was not really a concern, as will be shown in the 
analysis. However, both groups of women view this type of photographs featuring them with 
family members as expressions of the ideal woman devoted to her family members.  
Finally, the study of Miller et al, and Costa’s volume in particular, shows a shift towards 
ubiquitous photographs that were previously kept away from the public gaze in private photo 
albums at home. With the rise of social media, photographs of ourselves, ordinary family 
lunches, and mundane gatherings have become a daily feed in our social media platforms 
resulting in a higher level of visibility of the once private lives of women, in particular within 
conservative communities. The advantage of this is that it allows ethnographers to assess whether 
classical conceptions around gender and gender roles persist or are being challenged. Through an 
analysis of this vast flow of images and photographs on Saudi women’s social media accounts, 
we can assess whether men are still predominantly occupying the public spaces in the society 
while the women are enclosed in the private areas away from the public gaze or whether this is 
changing, and whether the portrayals of men as workers and the guardians and the women as 
caregivers are increasing or declining.  
 In relation to my research enquires, the aforementioned literature raises a number of 
important issues about the use of imagery to affirm or reimagine the public gender image and 
cultural values and norms in a community. This corresponds with the hypothesis in this research 
that young Saudi women are using their photographs on social media to negotiate their public 
image as well as to reassess the centrality of some cultural values such as veiling or male 
guardianship. The literature also mirrors some of the tensions between those who support 
contemporary/unconventional ideals of femininity and those who maintain traditional 
representations of gender (this will be addressed below and in the analysis in Chapter 7). 
 
3.5 Micro-celebrities, influencers and fashionistas   
In relation to self-representation and identity online, specifically to the ‘public’ performance of 
self, it is necessary to review the ‘micro-celebrity’ trend on social media platforms before ending 
this chapter as it relates to the findings of my study. Even though the trends of ‘fashionista’ and 
‘social influencer’ entails a somewhat non-conventional form of self-representation to what Saudi 
women are accustomed to (high visibility as oppose to veiling and restriction to the private 
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sphere), it is gaining popularity amongst Saudi female users on social media (see Chapter 6). In 
this section, I will review the act of self-branding to achieve online fame online, female micro-
celebrities’ efforts to create a counterpublic on social media, and finally the implications of being 
a fashionista.   
 
3.5.1 Self Branding 
Much recent attention has been given by scholars to the practice of pursuing fame and popularity 
through social media (Djafarova & Rushworth, 2017; Marwick & boyd, 2011; Replogle, 2014), 
with many asserting that is has become a prominent objective amongst users in general when 
engaging with social media (Van de Rijt et al, 2013; Greenwood and Kaufman, 2013; Uhls and 
Greenfield, 2012; Gamson, 2011). Indeed, recent research shows that being famous on social 
media and branding oneself has become a ‘job’ (Carah and Shaul, 2016; Booth and Matic. 2011; 
Ferberg et al, 2011; Marwick, 2010; Duffy and Hund, 2015). According to Mavroudis and Milne, 
it is a type of labour that “involves producing a manufactured version of self that can be publicly 
consumed” (2016, p: N/K). Duffy and Hund (2015) explore how female fashion bloggers depict 
the ideal of ‘having it all’ and the ‘glam life’ by turning their branded-self into a commercially 
successful and publicly visible form of what Marwick (2013) dubs ‘aspirational production’ (an 
attention-seeking practice whereby an individual present herself in a high[er]-status social 
position (Marwick, 2013, p. 122-123) that young female social media users are eager to consume. 
Similarly, Page (2012) documents how social media users and micro-celebrities actively employ 
the ‘hashtag’ tool to self-brand in an effort to achieve high levels of visibility. In 2013, Senft 
explored how branding the self was exploding into the public sphere on networked publics, in 
which the majority of users are aware of their public presence online and engage in micro-
celebrity practices. Given the architecture of social media such as Facebook features that 
publicise users’ updates, posts and likes by default, as well as encourage users to “monitor the 
activity of others in the name of social connection” (Senft, 2013, p.347), social media users are 
invited to view social media as a public stage and engage with it as a performance. These 
processes turn the Internet into a marketplace where users are urged to take on the role of both 
buyer and the seller, as well as act as the ‘goods’ through branding themselves for other users to 
consume what they post and buy into the lifestyle that they portray through their posts.  
 Terms such as ‘instafamous’, ‘micro-celebrity’, ‘Internet celebrity’, ‘Youtuber’ and 
‘social media influencer’ have become widely circulated in news outlets and become part of the 
popular culture (Brodesser-Akner, 2014; Satenstein, 2017; Saul, 2016).  These terms entail a 
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social media account with a large following which resonates deeply with them, and a degree of 
fame amongst other social media users. Achieving this degree of online fame and popularity calls 
for constant visibility and exposure to grab people’s attention, which might contradict or violate 
the social norms in Saudi society with regards to women. Women in Islamic conservative 
communities are expected to keep a low-profile and mainly confine themselves to the private 
sphere (see chapter 2).  However, more recently in the Arabian Gulf, the rising trend of the 
‘fashionista’ and social media influencers, particularly amongst women, indicates a significant 
social change may be occurring. The politics of visibility for women in Saudi is being challenged 
and renegotiated through the emergence of female Saudis such as, to name a few, @model_roz 
(5.7 million followers), @thehala (653k followers), @afnan_albatel (6.2 million followers), 
@malak_alhusaini (3.4 million followers), @adhwaaldakheel (605k followers), who each gather 
millions of followers on platforms such as Instagram and Snapchat. This suggests the emergence 
of these social networks as ‘counterpublics’ in relation to Saudi women.   
 
 
3.5.2 Women as micro-celebrities, seeking ‘counterpublics’  
An early study on celebrityhood in the age of social media was undertaken by Senft in 2008. This 
study examined the practice of ‘webcamming’ adopted by ‘camgirls’ and how it can relate to 
feminism and political expression. It is important to note that this was prior to the practice’s 
recent association with pornography. Senft defines micro-celebrity as a mind-set and an 
accumulation of self-presentation practices located in social media, through which users 
strategically and deliberately formulate a profile, reach out to followers, and share personal 
information to heighten attention and thus enhance their online status (Senft, 2013). Senft 
considers the concept of fame and publicity for camgirls, but her study applies to social media 
celebrities in general, translating into three aspects: theatrical authenticity, self-branding, and 
celebrity. One of the most interesting commentaries made by Senft in her study is the notion that 
throughout history women have reacted to their omission from the public sphere by founding 
counterpublics where their presence is admitted. She goes on to posit that social networks are 
modern counterpublics that women use for this very purpose. Her findings relate back to Frasier’s 
above-noted conceptualisation of ‘counterpublics’ and the use of these publics by marginalised 
members of the community to push back and secure a place for themselves within the public 
sphere. Senft also notes how today’s networked society encourages women to ‘represent’ 
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themselves through confession, celebrity, and sexual display, yet are castigated for too much 
visibility through conservative censorship and backlash.  
 
3.5.3 Instafamous, the rise of the glamourous fashionista 
Further research on this theme has been conducted by Alice Marwick (2015), who examines the 
phenomenon of ‘Instafame’ and celebrityhood on social media sites that promote the sharing of 
images and photographs in preference to texts. Marwick argues that this favouring of the image 
promotes a new type of micro-celebrity that is quite different from earlier documentations of this 
practice. Today, the practice of micro-celebrity has extended to include a specific set of visual 
self-presentation strategies that highlight the glamour and the luxury of the user, turning her/him 
into a ‘regular person’ who attracts mass audiences previously limited to broadcast media. 
Marwick explains how these instafamous ‘regular people’ tend to be good-looking and work in 
‘trendy’ industries such as advertising, design, fashion or media, all of which share a focus on 
physical appearance. While Marwick does not directly refer to trends in the Arabian Gulf, her 
observations on social media celebrities and ‘Instafame’ correspond with the sudden rise in the 
‘fashionista’ amongst Saudi women which is documented in this research. A fashionista is a 
young woman who is interested in fashion, closely follows the latest trends, adopts them and 
promotes them by taking photos of her daily style or creating video tutorials of her make up 
routine and shopping ‘hauls’. The title of ‘fashionista’ is usually reserved for women who have 
achieved a certain degree of popularity on social media platforms as social media influencers and 
micro-celebrities by gathering thousands, if not millions, of followers. This thesis considers the 
cultural parallels and contradictions between the characteristics of the fashionista and that of the 
traditional young Saudi female.  
 Fashionistas, which I view in this research as a digital expression of an aspirational 
femininity amongst Saudi women, are reaffirming pre-existent gendered scripts by their portrayal 
of women mainly as consumers. A fashionista’s feed is commonly flooded with photographs of 
luxury items and designer goods, expensive trips to exotic places while promoting merchandise 
and sponsorships from cosmetics companies and fashion houses for marketing purposes. All this 
positions these fashionistas mainly as consumers who are also encouraging their audience to 
consume. Fashionistas in particular, and the majority of female social media influencers observed 
in this study, rely on portrayals of the ‘glam life’ to build audience in what is dubbed an 
‘attention economy’ (Davenport & Beck, 2005). These depictions are balanced with occasional 
images of ‘candidness’ that are ‘natural’ and less aesthetically constructed, with the aim of 
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conveying a sense of ‘authenticity’ and ‘realness’ to ensure that the audience still view them as 
relatable, a crucial feature in the new age entrepreneurial digital business (Duffy, 2013; 
McQuarrie et al., 2013; Marwick, 2013b).   
The work of Ashley Dobson (2015) on self representation and self-production on social 
media is of relevance here. The issue of ‘instafame’, branding the self and marketing it, is that it 
raises questions about the ‘authenticity’ of the self that is perceived and communicated through 
the profile. Dobson (2015) notes that when the intentions and motives for creating a profile are 
reduced to commercial (such as the case with fashionistas and social media influencers who are 
cashing in on their online performances of self), then they “disrupt the conventions and 
expectations of the community” (p.11). She asserts that the tacit understanding of social media 
self-representation between the producers and viewers is that what is being viewed (the personal 
profiles) are indicators of someone's self-chosen and ‘authentic’ identity, produced for personal 
use rather than for commercial or political gain. Once this belief is questioned by the producers’ 
benefiting financially from their self-performance, then accusations of ‘fakeness’ are expected to 
arise. The implication here is that Saudi women who benefit financially from their performance 
of a ‘contemporary’ feminine identity on social media that challenges the traditional ideals of 
Saudi femininity mentioned in chapter 2, such as fashionistas, might find that the genuineness of 
their performance is questioned to be an attempt to stir up controversy and gain more followers, 
which is seen in the data in this study. Or worse, their entire claim of a Saudi nationality would 
be doubted as a publicity stunt to achieve exposure in the Saudi market which is undoubtedly the 
biggest market in the Arabian Gulf.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed three main notions: networked publics on social media, digital post-
feminist identities, and the central use of images to construct online identities on networked 
publics today. The review of these three notions serves to frame the analysis of my research to 
help answer the research questions about how social media engagement is challenging norms, 
values and attitudes in relation to veiling and, more broadly, gender roles in general. This review 
is also necessary to understand how social media engagement can facilitate the modernisation of 
the national image of Saudi women and the development of contemporary feminine identities 
(see analysis chapters).  
Identity theories were also reviewed in this chapter with a focus on the distinct post-
feminist identity that is promoted on networked publics. In agreement with feminist 
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poststructuralist epistemology (Butler, 1990; Barad, 2003; Cover, 2012) and much like Butler’s 
(1990) recognition of gender identity as a performance and a social construct, Dobson sees girls 
and young women on social media today as cultural producers who are ‘producing’ a 
postfeminist identity while trying to navigate its sometimes contradictory demands. The 
implication of this is that Saudi women could reproduce and redefine what an ideal Saudi 
femininity looks like through their use of social media platforms, even though this contemporary 
femininity might not necessarily be feminist.  
The chapter also reviewed the use of images/photographs as a key element of engagement 
and self-representation on social networks. Costa’s study of the Turkish city of Mardin was 
closely reviewed due to its resemblance to the cultural features of modern Saudi Arabia. Costa’s 
study sees two distinct ideals of femininity communicated through the use of imagery: a pious, 
modest self and a modern, liberal image concerned with fashion, makeup and aesthetics. This 
chapter also noted how the rise in selfie culture could undermine visibility limitations on Saudi 
women and thus encourage them to be more visible when representing themselves online. 
Finally, ultra-public performances of self on social media, or ‘micro-celebrity’, were 
reviewed. Achieving this degree of online fame and popularity calls for constant visibility and 
exposure to grab people’s attention, which might contradict or violate social norms in Saudi 
society with regard to women. Nonetheless, the trend is on the rise amongst Saudi Arabian 
women.  
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Chapter Four. Digital Relationships and Communication 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Saudi society is structured in a way that keeps men and women predominantly separate. 
Educational institutions, places of employment, public areas, and even social customs have all 
been constructed with the aim of keeping men and women segregated and within their own 
respective spaces, physically and culturally. Naturally, such severe and strictly enforced gender 
segregation has affected intimacy and personal relationships between the two genders. The lack 
of interaction makes pre-marital romantic relationships as well as the establishment of wider 
intimacies not only dangerous for those involved but also close to impossible in practice. This 
chapter reviews the central approaches and debates on online relationships and the development 
of romance on social media networks. This will underpin my analysis of how social media 
platforms have successfully created a gender-integrated networked public that is convenient for 
Saudi women to negotiate romance and wider intimacy practices. This will answer my research 
question on how social media engagement is impacting Saudi women values, norms, and 
attitudes towards romance and wider intimacy practices.  
The chapter will start by reviewing networked individualism as a term to describe the 
nature of digital communication on social media networks. I then review the polymedia context 
in which our digital relationships exist today. Following that, I address the issue of privacy 
online, central when managing relationships on social media platforms, with a specific focus on 
social privacy and the strategies employed by social media users to achieve it. The notion of 
scalable sociality is also reviewed in this chapter with a focus on the work of Elisabetta Costa in 
southeast Turkey as an informative research on mediated relationships in a conservative 
community that shares many similarities with Saudi society.  Finally, a review of digital romantic 
relationships is provided to frame the analysis in Chapter 9. 
 
4.2 Networked individualism  
When Wellman and Rainie (2012) discussed networked individualism, their focus was on the 
way we socialise on networked publics. The focal point of their definition of the term is 
relationships and how they are lived on social media platforms. This is in a way different from 
the notion of individualisation discussed earlier, which focused more on identity and choices, yet 
it is the same in the sense that it asserts the autonomy of the individual and her agency, except 
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this time carried out through relationships. Exploring the concept of networked individualism 
would be informative at this point in the review because it sheds light on the greater degree of 
agency that is granted to women once they are freed from the ties of the family, especially in 
terms of romantic personal relationships with the opposite sex. Networked individualism’s 
centralisation on the person (individual) rather than the group (the nation, the family) plays a role 
in challenging customs and traditions, as will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
 The previous chapter reviewed and discussed the notion of networked publics (boyd, 
2010; Ito, 2008), and I explained how social media networks are understood as networked 
publics. What Wellman and Rainie observed in their book Networked (2012) was that the 
infusion of mobile technologies into people’s daily routines and their submersion in networked 
publics have changed the way they interact with one another. Rather than entrenched in groups, 
people have to a much greater extent become networked as individuals, and so the world is 
arranged around networked individualism rather than group solidarity or local consensus. Similar 
to the notion of individualism, networked individualism perceives an increased personal 
autonomy in the modern age, except with a focus on sociality as mediated through digital 
networks. It represents a shift from the classical configuration of social arrangements and 
relations built around large hierarchical bureaucracies or social groups that are tightly knit, such 
as the family, to social organisation mediated through the use of modern communication 
technologies.  While Manuel Castells laid the foundation of this approach, it was Rainie and 
Wellman (2012) who popularised it and emphasised its importance by marking the rise of 
networked individualism as something which diverges from deep-rooted social arrangements that 
are constructed around “large hierarchical bureaucracies and small, densely knit groups such as 
households, communities, and workgroups.” (Rainie & Wellman, 2012, p.6).  
 A distinguishing characteristic of networked individualism is that people within this 
system operate more as “connected individuals and less as embedded group members” (Rainie & 
Wellman, 2012, p.12).  For example, family members no longer use one shared landline for the 
entire household, but rather each member of the family uses his/her own mobile phone to connect 
with their own network individually rather than connecting collectively as a group. This raises a 
concern amongst conservatives that the personal autonomy which comes with individualism is 
contributing to the continued decline in traditional social values, fragmenting society and leaving 
people atomised and isolated. This theme, which is very common in journalistic and media 
narratives today, and can be traced back to the work of early sociologists such as Ferdinand 
Tonnies, Georg Simmel and Max Weber as well as more recent work that highlights the 
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unfavourable outcomes of individualism (Bauman, 2001; Bauman 2000) such as the erosion of 
community (Heelas, Lash, and Morris 1996; Putnam, 2000, Leigh, 2010).  
However, Wellman and Rainie contest this rather simplistic view, and instead of viewing 
networked individualism as a withdrawal from social life, they view it as an enhancement of it, 
usually associated with a flourishing offline sociality. More importantly, they argue that this does 
not necessarily signify a drift towards social isolation, but instead marks a move to flexible 
autonomy. Miller et al (2016) notes that in traditional kinship systems, an individual's social 
obligations and practices arise from her position within the family and the tribe, from the fact that 
she is a wife, a mother, a sister. The implication here is that it would be hard to disregard the 
woman’s obligation to carry the family’s name, and the idea of her protecting the family’s 
reputation in a shame-honour culture becomes more powerful, thereby affecting her sociality. In 
contrast, within networked publics, users can choose to rearrange their social circle and 
disassociate themselves from their offline kin relationships (and consequently their roles and 
social obligations) and gain more agency in their sociality. This could have a profound impact on 
the way young Saudi women socialise on social media networks, where they can enjoy the 
flexible autonomy of networked individualism. Indeed, the findings of Miller et al (2016) in 
relation to networked individualism and women in conservative communities are to that effect.    
 However, it is important to remember that even though engagement on social media is 
promoting a sense of networked individualism and granting women enhanced agency, the reality 
is that these social media networks are not completely detached from the people we know and are 
related to offline. When young Saudi women are experimenting with non-traditional social 
connections with the opposite-sex, most likely their family members and acquaintances are 
simultaneously active on these same social media networks. Indeed, Costa (2016) notices how 
just as social media networks could be places of individualised networking, they can equally be 
places of group allegiance and conformity.  This is why issues of privacy, the imagined audience 
and context collapse, which I examine next, are important.  
 
4.3 Polymedia 
It is important first to review a notable contribution to the field of digital communication as it will 
highlight the complexity of relationships and their management in the age of digital media. The 
notion of ‘Polymedia’ acknowledges the multiplicity of media platforms that connect us. First 
introduced in 2012 by Madianou and Miller, the approach was part of research on transnational 
mothering amongst Filipino women abroad and the way they mediate their relationships with 
		58	
children at home back in the Philippines through the use technology and new media. Looking 
beyond the platform, medium or device, Polymedia views communication ‘horizontally’, noticing 
how communication media complement one another. The approach acknowledges how 
challenging it is to define social media and to assess its uses given the fact that they mean many 
different things to different people. While Instagram might be a way of expressing one’s self 
artistically to one user, it might be a private concealed space to flirt with another.  The study was 
informed by the idea of ‘affordances’, defined by Hutchby 2001 as the “functional and relational 
aspects which frame, while not determining, the possibilities for agentic action in relation to an 
object” (p.444). In an interesting example presented by Mirca Madianou in a research article in 
2015, Aria, a Filipina teenager, chose to communicate with her mother who is working overseas 
through Facebook or Whatsapp rather than Skype. To her, use of social media platforms was a 
way of finding the right distance in her relationship with her mother. The lack of visibility on 
Whatsapp and Facebook chat, an affordance that was achieved on Skye via video calls, means 
that Aria was able to talk to her mother while avoiding being reprimanded over her untidy room 
because her mom was not able to see it. The asynchronous temporality of social networking sites 
afforded Aria more command over how she presented herself and managed her relationship with 
her mother.  The mothers in the study (2012) chose the medium of communication (whether 
Facebook status or a Skype call) not only due to convenience or availability, but because the 
chosen medium of communication conveys a message on its own. Texting, for example, was used 
for phatic communication, while phone calls might communicate a sense of urgency. Therefore, 
within a polymedia context, each medium can only be understood in relation to the other 
mediums since it has been chosen over the others to communicate that message. The study also 
observed that communication does not take place over a single technology but by selecting 
between and combining a mixture of constantly changing media, thus highlighting “the need for 
each relationship to create a configuration of usage” (Madianou and Miller, 2012, p. 124).  
 The polymedia approach draws our attention to the ways in which users regard media as 
integrated environments of affordances, highlighting how they exploit the differences among 
media to handle their relationships. Navigating this environment becomes especially meaningful 
in mediated personal communication as users capitalise on differences between different types of 
media to convey emotions and manage mediated relationships. And as social media propagate, 
each platform develops its own niche in users’ communicative practices. What surfaces because 
of this is a complex environment of multiple, evolving social media. What the term ‘polymedia’ 
does is shift our attention from social media as individual platforms to a recognition of this 
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complex media environment which users navigate to fit their communicative requirements. 
Returning to the example of Aria, each social media platform obtains its own niche according to 
its affordances, while the collection of all the different media platforms together constitutes the 
environment within which this particular personal relationship between her and her mother was 
being negotiated. What cannot be achieved through the affordances of Whatsapp could be done 
through the use of a different platform which incorporates different features and affordances. 
Thus, users seldom employ just one platform in their online communication, but rather a 
compilation of media while boosted convergence intensifies the shifting between platforms, as 
observed in Madianou’s 2014 research ‘Smartphones as Polymedia’. In this research, Madianou 
assessed whether smartphones function as an environment of polymedia, discovering that 
“smartphones consolidate the emergence of the ubiquitous internet and the ‘taken for 
[grantedness]’ of the mobile phone” (Madianou, 2014, p.678). For users who own a smartphone, 
being ‘online’ is the default situation to a point that it no longer registers as a distinct state. 
‘Always on’ users, as Madianou calls them, employ smartphones as an “integrated environment 
of communicative opportunities” (Madianou, 2014, p.670). The mobility of smartphones, along 
with their capability to hold innumerable applications, facilitates jumping between these 
platforms easily and fluidly, rendering them representative of a media environment in their own 
right. As a result, smartphones as polymedia heighten the awareness of significant others, and in 
cases of physical separation shorten the distance.     
 Finally, Madianou and Miller's (2012) findings show that this increased and often indirect 
communication is not necessarily positive, as friction and discontent are as common as the more 
fulfilling aspects of digitally mediated communication. Consequently, a polymediated context of 
social connection raises issues of privacy (as will be seen below), which is a matter of utmost 
importance for Saudi women, who, in a shame-honour culture, need to protect their reputation 
while negotiating norms and values on social media. 
 
4.4 The issue of privacy: avoiding surveillance  
First, it is important to make it clear that what is meant by privacy here, and throughout this 
research, is ‘social privacy’, or, as danah boyd puts it, not personally identifiable information 
(PII), but rather personally embarrassing information (PEI) (boyd, 2010b). The difference 
between the two, as boyd explains, has to do with the audience at play. Issues with privacy and 
PII, are mostly issues with strangers such as governments and corporations or third parties 
manipulating and misusing people’s data for marketing purposes or government surveillance. 
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However, according to boyd, what people are mainly concerned about when engaging on social 
media is PEI and the social personal damage that can be done by individuals they actually know 
or get to know and might be embarrassed in front of. It is for this reason that, as boyd asserts, 
“People often do not worry about whether or not something is publicly accessible online, but how 
far it can spread and searchable it might be by those who might be trying to embarrass them” 
(2010b, p. N/A). Issues of privacy are even more urgent in shame-honour cultures such as Saudi 
Arabia, where people (especially young women) care for their reputations and fear tarnishing 
them because they extend to the rest of the family and beyond to the nation.  Thus, it is necessary 
to review the way in which privacy is achieved on social media networks in order to fully 
understand the way in which it is impacting Saudis’ online sociality and connections and how 
these sites are used to negotiate romance and wider intimacies. As much as data privacy, which 
involves the right of protection against third parties (PII) is an important issue, it is beyond the 
scope of this research to address it since the focus here is on personal and intimate social 
relationships online, for which PEI is more relevant.  
 
4.4.1 Privacy defaults and user agency 
While the situation in most interpersonal communication offline is that interaction is private by 
default/public through effort, dana boyd (2014) draws our attention to the reversed situation in 
mediated online interaction. For example, offline, and even in a public setting, two people who 
are having a conversation in a coffee shop can assume a degree of privacy. Even if people close 
by do hear parts of the conversation, social norms and etiquette would prevent them from taking 
part in the conversation. However, in mediated environments, assumptions around social norms 
and privacy are being questioned as many social media platforms are designed to encourage users 
to ‘share’ and spread information. Default settings on websites such as Facebook, for example, 
make it a lot easier to share with everyone in the friend list than to manipulate the settings to limit 
the post to a selected audience. Therefore, interaction on social media is public by default, private 
by effort.   
Fundamentally, social privacy online relates closely to user agency as it is about having 
control over how personal information flows online (boyd, 2010a). Surveillance online, whether 
by parents, peers or society in general, is a concern many users of social media platforms have 
across all social groups, and a significant one when considering digitally mediated intimacies and 
personal relationships. Whether it is women in shame-honour cultures who worry about their 
reputation and the repercussions of public social engagement online with the opposite sex, or the 
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common user all over the world, we care about who is watching us doing what. It is true, 
however, that we might not all choose to be as ‘private’ as one another, and what constitutes 
private differs from user to user depending on the context. Users of social media in southeast 
Turkey, for example, were found to be protective of their photographs for fear that someone 
might share them on social media without their knowledge or consent (Millet et al, 2016). On the 
other hand, the same study found that users in industrial China were less protective of 
photographs since they consider it a gesture of affection and appreciation for someone to share 
their photographs online unexpectedly. However, we all want a degree of control over what we 
put out there, even if we choose different scales of exposure for ourselves.  
Even though mediated interpersonal communication on social media platforms is public 
by default, the fact that a person is engaging in public on social media (on public-facing 
platforms) does not mean that he/she does not care about privacy (boyd, 2010a). As boyd asserts, 
“There is a big difference between being in public and being public” (2014. p.60). Pew found that 
85% of adult users want to have control over who has access to their personal information. Even 
a puzzling piece of data such as Miller et al’s (2016) finding that four in five people in rural 
China share their password with others should not be misinterpreted as a lack of concern about 
privacy. Instead we need to look at who they are willing to share their passwords with, and we 
will find that it is normally only with people they trust. This brings us back to the understanding 
of social privacy online as a desire for control over who sees what, and thus as an expression of 
user agency. Social privacy online is not something that a participant has or does not have, but 
something that users work for and negotiate to achieve using several techniques and strategies.  
 
4.4.2 Strategies to achieve privacy 
Individuals online use many techniques to achieve privacy. The most obvious way would be to 
tamper with privacy settings in order to restrict the visibility of a certain post to a certain 
audience. However, boyd found that users of social media might resort to other strategies in order 
to achieve privacy.  
 
Social steganography 
Instead of restricting audience, users might restrict access to meaning by using inside-jokes, 
otherwise known as ‘social steganography’. Social steganography is basically the act of hiding 
the meaning of a message “in plain sight by leveraging shared knowledge and cues embedded in 
particular social contexts” (boyd, 2014, p.65). This could be achieved through the utilisation of 
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innumerable linguistic and cultural tools, such as song references and lyrics, insider-jokes or 
other anecdotes from popular culture which would limit the meaning of the message to a selected 
few and exclude others from understanding it even though the message itself is functionally 
accessible by everyone. In her book It’s Complicated (2014), boyd explains how teens in the U.S. 
might use pronouns and nicknames or refer to certain events and user-predetermined code words 
to gossip with one another without adults understanding it.  
 boyd gives the example of surfing Facebook with 17-year old Serena when stumbling 
upon a status by a classmate of Serena’s which read: “I’m sick and tired of this”. While boyd 
herself, or surely any other person who is not in Serena’s school might not understand what the 
pronoun ‘this’ refers to, Serena and her school mates could fully interpret that it refers to the 
dispute that this classmate had been having with another girl from school. Through this 
technique, Serena’s classmate succeeded in limiting access to the meaning of her message even 
though the message is technically accessible to everyone on Facebook and linguistically coherent 
and meaningful, thereby achieving a greater level of privacy for herself.  Encoding content using 
social steganography could be a very useful strategy for young Saudi women to reclaim agency in 
their effort to achieve privacy in contexts in which they assume others are watching.  
 
Switching Audiences 
Another way of protecting one’s privacy online is by switching platforms - or rather audiences - 
for sharing certain messages or for a specific activity, such as choosing to share a selfie on 
Snapchat (which fosters only your close friends) rather than sharing it on Facebook (which hosts 
all your family). This entails a premeditated decision to keep audiences separate from one another 
and to manage social media profiles respectively. This act of switching platforms and being 
mindful of the audience on each platform, which boyd discusses (2014), is closely related to the 
notion of ‘scalable sociality’ which Miller et al developed in their book How the World Changed 
Social Media (2016), which will be reviewed below. Contacts and platforms could possibly 
overlap, but generally platforms become associated with certain types of communication that the 
user deems suitable for the audience on that specific platform. However, this strategy does 
present its own challenges when trying to avoid what boyds labels ‘context collapse’.   
 Context collapse happens when “people are forced to grapple simultaneously with 
otherwise unrelated social context that are rooted in different norms and seemingly demand 
different social responses” (boyd, 2014, p. 31). In a world where the notion of ‘polymedia’ 
(Madianou and Miller, 2012) dominates our communication, users might wish to separate certain 
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aspects of their personality and limit them to a particular medium with a particular audience in 
mind. However, the proliferation of social media platforms and their popularity has increased the 
probability that users will unexpectedly encounter people on the wrong platform, such as your 
aunt joining Instagram and requesting your friendship, or your mother checking your Facebook 
wall. Having imagined audiences in mind helps users to construct their online profiles and 
activity accordingly, and thus “The imagined audience defines the social context” (boyd, 2014, p. 
32). Yet, because of the intricate nature of privacy settings online and the publicness of many 
social media programs, it is hard for users to know exactly who might be also watching. 
Manoeuvring collapsed context while bearing in mind multiple potential audiences involves 
substantial social monitoring and negotiation and is certainly influencing the way we use social 
media platforms. The risk of context collapse is of a much higher consequence in the situation of 
young Saudi women from conservative families. The possibility of encountering a family 
member on a platform where these young women might choose to negotiate romance and 
intimacies with the opposite sex by adding, connecting and flirting with young men (a situation 
that the family and wider society deem inappropriate) would have a significant impact on these 
women’s reputations.  
 
Pseudonyms 
In an effort to overcome the issue of context collapse, the user might resort to the use of 
pseudonyms. The use of pseudonyms is a practice that was more common in the early days of the 
Internet in the 1990s (Turkle,1995; Stone,1996) when online communication was primarily 
textual and characterised by anonymity. However, today the ‘real-name web’ (Hogan, 2013) is 
very different from the sparse, strange and simplified ‘old web’.  Qualities that made it that way 
have receded today, leaving us with a web that is densely connected.  Moreover, even though the 
Internet supplies the affordance of anonymity, it is not anonymous by default any more, as used 
to be the case. Built-in cameras and microphones in laptops and smartphones have resulted in a 
decrease in textual communication online and a rise in photo-sharing and video-chatting, 
increasing the gap between pseudonym and online communication practices. This is not to stay 
that anonymity or pseudonyms have disappeared entirely from our online social practices, or that 
it should/will disappear, as it certainly encourages the full participation of all groups of society, 
including the vulnerable, the marginalised and the oppressed, all of whom worry about 
surveillance (Bodle, 2013). The growing usage of real names does not weaken the motivations 
for anonymity or pseudonyms. Functional reasons for pseudonyms still endure, such as wanting 
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to use a unique nickname, or as Ibarra and Petriglieri (2010) argue for personal motivations of 
identity play. But more generally pseudonyms are used in an effort to avoid the critical issue of 
context collapse upon negotiating privacy. 
 
4.4.3 From being a threat to being an opportunity 
It is because of scenarios like this that users of social media around the world might view social 
engagement on these platforms as a potential threat to their privacy. However, in several 
countries, such as India (especially in the south) and China, engaging on social media platforms 
might be the first chance for individuals to experience a genuinely private space (Miller et al, p. 
xvii). In industrial China, Miller et al (2016) observed how factory workers live together in 
factory accommodation with between six and eight occupying the same room. Daily life is 
collective where people cook in public spaces and visit without knocking. It is widely accepted 
that one would only hide a rather grim secret from the public eye. In such an environment, the 
use of social media platforms presented Chinese people in these contexts with their first chance 
for true privacy, especially given their frequent use of anonymity affordance online. Miller et al 
found that on social media factory workers in China were able to document their thoughts and 
secrets without fear of judgment from the people who they live with and share their offline space 
so closely with (Miller et al, p. 188-189).  More relevant to a case study on Saudi women, social 
media might be the only space where some Saudi women could connect and engage in a sexually 
integrated social environment, privately, and away from the gaze and control of her family.   
 boyd concludes that achieving privacy is a continuous process “by which people seek to 
have control over a social situation by managing impressions, information flows, and context” 
(2014, p.76), which makes it a variable, changeable construct highly related to user agency. The 
once rigid line which lay between public and private is now obscure, and privacy is no longer 
understood as something you have or do not have online; it is something that you constantly work 
for. In the context of Saudi Arabia, the novel ability to engage socially and freely between the  
sexes online entails achieving a certain degree of privacy, at least in the early stages of this 
practice, before it can be accepted as a social norm for the opposite sexes to interact freely in the 
community. This will be examined more closely upon reviewing Elisabetta Costa’s 2016 
contribution on the conservative Islamic society of Mardin below.  
 
 4.5 Scalable sociality 
Significant analysis and discussion on the subject of social media and its impact on personal 
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relationships is presented in the study by Daniel Miller et al (2016) (see Chapter 3). In their 
attempt to define social media, Miller et al (2016) pay close attention to the ‘scales’ on which 
users fluctuate upon communicating and socialising at a given moment online. They conceived 
two main scales: the first one is the scale from ‘the most private to the most public’, and the 
second is the scale from ‘the smallest group to the largest groups’ (p.3). At the opposite ends of 
these scales, we find private, one-to-one communication/socialisation at one end, and public 
broadcasting or mass communication/socialisation at the other end. The study asserts that our 
engagement with social media has created this notion of online ‘scalable sociality’, or the ability 
of adjusting the scale of socialising in terms of reach according to the preference of the user at 
that time considering the polymedia context of today’s digital communication as well as our 
desire to achieve privacy. The Polymedia approach (Madianou and Miller, 2012) acknowledges 
how most people today use a wide assortment of social media platforms and that no one platform 
can be understood in isolation from the others. Therefore, within the context of Polymedia, users 
can “map different kinds of sociality onto the diversity of their social media platforms” (Miller et 
al, 2016, p.4). The use of a certain platform and the connotations of using it as a medium relates 
to the way another one is used and perceived, and is therefore a perfect illustration of the concept 
of ‘scalable sociality’.  So a user might share some information on the public facing areas of 
social media such as a Facebook wall, for example, while choosing to limit romantic 
communication to private messaging, thereby adjusting the scale of sociality to a lower degree 
when convenient. For example, while a Skype video call might be preserved for the most intimate 
of relations, such as lovers at a distance, WhatsApp can be used for small group texting to close 
friends or to household family members. On a larger scale of sociality, Facebook is more of 
public facing platform that involves everyone a person knows from family members and distant 
cousins to work acquaintances and close friends, while Twitter could be open to even complete 
strangers. Miller et al conclude that “The best way to define what is popularly called social media 
but also includes prior media is thus to describe the new situation as increasingly ‘scalable 
sociality’” (p.3).  
 There is no uniform ranking of the scale of sociality on these platforms; instead, users 
select them according to their preferences and according to the platforms’ audience. Some might 
choose to have a private Facebook account, while others might use Skype group calls with 
several friends at once instead of only dyadic video calls. Scalable sociality is not only illustrated 
through Polymedia, but might be also observed within a single platform. For example, the 
functionality of ‘groups’ within WhatsApp enables the user to have a group designated solely for 
		66	
family members, while another one includes only close friends. Topics discussed easily in the 
friends group might be disregarded in the family one due to the presence of parents. Just as well, 
the user might choose to restrict a post to a certain group of contacts on a platform through the 
privacy preferences, or even to directly send a private message through the private messaging 
system of that platform instead of using its public space. This is the advantage of scalable 
sociality: it gives users choice and control over the degree of privacy or the size of the group with 
whom they wish to communicate.  
 Scalable sociality is useful for dividing spaces of interaction on social media platforms 
into a public-facing platform/space such as the Facebook wall, which everyone can view, and a 
private platform/space such as the direct messaging system on Facebook or the dyadic messaging 
on WhatsApp. This divide is critical for conservative communities with shame-honour cultures in 
which people need to be aware of social surveillance and privacy to protect their reputations, as is 
the case in Saudi Arabia. The inherent tension between privacy and publicity is a matter of 
interest in many western studies, and it is a central theme in Elisabetta Costa’s research (2016), 
which links her findings together and constitutes the perspective through which she examines 
social change. As a conservative, mostly segregated community, the issue of privacy and 
publicity is of special interest for the users of Mardin when engaging online. She states that social 
media are comprised simultaneously of both very public and very private settings, as well as the 
many areas between the two extremes. She asserts that this is one of the main reasons why social 
change, when prompted by social media, “is not a linear and uniform process, [but is] rather…  
the combination of conflictual and opposite transformations” (Costa, 2016, p. 4). This is the case 
mainly because people in shame-honour cultures behave differently on public areas of social 
media platforms than the way they do on private areas.  
 Through observing the public spaces of social media such as the Facebook wall or the 
Twitter feed and the way they are being used in Mardin, Costa finds that Mardinian users of 
social media have devised a new mode of public space that is hyper-conservative and more 
traditional than the offline Mardin society. This digital public space “reinforces traditional groups 
such as the family and lineages as well as the individual” (Costa, 2016, p.4). One important issue 
that Baym (2013) refers to in her book on personal connections online is that social forces such as 
gender and culture persist in our online communication and in some cases are even strengthened 
when mediated. And while mediated communication introduces many new qualities, it continues 
to exhibit and reinforce the wider cultural forces that shape meanings in all contexts. On the 
public online space, Costa (2016) found that female users would portray themselves as good, 
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modest Muslim women who adhere to traditional values, omitting any aspect of their lives that 
does not showcase their conformity to gendered norms and Muslim morality. This seems to stem 
directly from the degree of surveillance that their images and posts are subjected to on social 
media by immediate family and friends, a surveillance that might not necessarily occur offline. 
For example, photos that show men and women in public settings together, such as in cafes or 
restaurants, are rarely displayed publicly on profiles as it may lead to gossip or misunderstanding 
even though these practices have obviously occurred in ‘real life’.  Equally concealed on public-
facing social media platforms are premarital romantic relationships and flirtations, even if they 
are known to close friends offline; these relationships are never carried out on the public areas of 
social media. Public facing platforms are also used as a public form of interconnectivity with the 
extended family and kin, in which narratives of happy relationships are shared publicly in the 
form of family photos or to send religious holiday greetings to extended family members.  
 In the traditional conservative middle-eastern communities, the line between public and 
private has always been attentively policed. Domestic intimate areas of the home, such as the 
kitchen or the family living room, for example, have always been restricted and protected from 
outsiders’ gazes.  Therefore, women, considered belonging to that private domain, were expected 
to also remain concealed.  However, in Mardin, Costa notes that images of these private areas 
started to pop-up on public-facing platforms, with, for example, everyday photos of the family 
sharing meals together displayed on the Facebook wall for everyone to see. Similarly, the study 
notices the “increasing visibility of women whose public presence has always been limited and 
controlled” (p.6). Yet Costa explicitly details that alongside these intrusive pop-ups of the 
domestic and intimate in public areas of social media, the people of Mardin still perform selves, 
relationships and values that adhere strictly to the traditional customs of their society. Highly 
conscious of protecting reputation within the community, Mardin men and women exhibit only 
what conforms to conservative and traditional social norms on public-facing social media.  
 In contrast, upon reviewing private areas of social media, Costa finds that it had led to 
new individual-based forms of socialisation as well as facilitating prohibited mixed-gender 
friendships and love relations. On the private areas of their social media, the men and women of 
Mardin were found to be creating and maintaining their own relationships as individuals away 
from the binds of family and society that contain their offline lives. While offline, these same 
individuals tend to be defined as members of kin groups, where their role, identity and 
demeanour are determined by gender or age. Online, however, Costa notes that social media, 
specifically its private areas, could be viewed as a liberating tool where users in conservative 
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communities are able to express repressed desires and create more individual-based social 
relations. And while this argument is true for both men and women, it is especially true for 
female users, who tend to have much less autonomy and whose choices are eminently determined 
by older male family members.  
It was interesting to note how women in Mardin were offered a new opportunity through 
social media to meet new people and make new friends despite the restrictions on their offline 
movements. Costa chronicled how young female users often added strangers to their social media 
accounts and had private conversations with them. They had become skilled in navigating 
privacy settings to conceal these interactions from other friends and family contacts, or they 
would simply create a fake profile designated solely for this purpose, connecting with strangers 
away from the gaze of the family and friends. Even though this is not courtship or flirtation, but 
merely friendship, they still felt the need to hide it from others as it is considered morally 
reprehensible to communicate with total strangers.  
Costa’s finding that social media has increased the autonomy and the number and types of 
friends users could have, especially women, is in line with Wellman and Rainie’s (2012) notion 
of our movement in modern societies towards ‘networked individualism’ (explored above), 
defined as the move from group-based networks to individualised networks. This development, 
however, is not necessarily at the expense of group allegiances, but perhaps alongside them. As 
Costa notes, social media was being used in Mardin largely to maintain contacts with relatives 
scattered around Turkey and abroad, inducing strong family relations and tribal ties that 
otherwise would have been compromised by this geographic dispersal. Nonetheless, amongst the 
new kinds of social relations that Costa saw emerging online, romantic relationships are central. 
This is something which I address in the next section.   
 
4.6 Digital Romantic relationships  
It is useful to first review some of the key western literature on romantic relationships online in 
order to build an interpretive framework for the research, before moving on to review in some 
detail Costa’s account of romantic relationships in the conservative community of Mardin. The 
use of social media networks for initiating and cultivating romantic relationships is very common 
in western communities despite the frequent opportunities for a person to initiate a romantic 
relationship offline/organically (Gershon 2010; Pascoe 2010; Lenhart and Madden 2007; boyd, 
2010). Digital interaction plays an important role, specifically amongst young adults and 
adolescents, in initiating casual relationships and in progressing to a more serious/exclusive 
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attachment. Christo Sims (2007) found that especially amongst young adults flirting through 
social media with a possible love interest was less intimidating than face-to-face flirtation. 
Through what he calls ‘controlled casualness’, teenagers and young adults are able to manage the 
flirting process more effectively while avoiding the usual vulnerabilities that come with it.   
The role of social media does not stop at commencing a romantic relationship. The 
multiple sites of social networks are then used to cultivate and manage the relationship, moving it 
between platforms in accordance with the stage it is at (Pascoe, 2010) and adding more media 
channels to the communication in a calculable configuration of ‘media multiplexity’ 
(Haythornthwaite, 2005). Baym (2013) points out that as the ties we make online strengthen, 
more forms of communications are added, such as video call or instant messaging in order to 
expose us to more social cues. In her book Social Media and Personal Relationships (2013), 
Deborah Chambers documents the way in which digital media is being used by young adults to 
initiate and manage romantic relationships in a very intricate and calculated manner. She notes 
how instant messages and written textual communication in general is found to be very 
appropriate in the early stages of the relationship as it entails the right amount of informality 
(Gershon, 2010) as well as offering more control over the communication. Similarly, comments 
and likes on a love interest’s pictures or posts are also a way of treading carefully in the early 
stages of flirting in order to save face in the event that the feelings are not reciprocated. Once 
feelings prove to be mutual, then more platforms are incorporated into the digital interaction and 
the budding partners move on to video calls, phone calls and personal meetings. In addition, 
social media is used to announce and display the relationship to friends by sharing the couple’s 
photographs publicly and changing the relationship status on one’s profile, otherwise known as 
being ‘Facebook official’ (Papp et al, 2012). Moreover, social media is impacting users’ 
behaviour within intimate relationships due to the notion of continuous availability. Partners are 
communicating flexibly and frequently through the various platforms offered (Baron 2008; 
Gershon 2010, Pascoe 2010), thereby intensifying the relationship and raising expectations about 
their partner’s availability despite geographical distance or, in the case of adolescents, parental 
control.  Regular check ins and several instant media messages and texts per day become 
expected from each partner and their lack could trigger jealousy, anxiety and even digital 
surveillance (Marshall et al, 2012; Muise et all, 2009). 
 Social media networks are also used to mediate and manage breakups, sometimes in quite 
a public manner (boyd 2010a, 2010b). Gershon (2010) found that many consider breaking up 
over a social media platform to be very inappropriate, yet the practice still occurs. Depending on 
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each person’s media ideology (their own media values), some find it acceptable to end a 
relationship or announce a breakup on social media networks while some find it cruel and 
distasteful (Gershon, 2010).  Gershon also found that there was no shared consensus about the 
role social media plays in announcing the breakup to friends and family, or on how it is used to 
cope with the breakup itself as ex-partners still occupy the same virtual spaces and still appear on 
each other’s feed. Following a breakup, monitoring and stalking an ex-love interest or an ex-
partner is an issue that is being raised by the heavy use of social media networks and their 
intersected nature (Muise et al, 2009; Pascoe, 2010).  On many occasions, it is hard to overlook 
the updates on newsfeeds and the tags in a friend’s photographs and check-ins that involve an ex-
partner. Thus, stalking and surveillance is made easier and less risky.  Snippets of information 
that are gathered via photograph tags and check-ins and status updates can paint a picture of how 
that person has spent his/her weekend and with whom. This has created a pattern of 
communicating passively with partners or ex-partners which the person knows are watching, 
either by manipulating the relationship status on Facebook to single, or through using social 
steganography by posting certain songs or specific quotes that are meant to communicate a 
certain message passively without having to actually talk to the (ex-)partner.  
 The incorporeal nature of online romance does not diminish the role of the physical body 
in online intimacies (Chambers, 2013). Photographic and video-sharing tools are now key 
features in social media platforms, with some, such as Snapchat and Instagram, being solely 
devoted to video- and photo-sharing. Through the utilisation of these features, the body plays a 
dynamic and central role in online romantic relationships as both an object of desire and a 
potential reward once the relationship evolves. Physical expressions of intimacy can be 
communicated on social media and dating sites through various intricate textual and visual cues 
(Weisskirch, & Delevi, 2011; Livingstone and Gorzig, 2015; Lee et al, 2015). The occurrence of 
romance and intimacy online is quite fitting with Giddens (1992) concept of ‘plastic sexuality’, 
which challenges traditional/conventional romantic/sexual relationships. Giddens argues that 
plastic sexuality is an aspect of his notion of a ‘pure relationship’ in which personal autonomy 
and choice are equally emphasised for women and men. This is respectively shifting gender 
power in western societies towards female sexual equality. The huge range of choices on offer to 
both men and women on dating sites and through social media platforms is arguably granting 
women sexual freedom and associating it with self-realisation in the same way that Giddens 
argues through the notion of a ‘pure relationship’.  In addition, the autonomy that is emphasised 
through plastic sexuality is argued by Giddens to be facilitating and generating a wide range of 
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sexual activity that is not necessarily conventional and which could help us to understand the 
virtual and digital intimacy/sexuality that is viewed on these sites.  
Now that some of the key debates about online/digital romance and intimacy in the 
western world have been reviewed, the next section will turn back to Costa’s review of online 
romance in a culture that is more comparable to Saudi culture. 
 
4.7 Digital romantic relationships in conservative communities: Mardin 
In her focus on romantic relationships, Costa emphasises the transformative role that social media 
platforms play and the degree to which it has enhanced opportunities to fulfil a desire that some 
feel for premarital romantic love within the conservative community of Mardin. She highlights 
how social media platforms are a new, gender-integrated space where women and men can 
connect and interact more frequently than in the past. Prior to the popularity of social media in 
Mardin, the chance to engage in premarital love affairs was traditionally limited to the infrequent 
occasional encounters in a small number of offline spaces. Her evidence shows that in older 
times, premarital couples could meet clandestinely, but their options for locations were scarce, 
such as a cave or the courtyard of a mosque, for example. Not long ago, shopping malls and 
modern cafes were built on the outskirts of the expanding city and were also added as potential 
dating spots, yet they still required discretion and caution. Social media platforms, by contrast, 
are a highly accessible alternative and they now presented opportunities for an unprecedented 
number of illicit relationships.  Social media has formed a unique and flexible architecture shaped 
by its users to experience, and not just fantasise, about love, and yet keep it rigorously hidden 
(Costa, 2016 a, p.26-27). 
Costa acknowledges that the notion of online or digitally mediated romantic relationships 
in Middle Eastern societies in general, and in Mardin specifically, is not a new one. In fact, 
romance existed in ‘cyberspace’ prior to the emergence of social media. From the very early days 
of the Internet in the region, digital communication has been used to initiate romantic relations 
through forums, mIRC chats, and MSN to name a few sources (Kaya, 2009; Wheeler, D.  2006). 
This was also the case in Mardin. However, Costa argues that the diffusion of social media and 
smartphones has made online premarital romantic relations and friendships more common, less 
anonymous and accordingly more integrated into the everyday life of the young users in the 
Middle East. This has been facilitated through the scalable sociality of these platforms, as users 
continually navigate between a public area where they can meet new people, while 
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simultaneously presenting a self that is in accordance with moral expectations, and private areas 
where they can retain a hidden intimate communication with both lovers and friends.          
 Costa observes how social media in Mardin was ‘naturalised’ as a digital liaison between 
lovers, and courtship was perceived to be its distinct and vital purpose. This of course has raised 
overt issues of morality, which are not new to the literature on Islamic morals, and the issue of 
romance. In fact, several studies have investigated how traditional Muslim morality and values 
can coexist with practices of love and romance within the same settings and carried on by the 
same people (Abu-Lughod, 2000; Gilsenan, 1982; Lambek, 1993; Marsden, 2005; Marsden, 
2007; Schielke, 2009). However, subsequent to the emergence of a key study conducted by Lila 
Abu-Lughod in 2000, academics’ understanding of intimate romantic premarital relationships as 
simply ‘challenging’ traditional Islamic values in the region have ceased. In addition, Costa’s 
examination of romance in Mardin is contributing to the discourse by documenting how social 
media have shaped “new private and secrete public spaces” which cultivate premarital romance 
that used to be limited yet not completely absent (Costa, 2016 a, p.104). In a paper published in 
2016 (b), Costa specifically examines the morality of premarital romance against the Islamic 
background of Mardin's population, drawing upon the same data used in her study. She found 
that there was no shared understanding between the residents of Mardin of what constitutes an 
appropriate use of social media for courtship and flirting which is a normative cultural genre that 
was common amongst young female users.  A total diversification of individual ideas on the topic 
was also not the case either. Rather, a communal set of religious and moral values was interpreted 
differently, resulting in social media being viewed as morally appropriate in different ways by 
different women. That is to say, social media enabled a variety of moral Muslim selves which 
mirror distinct understandings of morality, religion, and modernity.          
 The inclusion of social media into intimate everyday life and practices has not formed 
‘structuring patterns of behaviour’ (Bourdieu 1977) unconsciously embraced by all users, but as 
Costa’s ethnographic data reveals, “Young unmarried women consciously attempt to live their 
moral dispositions” (Costa, 2016 b, p.212). Through their use of technology, young women are 
immersed in an active process of moulding the self, and simultaneously they are moulded by the 
technology. The outcome of this is a plethora of patterns and practices and the absence of a clear 
normative ideal standard for conducting romance online. This is the result of a divergent 
interpretation of morality on the one hand, and the secrecy that surrounds romantic practice in 
conservative communities on the other. There is no shared social context to develop social norms 
in regards of romance. For that reason, it is only with difficulty that a consensus on ‘proper 
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accepted ways’ for Muslim females to engage in premarital love is reached (Costa, 2016 b, pp. 
212-213). Costa’s findings help to explain the importance of viewing Muslim morality as 
interwoven in mediated practice, instead of viewing it as a set of values that are detached from 
the material and media world we live in. Her study demonstrates that routines of using digital 
media, and the accommodation of love aspirations within them, have been forming new (debated 
and changeable) moral normative orders around premarital romance. Her participants did not 
regard premarital romance and piety as two opposing ideals, but as “compatible expectations 
simultaneously fulfilled by the new mediated practices” (Costa, 2016 b, p.213). Instead of 
opposing each other, premarital love and morals are mutually shaping each other. 
 Through a series of examples gathered during her 15-month ethnographic research, Costa 
reveals how these stories narrate an account of social change in the Mardin community, a shift 
“from tradition to modernity, from arranged marriages to marriages for love, from extended to 
nuclear family, from a family-bond society to individualism” (Costa, 2016a, p.106). However, 
she duly notes how some traditions are still upheld - publicly at least - as the standard code, even 
if they are not actually practiced. For example, she records how arranged marriages are still 
portrayed as the ideal, and how many cases of ‘love marriages’ are presented to the public as 
arranged ones. In addition, she notes the preservation of cornerstone ideologies such as virginity 
before marriage or discretion when flirting, all remaining firm amongst the residents of Mardin. 
She concludes by saying: 
  
Modernisation has produced new social relations, but also new conservative ideologies 
and new strategies to protect women’s respectability and reputation. On social media, 
indeed, new friendships and romances came along with a new, conservative presentation 
of the self (Costa, 2016 a, p.115).      
 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed key approaches relating to relationships online and managing them.  
The networked individualism approach argues there has been a transformation from kinship 
systems and group-embedded patterns of sociality towards a more autonomous and 
individualistic type. This transformation has significant implications for Saudi women 
considering the shame-honour cultural frame of Saudi culture that ties the honour of the family to 
female chastity and as a result justifies control of her sociality. The flexible autonomy of 
networked individualism enables Saudi women to at least partially escape the limitations of being 
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embedded as a daughter, sister and a wife within the family, to a freedom of being socially 
independent from these ties, which in return would facilitate social practices that the 
family/group deem unacceptable, even reprehensible. This explains the flourishing of romantic 
relationships and the development of new, wider intimacies between the two genders in Saudi 
Arabia on social media networks. The gender integration on these networks, combined with 
agency over achieving social privacy and finally the flexible autonomy of networked 
individualism are coming together to create an environment that nurtures and promotes the 
growth of these mixed-gendered relationships and intimacies. 
 However, the Polymedia context in which sociality is being lived online is presenting its 
own challenges in achieving privacy. Upon analysing online romantic engagement and wider 
intimacy practises amongst Saudi users, and given the sensitivity of opposite-sex relations in 
Saudi Arabia’s shame-honour culture, achieving social privacy on social media networks 
becomes a central issue. Therefore, the chapter has identified a number of popular strategies that 
are being employed online to manage privacy and gain more agency over our online 
communication. The notion of scalable sociality relates to managing privacy online in the sense 
that it is dividing social media platforms into public facing areas and private areas. Costa’s work 
is of importance here as it examines a community that shares the same shame-honour culture and 
traditional collectivity with Saudi society. She notes that the transformation towards an 
individual-based sociality in conservative communities is concealed within private areas of social 
networks. People in these conservative traditional communities, especially the older generation, 
do not recognise the new types of mixed-gender relationships as legitimate, and thus the ones that 
engage in them refrain from displaying relationships in public. Consequently, a social change 
towards a more individualised sociality and self in private spaces online is occurring at the same 
time as a performance of ultra-conservative and traditional social norms in online public spaces, 
which are gradually progressing to incorporate aspects of the intimate, domestic domains. Thus, 
social media can provide part of the solution to the problem of negotiating romance and intimacy 
in conservative traditional communities, and this is why these platforms become naturalised for 
this purpose. The analysis chapters in this research will show if the same can be said about the 
Saudi community in relation to women and their relationships with the opposite sex given the 
sensitivity of opposite-sex relation in Saudi’s shame-honour culture.  
 
  
		75	
Chapter Five. Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains how an appropriate research design to answer the research questions was 
identified (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993, p.30). It addresses the rationale behind the three methods 
of data collection chosen: netnography, focus groups and one-to-one interviews. The chapter 
starts by discussing the philosophical position of the research and explains its ontology, 
epistemology and methodology. The discussion then details the methods and research tools 
employed to collect data, before considering the methods of analysis used: thematic analysis. 
Next, the chapter discusses the practical issues regarding data collection - sampling, validity and 
reliability, and ethical considerations. Finally, an account of reflexivity is included, in which the 
researcher reflects on her role in the process of collecting the data and interpreting it.  
 
5.2 Philosophical Standpoint 
Khun (1970) argues that it is important to consider the paradigm that underpins the design of any 
qualitative research and why it is chosen. A paradigm, or a philosophical position, creates a 
holistic view of knowledge, how it is acquired and how we see ourselves in relation to it. 
Awareness of it increases the quality of the research by informing the design of methodology, as 
well as the approaches and techniques used in the data collection. This section defines the key 
concepts of ontology and epistemology. It then considers different paradigms of inquiry: 
positivism, constructivism and subjectivism (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000a; Guba, 1990), before 
assessing the ontological and epistemological questions of the research and matching them to an 
appropriate interpretative framework. 
 
Ontology is the logical starting point of any research as it entails the researcher considering the 
foundation of knowledge and what reality is, followed by understanding the epistemological issue 
of how that reality can be known (Blaikie, 2000, p.8; Grix, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p.201; 
Hay, 2002, p.63). Epistemology refers to the theories and models that guide the knowledge 
production process, and is directly related to ontology in the sense that choosing a particular 
ontological stance implies the adoption of a particular epistemological stance, and vice versa 
(Crotty, 1998). For example, early social research, which was heavily influenced by the European 
intellectual movements associated with the enlightenment, approached social phenomena in a 
rigid quantitative manner. Researchers of the time tended to view humans as a static and 
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unchanging ‘object’. Thus, they used a positivist paradigm with a realist ontology and a dualist 
epistemology, which employs quantitative research strategies, and with scientific techniques 
similar to those found in the natural sciences (Bryman, 2001, pp.12-13; Grix, 2002; Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000, p.179; Packer, 2011, p.5; Polkinghorne, 1989).  
 
Positivists endeavour to deliver results that are rigorously objective and devoid of biases, which 
they assume will make the results reliable (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000a; Guba, 1990, p.22; Lincoln 
& Guba, 2000, p.168). However, the inflexibility of the positivist paradigm and the complexity of 
human behaviour and emotion renders positivism less adaptable to many situations (Flick, 1998, 
pp.2-3). Subsequently, philosophers of social science challenged the positivist paradigm by 
developing a number of post-positivist approaches which acknowledge the possibility of human 
error, bias, and subjectivity and recognise that theories need to be constantly revised (Guba, 
1990, p.22; Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p.168). The differences revolve around the constitution of 
reality and our understanding of it (i.e. is there a reality (a truth) and can we actually know, 
describe, and measure it objectively which is what positivists believe, or, on the other hand, do 
we constitute reality in the processes of observing which is how post-positivist understand reality. 
The goal of research for the positivist is to know the truth; the goal for post-positivists is to be 
intellectually honest and self-reflexive in researching while acknowledging that we cannot know 
the truth.  
 
A different approach saw the rise of anti-foundational ontologies that were less concerned with 
objectively measuring an objective reality (as opposed to the process of meaning-making itself), 
interpretative epistemologies and qualitative research methods as tools of inquiry. Amongst the 
leading paradigms of this nature is social constructivism. The ontological position within a social 
constructivist paradigm asserts that, in contrast to positvism’s depiction of a single observable 
reality, there are actually multiple representations of reality. It considers reality (social 
phenomena and their meanings) to be continually revised through social interaction, in which 
individuals in groups create and recreate culture rather than culture being a pre-given and 
dictating behaviour (Bryman, 2012). In order to assess how extensive interaction on social media 
platforms is influencing the values and norms of young Saudi women, to examine how 
engagement on social media is contributing to changes in the public image of young Saudi 
women, and to understand the impact of social media on values and attitudes towards intimate 
and mixed-gender relations (i.e. the key foci of this research), an ontological stance that 
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recognises the changing nature of culture must be adopted. Thus, given the research questions, 
this research is positioned within a constructivist paradigm.  
  
Constructivists aim to understand and reconstruct what individuals (including the investigator) 
initially believe reality to be (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p.113). In their exploration of human 
awareness, constructivists insist that we should always be open to new interpretations of reality. 
From a constructivist ontological standpoint, there is no single objective reality as to what a 
Saudi woman is, looks like, or what her values are; on the contrary, there are multiple subjective 
meanings of ‘Saudi woman’ that are constantly reconstructed through (re)negotiation in human 
interaction. Accordingly, a constructivist epistemological stance asserts that reality needs to be 
interpreted in order to discover and frame the underlying meanings of events, activities and social 
phenomena (Charmaz, 2000, p.523; Fay, 1996; Potter, 1996; Schwandt, 2000, pp.197-198). 
Furthermore, the researcher plays an instrumental role in creating knowledge through interaction 
with the participants. Thus, in order to understand how social media is impacting on the values 
and norms of Saudi women when it comes to opposite-sex relations or identity expressions, we 
need to interpret the meanings of Saudi social media behaviour and activity, and interpret what it 
means to be a Saudi woman according to the respondents and the observed individuals. Guba and 
Lincoln (1998, p.111) state that constructivist epistemology is transactional and subjective. 
‘Transactional’ in this sense means that the reality of what a Saudi woman is and looks like arises 
from interactions between individuals and between individuals and situations (Berlin, 1987). 
These interactions produce a ‘truth’ that is never static but rather constantly evolving. What is 
meant by ‘subjective’ is that the truth is unknown, and it is the job of the researcher to uncover it 
by constructing an impression of it as he/she sees it (Ratner, 2008). Thus, in this context, there is 
no distinction between ontology and epistemology, as the “investigator and the object of 
investigation are interactively linked so that the findings are literally created as the investigation 
proceeds” (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p.111).  
 
Finally, the methodological framework is chosen in accordance with the ontological and 
epistemological stances. In a constructivist research that is concerned with interpreting behaviour 
and social phenomena, several methods can be used to collect accurate, valid data which helps to 
interpret the reality that the researcher is investigating. Given the ontological and epistemological 
frameworks through which constructivism sees the world, constructivist research uses the 
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qualitative methods of observation (through ethnography or netnography), qualitative interviews, 
case studies, focus groups, narratives, among others, for collecting data.  
 
5.3 Data Collection Strategy 
The keynote methods used in this research is netnography. Netnography was chosen because of 
its high compatibility with the study of social media networks. Its observational nature enabled 
me to examine Saudi women’s use of social networks, and therefore to answer the research 
questions on how the rise in social media use in Saudi Arabia is influencing the values and norms 
of young Saudi women, their attitudes towards romance, and in what ways is it contributing to 
changes in their public image. In addition to netnography, two further methods of data collection 
were adopted in order to increase the validity of the findings: one-to-one interviews and focus 
groups.  
 
Validity and reliability are a common concern associated with findings generated through 
observation and a constructivist paradigm. One way to overcome these limitations is to use 
multiple methods of collection to validate the findings by corroborating one source of data with 
another, known as triangulation (Mason, 2002). The data that was collected from the initial 
netnographic observations was used to formulate the questions that guided the focus groups and 
interviews. Findings gathered through netnographic observation were thus cross-checked 
(‘triangulated’) with several respondents during personal interviews, as well as through the 
discussions in focus groups, and interpretations were developed accordingly. The inclusion of 
these two methods enabled me to accurately interpret the behaviour and actions observed 
netnographically online by discussing them directly with the respondents. Moreover, having a 
different sample in each method (micro-celebrities in netnography, and regular users in the focus 
groups and one-to-one interviews) enabled me not only to cross-validate the data but also to 
capture different dimensions of the same social process: performing femininity/identity 
construction.  
 
In this context, the role of the qualitative researcher is a self-reflexive bricoleur who groups and 
gathers the pieced representations of reality together and builds an account of a community 
narrative at a certain moment in time (Charmaz, 2000, p.522; Nelson et al., 1992, p.2; Weinstein 
& Weinstein, 1991, p.161), narratives which may change at different historical moments (Lincoln 
& Guba, 2000, p.167). Thus, what it means to be a Saudi woman, what she looks like and how 
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she behaves and her values and ideals about love, intimacy and opposite gender relations in 
general might be different today from a point in the past due in part to extensive social media 
engagement, which themselves may change over time. 
 
The following sections discuss the three methods used, their sampling frame and how each relates 
to the research questions.  
 
5.3.1 Netnography 
As stated, observation is a compatible method with a constructivist research paradigm. In 
netnography, which originated in ethnography, interactions are observed on digital networks and 
later interpreted to answer the research questions. It is a dance of possibilities to understanding 
social interaction in contemporary digital communications context (Kozinets, 2015). In this 
section, I discuss my sample for this method, what websites and accounts were included. I also 
explain when the data was collected and how it fits into the overall research design. In addition, I 
highlight what I did and why.  
 
Sampling of netnography 
The sampling for this method is twofold: website (platform) samples, and account (user) samples. 
Choosing the website sample was in accordance with Kozinets’ (2015) guidelines for selecting 
online communities that are worthy of netnographic observation. Kozinets (2015, p.168) 
recommends choosing sites that are: relevant, active/interactive, substantial, 
heterogonic/homogenic, rich in data and experiential. Relevant is used in the sense that the sites 
relate to your research questions. Thus, Instagram is relevant because the heavy use of 
photography and images meant that it is a possible site to assess contesting norms and values 
around veiling as a fundamental feature of the customary image of the Saudi woman. What is 
meant by active and interactive is that the site has recent and regular flows of communication 
between the participants. For this reason, Facebook was excluded from the observation as it is no 
longer actively used by many Saudis; instead, Snapchat was used because of its current 
popularity and high activity. Being substantial and rich in data means that the sites chosen must 
have a critical mass of communicators and offer detailed or descriptively rich data with 
significant numbers of postings and comments. This quality was found on Instagram, where the 
accounts of social media influencers included a plethora of comments and interactions from other 
Saudi users. All the sites observed were homogenous in the sense that I observed a Saudi 
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collectivity on the site. For example, on Twitter, I chose to observe the trending hashtags in Saudi 
Arabia. This was done through a ‘filter’ option in which you can view what hashtags are trending 
in a certain country. However, the sites were also heterogeneous in the sense that they included 
both genders (men and women), as well as Saudis from various social classes and cultural 
backgrounds. Data collected through netnography was naturalistic as respondents were observed 
in their setting with no interference from the researcher. See Table 4.1 for a summary of the 
websites considered and used, along with the reasons for choosing or rejecting them.  
 
Platform Included or not Reason(s) 
Instagram Included • For its heavy use of Images and videos. 
• For its activeness and interactive comment section. 
Snapchat Included • For its heavy use of video and images. 
• Activeness and relevance. 
Twitter Included • Substantial and rich in data.  
• Highly interactive hashtags. 
YouTube Included • Interactive comment section.  
Facebook Not included • No longer active 
Table 5.1: Platform Sample 
 
The second consideration in the sample was to consider whom to observe on these platforms. My 
criteria for choosing the sample was: Saudis (whether male or female) between the ages of 18-35 
who are users of social media. On Instagram, I observed the accounts of six female Saudi social 
media influencers (micro-celebrities), as well as the private Instagram accounts of nine ordinary 
Saudi women (one of whom is running a business through her account), who later participated in 
the one-to-one interviews (see Table 4.2). Micro-celebrities sample was chosen based on 
popularity and reach. I drew on my prior knowledge of Saudi digital culture as a young Saudi 
female myself, in identifying the sample and choosing 6 of the biggest most popular women 
accounts. A higher number would have been hard to manage because of the high volume of posts 
and comments on these micro-celebrity accounts. As for the ‘ordinary’ accounts, I sampled them 
using a snow-ball technique starting with a general ‘call for participants’ that I have posted on my 
own Twitter and Instagram accounts, to which a several friends and acquaintances responded 
		81	
positively and agreed to take part in the research. They then recommended other friends and 
acquaintances of their own. Only 9 women responded positively to being part of the research and 
all those who have accepted were part of the sample. If I had more time to collect my sample I 
might have been able to observe a bigger number of participants. Nonetheless, the sample 
provided interesting rich data despite its small size. The observance of micro-celebrity accounts 
related directly to my question on how social media engagement was changing the image of 
young Saudi women and contesting the values and norms around veiling and producing a post-
feminine image of Saudi woman. The accounts were also very rich in data due to their popularity 
and their publicness. In addition, the private accounts were informative in relation to the 
questions around attitudes towards romance and wider intimacy practices which I later discussed 
with the observant in one-to-one interviews.  
Percentages used in the analysis to interpret the data (such as in the analysis of figure.27 or the 
analysis of Khawater Al-khuwaiter posts) were reached by selecting a random sample of 100 
posts/comments and coding them to asses the percentage that I use in my analysis. 
 
Person Observed Type of Account Number of Followers 
Roz (@model_roz) Public 6.7 M 
Hala Abdulla (@thehala) Public 830K 
Sausan Alqadhi (@stylemesausan) Public 44.6K 
Afnan Albatel (@afnan_albatel) Public 6.7M 
Khawater (@om_Shahoooody) Public 1.1M 
Thana and Sakhaa (@theabduls) Public 69.9K 
Aseel (@Guzel.sa) Public (Business) 21.5K 
Mai Private 169 
Shikhah Private 132 
Sarah Private 99 
Muneerah Private 32 
Wafa Private 138 
Hessah Private 4K 
Kholood Private 6K 
Ghadah Private 750 
Table 5.2: Instagram Sample 
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The Twitter Sample was approached differently. Instead of targeting certain accounts, I observed 
the activities on trending Saudi hashtags that were related to my research questions. This was 
done through a ‘filter’ option on the platform which allows you to view what hashtags are 
trending in a specific country. In particular, a hashtag regarding Malak Alshehri was very useful 
as it related directly to my question around the image of young Saudi women, as well as to the 
theme of nationalism (this is explained in more detail in the analysis sections). A similar 
approach was used in the YouTube sampling, in which I examined the comment sections under 
specific videos from Saudi YouTubers that discussed topics relating to the themes of the research, 
such as the videos of Hatoon Qadi, a female Saudi YouTuber. Other videos were either pointed 
out by the respondents in my focus groups, or I became aware of them due to their popularity 
(viral videos). In the latter case, the videos were embedded either on Twitter Hashtags or on 
Instagram accounts I observed. The Snapchat sample amounted to 61 individuals and was a 
combination of the following: 12 of the highest viewed Saudi micro-celebrities (influencers) 
these are mostly the same influencers that were followed on Instagram as each influencer has an 
account on each platform plus 6 more micro-celebrities, again here the criteria for choosing them 
was their reach and popularity amongst young Saudis. Forty-three personal Saudi friends and 
acquaintances of mine, these were my original friend list as a user of Snapchat myself. In 
addition, 15 individuals from my focus groups whom I asked to add on Snapchat in order to 
observe them and then later interview them in the one-to-one interviews [see table 5.4]. These 15 
were chosen based on consent (those who agreed to be observed were included in the sample). 
Not all 15 made it to the one-to-one interviews phase. I ended up interviewing only 6 people, 
these were the ones that were perceived to have something interesting that needed further 
discussion, as the interviews facilitated any further questions or explanation to their activity on 
the platform. With regards to gender, I observed and analysed both the responses of male and 
female users on all these platforms equally. It is important to highlight that although the observed 
accounts on Instagram are of women, the comments on their posts were open to both genders and 
it is from here that a large portion of my data came. The reader will notice that the majority of the 
examples I use in this research are from Instagram, this is due to the vividness of the images on 
the site. However, it is important to note that the examination of other platforms such as Twitter 
for example was instrumental for this research. It was a useful tool not only for recruiting 
participants but also for gaining knowledge of the latest trends and debates concerning Saudi 
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women which in return helped me form the questions for the personal interviews and focus 
group.  
 
Time frame of netonography 
The netnographic observance of the different social media platforms and accounts was not 
limited to one stage of the project, but occurred throughout the whole study. The ability to access 
previously produced interactions retroactively enabled me to go back and forth in my 
netnographic observation of these accounts and platforms. An initial scan was undertaken at the 
beginning of the data collection process and prior to the holding of focus groups and interviews 
in order to inform the questions and themes to be discussed. This scan took place between July 
and September 2015, and brought new themes to my attention, such as the theme of nationalism 
and the image of the ‘true’ Saudi woman.  
 
After the focus groups were held, between November 2015 and February 2016, an in-depth 
observation of certain accounts was conducted, as well as observation of several hashtags on 
Twitter. These produced rich sets of data. I developed an archive system to save the data that I 
found potentially useful for analysing at a later date. I created three different folders: Nationality, 
Relationships, Identity, with each correlating with a possible general theme. Data that was found 
interesting, whether it was a comment from a user, a photo shared by a celebrity on Instagram, a 
post on Snapchat, or a tweet in a hashtag, was captured through using the print screen or snip it 
tool, then archived in the corresponding folder. While most of the data using this method was 
collected in that period, I continued to monitor these accounts and websites throughout the rest of 
2016 2017 in case any relevant data was added. Indeed, in September 2017 the ban on women 
driving was lifted in Saudi Arabia along with allowing women into sports stadiums for the first 
time (a public area from which there were excluded before), which generated a lot of reaction and 
debate on social media platforms. Therefore, more examples were added to the analysis from 
September 2017.  
 
Limitations and advantages of netnographic research 
Given the topic of this research and the research questions, this method was found to be very 
useful and instrumental in observing and assessing how social media is impacting on Saudi 
women's values, norms and attitudes towards love and wider intimacy practices, in addition to 
observing contemporary Saudi femininity and how the image of the Saudi woman is being lived 
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on social media networks. Just as an ethnographer observes the interactions of subjects within a 
community, a netnographer observes the conversations, activities and interactions between users 
on a networked society, such as social media platforms, and considers these to be data. This data 
is recorded in contemporary communication networks and can be accessed by anyone, which is 
an advantage of this method. The retroactivity factor meant that I could go back and observe 
interactions that had happened several years before, while in ethnography the researcher is 
limited to observing the current situation.  
 
The main limitation of netnography is that it relies heavily on the researcher’s interpretative 
skills. In order to successfully conduct netnographic research, the researcher must have an in-
depth understanding of the culture that surrounds the data by immersing himself/herself in the 
community he/she is studying (Kozinets, 2010, p.75). It is not sufficient to be able to run a 
software or an application. So it was necessary to fully understand how Saudi women think and 
behave and to be very knowledgeable of the complex Saudi culture and Arabic language 
(including the Saudi dialect and modern slang) to be able to detect and explore the nuance, 
sarcasm, and symbolism found in the data and to be able to interpret it correctly. It is obvious that 
being a young Saudi woman gave me a significant advantage in this research and turned me into 
an additional tool that enriched the research and enabled me to unearth the interactions that were 
worthy of analysis from the large volume of data found. I had prior understanding of the Saudi 
culture by being part of it, as well as full knowledge of the latest trends, viral videos and 
influential online Saudis. Another advantage of this method is that it is less intrusive than 
ethnography as the researcher does not need to be physically immersed in the daily lives of the 
observants; instead, all the observants’ interactions can be viewed, downloaded and saved 
digitally from a network public. This is efficient as it saves the researcher money, travel and time 
that otherwise would have been needed to conduct ethnographic research (Kozinets, 2002).  
 
5.3.2 Focus Groups 
Focus groups were held to cross check data gathered from the netnographic research and to help 
interpret it. One of the main reasons for holding focus groups was to generate data on the 
opinions and attitudes of women and men towards romance and their wider intimacy practices. 
The focus groups and one-to-one interviews were more useful compared to netnography for 
collecting data on this specific topic. This is because the practise of intimacy on social media is 
often conducted in the private areas of networked publics away from the gaze of the netnographic 
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researcher. Focus groups were also useful in observing discussions around the changing values 
and societal norms around practices such as veiling and gender segregation. The discussions 
provided rich data on the intentions and motives behind the observed online actions of the Saudi 
youth and the way they think of the Saudi collectivity.  
 
Sampling of Focus Groups 
Seven focus group discussions were conducted with five groups comprising all women 
participants, and two groups containing mixed genders (see Table 4.3). Although this research 
focuses mainly on Saudi women, their image and their attitudes towards love and intimacy 
practises, these areas are, quite obviously, highly influenced by men. In a patriarchal society such 
as Saudi Arabia, the attitudes of men impact significantly the actions of women, as is revealed in 
the analysis. Therefore, it was important to include men in the focus groups to generate a well-
rounded set of data. As mentioned earlier, participants were chosen through a purposive snowball 
sampling technique (Tonkiss, 2004, p.199), where participants referred me to others who were 
willing to take part in the research. I first reached out to my own friends and contacts using an 
announcement across all my social media platforms (this included Instagram, Snapchat and 
Twitter) and the ones who responded to my call for participants referred me to more people who 
they know and are willing to take part in the study.  
 
 
Focus Group No. Number of participants Gender 
Session 1 5 All female 
Session 2 5 All female 
Session 3 4 All female 
Session 4 4 All female 
Session 5 4 All female 
Session 6 7 3 Males, 4 females 
Session 7 7 2 males, 5 females 
Table 5.3: Focus Groups Sample 
 
The participants were between 18 and 35 years old. This age range was chosen for several 
reasons. First, the Internet became accessible to the general public in Saudi Arabia in the early 
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2000s. Thus, it was important for the research that the sample included those who were born in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Half of the participants were digital natives, while the rest were digital 
immigrants (Prensky, 2001). Digital natives are users who were born during or after digital media 
and technology became popular. This includes those who were born in the 1990s as they grew up 
with digital media, even if it was in its early stages. Thus, I identify all participants who are 26 
and younger as digital natives. Those who are older are digital immigrants. It is important to 
distinguish between the two groups as it helps in assessing the impact of social media in changing 
the attitudes of users towards societal norms and values. Digital immigrants are more likely to be 
able to recall a time when their values were stronger and more influenced by the collectivity, 
whether this is the family or society as a whole. Moreover, the distinction between the two age 
groups allows us to consider the fractured modern identities that are expressed by digital 
immigrants online, and compare them with the more cohesive expression of identity amongst 
digital natives (see Chapter 6 for more detail). All the participants were from Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia’s capital and largest city, and two of them currently live abroad. With 6.5 million residing 
in Riyadh (High Commission for the Development of Riyadh, 2016), the city is a melting pot for 
all Saudi tribes and cultural backgrounds, both conservative and liberal. 
 
Time frame of focus groups 
It was critical that the focus groups took place after the initial netnographic scan of popular social 
media networks in Saudi Arabia in order to help form the guiding questions and to flag any 
online behaviours in need of discussion. The primary netnographic observation was undertaken 
between July and September 2015. Accordingly, the focus groups were conducted and recorded 
in September and October 2015. However, due to technical problems with my personal computer, 
a small number of sessions were lost. It was not possible to retrieve them despite considerable 
effort. Thus, a few more sessions were conducted to compensate for the shortage in data due to 
this setback. The extra sessions took place in December 2015 and January 2016. The sessions 
were held at a time that suited all the participants (Converse & Schuman, 1974, p.53; Tonkiss, 
2004).   
 
Method, advantages and limitations 
The sessions were conducted via Skype, which was not only economically advantageous but also 
allowed geographic distance to be overcome (Reid & Reid, 2005). Skype calls enabled all 
participants to see and hear one another, including the moderator. The sessions were captured 
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using Quicktime, which recorded the screen of the moderator as the sessions took place. In terms 
of reflexivity, the use of Skype, which is in itself a social media platform, highlighted several 
issues around gender segregation which were raised. Participants were aware of these issues and 
spontaneously referred to them during the focus groups, which was an example of how social 
media is facilitating mixed-gender relations.  
 
As some of the topics debated in this research (such as veiling, pre-marital love and intimacy) are 
traditionally sensitive in Saudi Arabia, I positioned myself as a data co-producer in the focus 
groups by citing my own experiences with social media as a young female Saudi user in order to 
establish a familiar and trusting relationship with the participants and therefore lead a free-
flowing discussion (Burgess, 1982; Byrne, 2004; Mason, 1996, pp.36-38; Spradley, 1979). This 
is in accordance with the constructivist research paradigm adopted in this study, in which the 
researcher is a co-producer of the data, and reality is transactional and subjective (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1998). From a constructive ontological stance, reality is a result of the interaction 
between the individuals with one another (including the researcher) and individuals and their 
settings (Berlin, 1987; Charmaz, 2000, p.523; Fay, 1996; Potter, 1996; Schwandt, 2000, pp.197-
198).  
Finally, despite my effort to include a number of male participants in the focus groups with the 
intention of generating a balanced dataset, the number of men was not sufficient to do so. I 
accumulated far fewer responses from men than I have anticipated. Nevertheless, as this remains 
a study about women and their contemporary ideals of femininity, it is therefore the  voices and 
views of young? women that are the focal point of this research.      
 
5.3.3 Semi-Structured, One-to-One Interviews 
Interviews are a popular way of collecting data in modern qualitative and quantitative studies 
(Atkinson & Silverman, 1997; Fontana & Frey 2000, pp.646-647; Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, 
p.1; Mishler, 1986, p.23; Silverman, 1993, 1997). Bryman (2012) posits that there are three 
different types of interview: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured interviews. While the 
first type is more commonly used in quantitative research (Converse & Schuman, 1974; Seale, 
2004), the latter two are commonly adopted in qualitative research (Bryman, 2012). Semi-
structured and unstructured interviews allow the participants to share their personal perspectives 
and are generally more efficient when exploring topics where there is limited knowledge 
(Bryman, 2012; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Moreover, qualitative interviews are concerned with 
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developing an understanding of subjects’ identities as a cultural and historical construct that is in 
a continuous process of subjective transformation (Foucault, 1979, 1982). Therefore, qualitative 
interviews often seek to encourage participants to articulate their personal experiences and 
viewpoints in their own words (Byrne, 2004, p.182; Fontana & Frey, 2000, p.653; Taylor & 
Bogdan, 1984, p.7). Because one of my key research questions is about the developing and 
changing values of Saudi women, semi-structured interviews were considered to be important to 
ascertain the romantic practices of women online and how their online engagement on social 
media might impact their values and norms around romance and wider intimate practices. In 
addition, it was deemed to be a suitable method to examine the development of a contemporary 
feminine identity that is emerging amongst young Saudi female users of social media. 
 
Sampling of one-to-one interviews 
The interview sample was drawn from the focus group sessions, as well as the participants who 
had their accounts observed netnographically. As mentioned earlier, those who depicted 
interesting views on the focus group discussion or posted things that needed to be unpacked were 
asked to be interviewed, this was the criteria on which the participants in the interviews were 
chosen. The aim was to discuss their actions, behaviours or comments that were relevant to my 
research questions. In total, six one-to-one interviews (one male and five females) were 
conducted (see Table 4.4). Two more participants were asked to be interviewed but they have 
refused to take part in the interview section of the research.  
 
Interviewee Age Point of Recruitment  
Aseel 30 Observed account 
Wafa 35 Observed account 
Mai 26 Focus group participant + Observed account 
Sarah 32 Observed account 
Munaeerah 23 Focus group participant  
Ali 33 Focus group participant  
Table 5.4: One-to-One Interview Sample 
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Time frame of one-to-one interviews 
One-to-one interviews were scheduled to take place after the completion of the focus groups. The 
decision to collect the data in this order was deliberate as interviews were included to enable a 
deeper understanding of the issues raised in the netnographic observation and focus groups and 
personal motives behind some of the observed actions. Thus, it was important that interviews 
were undertaken after this knowledge was acquired and the themes formulated. Accordingly, the 
interviews were conducted in February and March 2016.  
 
Method, advantages and limitations 
As with the focus groups, the interviews were undertaken via Skype. Participants were in their 
homes and connected online and the interviews were recorded using Quicktime.  Kazmer & Xie 
(2008) note that online interviews are commonly very effective when the research topic is related 
to the online context, such as the case with my study dealing with social media usage. As stated 
previously, in preparation for the interviews I observed the Instagram and Snapchat accounts of 
four of the participants over a period of four weeks (the other two were recruited to follow up 
some of their comments during the focus groups). Consent was obtained prior to the observation 
as three of these accounts were private. Some of the practices observed were noted in order to be 
discussed during the interviews, particularly those related to romantic expressions. This enriched 
the data that had been collected netnographically and compensated for the limitations of 
netnography when it comes to examining behaviour taking place in private areas of the 
Internet/social networks. Wengraf’s (2001) argument that semi-structured interviews are a 
research tool with “high-preparation, high-risk, high-gain, and high-analysis” (2001, p.5) proved 
to be true in my research. The main characteristic of semi-structured interviews is that they 
provide flexibility (Bryman, 2012). I followed a pre-scripted ‘interview guide’ that was 
customised to each respondent in accordance with the data collected netnographically or in 
accordance with their participation in the focus group. The guide was followed to a certain 
degree. However, the flexibility of the semi-structured interview allowed for new questions to be 
formulated according to the responses of the participant during the interview (Bryman, 2012).  
 
The questions were open-ended and the atmosphere of the interviews was informal in order to put 
the participants at ease and allow for a free-flowing conversation. In addition, my gender and 
proximity in age to the participants was an advantage as it allowed me to create an atmosphere of 
trust and friendliness with my female respondents. This development of a rapport, as well as the 
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privacy of the interviews, meant that the respondents felt free to express their feelings and 
opinions around some of the sensitive topics discussed with no fear of judgment. In contrast to 
focus groups, where participants tend to express ‘culturally expected views’, interviews allow for 
true and genuine opinions to be expressed independently from the group (Bryman, 2012, p.518). 
In addition, the results of the Asch experiment (1951) show that in a focus group an emergent 
group opinion can suppress a different perspective that is held by just one member of the group. 
 
5.4 Analytical Approach - Thematic Analysis 
Data was analysed using thematic analysis, which is one of the most common modes of analysis 
in qualitative research (Guest, 2012). In addition, it supports a constructivist research paradigm 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006) because it examines how events, realities, meanings and experiences are 
the outcome of interactions between individuals with one another and with social settings. This 
approach focuses on an entire data corpus, such as focus groups, interviews, and netnographic 
data, as opposed to narrative analysis, for example, which points out themes within one data item 
such an interview with a single participant (Murray, 2003; Riessman, 1993). Thematic analysis 
was considered appropriate as it enabled an understanding of the large data corpus. Furthermore, 
it is a flexible and functional research tool that can potentially yield a “rich and detailed yet 
complex account of data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.5). Braun and Clarke define thematic 
analysis as “A method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns within data” (2006, p.79). 
It organises and describes data sets in rich detail into themes, as well as interprets various aspects 
of the research topic (Boyatzis, 1998). The way these themes are identified is not necessarily 
dependent on measuring them quantifiably by counting how many times they appear in the data 
corpus; rather, some themes are determined according to their ability to capture something 
important in relation to the research questions.  
 
The coding was done manually by transcribing the focus groups and interviews. If the data were 
larger, software packages such as Nvivo would have been useful for the coding. However, I 
found it possible to code the data manually using word files and folders to group contents of each 
identified theme together, as explained above. An inductive approach to thematic analysis was 
employed for coding the themes in which the coding frames were not pre-determined and the 
researcher attempted to be free from any preconceptions. This approach produced a theme that 
was not originally considered in the research questions: nationalism and the ‘true Saudi identity’. 
Accordingly, the research questions were refined as the project progressed in order to reflect the 
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intention to assess this emerging theme. However, as Braun and Clarke (2006) argue, a researcher 
cannot be entirely free from a theoretical and epistemological commitment, and data are not 
coded in an epistemological vacuum. Thus, some themes were coded in a deductive ‘top down’ 
manner in which the coding was explicitly analyst-driven by the researcher’s interest in the 
values and norms of young Saudi women. Therefore, it was anticipated that certain themes 
identified in the data would arise, such as veiling and gender segregation. Ryan and Bernard 
(2000) list a number of techniques to identify themes within the data collected, several of which 
were used to identify themes within the research, such as: simple word count, repetition, and 
indigenous categories such as the use of the word ‘eyb’ (shameful).  
 
Three main themes emerged from the data collected, each comprising a chapter of the analysis: 
online identity, nationalism and the true Saudi woman, and finally, personal and intimate 
relationships online. Sub-themes that emerged within these three main themes were: gender 
segregation; veiling; premarital relationships; and online fame/micro-celebrity.  
 
Importantly, the analysis of the themes went beyond the semantic content of the data and 
examined the underlying ideas, ideologies and conceptualisations that were informing and 
building the semantic content. At this level of identification, thematic analysis overlaps with 
certain types of discourse analysis, specifically thematic discourse analysis, where broader 
meanings are theorised as underpinning what is actually articulated in the data. This was 
undertaken in this research specifically in the example of nationalism, where theories about 
women and nation and women as guardians of culture were used to underpin and analyse the data 
collected netnographically from the perspectives of Saudi women.  
 
The analysis was conducted in several phases. This was not a linear process, but rather a 
recursive one in which the researcher moved back and forth between the phases as and when 
necessary. In the first phase, in September and October 2015, I familiarised myself with the data 
as I translated and transcribed the data from Arabic to English. This resulted in an overview being 
formed, and general notes were taken to highlight ideas for possible patterns to be used in theme 
coding at a later stage. Several scholars highlight the importance of transcribing data for the 
researcher to successfully familiarise himself/herself with it (Bird, 2005; Lapadat & Lindsay, 
1999; Riessman, 1993). The second phase of generating initial codes and searching for themes 
within them took place in January 2016. In this phase, an inductive approach to the data was 
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employed and the initial codes were produced manually at a basic descriptive level (Tuckett, 
2005). At this point the research questions were reformulated. It is worth noting that the coding 
of themes was a combination of data-driven and theory-driven coding processes. By the end of 
February 2016, the search for broader themes began and the codes were sorted into different 
themes that were revised and refined before finally narrowing down to three main themes with a 
number of sub-themes. The process of revising the themes continued throughout the spring of 
2016, as more data was added through the on-going netnographic observations.  
 
Finally, the last stage in the analysis was defining and naming the themes, analysing them in 
detail, linking them to the research questions and linking this with the theoretical framework. 
This happened in February and March 2017. In this phase, the initial descriptive data that was 
formalised in the first and second phases was further analysed and contextualised in order to form 
arguments in relation to the research questions. This phase focused mainly on the third research 
question as I attempted to ascertain the cultural implications of changes in the values and norms 
of young Saudi women, their attitudes towards romance and their wider intimacy practices, and 
changes in the public images of young Saudi women. Thus, the overall analysis of how social 
media engagement is impacting the lives of Saudi women was pinned down during this phase.  
 
 
5.5 Validity and Reliability 
Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research, including netnographic research, has no clear 
and measurable standards of evaluation. Thus, it is often critiqued as being vague or ambiguous, 
and there is debate about whether or not the results should be generalised. However, Baym 
(2006) highlights the many strengths that qualitative studies enjoy. On top of being grounded in 
theory and data, qualitative research usually demonstrates rigor in data collection and analysis, as 
well as the ability to draw on several data collection strategies (Baym, 2006, p.82). As noted 
above (see section 5.3), the use of different methods of data collection is known as triangulation, 
which is a robust technique that enables the data to be validated through cross verification, 
thereby increasing its credibility (Bogdan & Biklen, 2006; Rothbauer, 2008). As noted (see 
section 5.3), this research did not rely solely on netnographic data, but also used focus groups and 
semi-structured interviews, thereby increasing the validity of the results. 
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Furthermore, while the reliability of quantitative research was conventionally associated with 
objectivism (Schwandt, 2000, p.196; Shapiro, 1981; Taylor, 1985, 1995), the nature of qualitative 
research is being reconstructed to adopt an open-ended, interpretive, and naturalistic approach 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Geertz, 1973, 1983). Several scholars note the move in qualitative 
research towards the endorsement of authenticity and trustworthiness as new standards are used 
to evaluate the validity of the research (Guba & Lincoln 1989, p. 245-251; Lincoln & Guba 2000, 
p. 178-179; Schwandt 1989). Based on its assumption that there is not a single objective truth, 
constructivism employs negotiated criteria to understand and explain the multi-constructed social 
realities within diverse contexts (Hiley et al., 1991; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Rabinow & Sullivan, 
1979). Accordingly, this study constructs a dialogic space in order to explore the ways in which 
social media engagement is impacting Saudi women’s values, norms and attitudes towards 
personal relationships with the opposite sex and towards love and intimacy, as well as its impact 
on the image of the Saudi woman and the implications that arise from all of this.  
 
Given that the focal point of this research is women, and that I myself am a Saudi woman, 
intellectual honesty and bias cannot be avoided entirely, as is the case with other interpretivist 
research that aims to give voice to the marginalised (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p.14; West, 1989, 
ch. 6) or attempt to grasp the meaning of social experiences (Charmaz, 2000, p.523; Fay, 1996; 
Potter, 1996; Schwandt, 2000, pp.197-198). Nonetheless, bias was controlled within this research 
through various approaches: records were kept regarding the research progress, data analysis and 
problems that arose, all of which was very helpful in the reflexivity in the last stages of the study. 
In addition, the research was conducted systematically in order to collect valid empirical data by 
using multiple methods—netnographic observation, focus groups and semi-structured 
interviews—within an open-ended paradigmatic structure. Finally, comparative methods, which 
require rigorous criteria, were used to analyse, categorise, and refine the data into distinct themes 
that not only included deductive themes which were determined within the initial theoretical 
framework, but also inductive themes.  
 
5.6 Ethical Issues 
All participants in the focus groups and personal interviews received and approved a consent 
form, which highlighted the potential risks of the study. They were also given an information 
sheet which clearly explained the objective of the research, stated their right to withdraw from the 
study whenever they wanted, and listed all the researcher’s contact information. They all took 
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part in the research voluntarily with no compensation or any other form of payment. At the 
beginning of each focus group and interview the respondents were briefed orally about the study 
and its aims and were given my contact information. They were asked to reach out to me 
whenever they had further questions or enquiries about the progress of the research.  
 
The participants were informed that the focus groups and interviews were being recorded; 
however, they were guaranteed that the recordings would only be used by the researcher in this 
specific study. Similarly, during the netnographic data collection, respondents with semi-private 
social media accounts were only observed after their consent to participate had been secured. 
They were also informed of the possibility of recording (capturing) their actions/posts/likes on 
the social media platform as part of the netnographic research. However, micro-celebrity 
accounts that were observed netnographically were not informed of the research. Scholars have 
widely debated the ethical issue of permission and consent within netnographic research 
(Boellstroff et al., 2012; Buchanan, 2004; Ess, 2009; Johms et al., 2003; Krotoski, 20010; Mckee 
& Porter, 2009; Thorseth, 2003). A number, such as Boellstroff et al. (2012), stress the 
importance of informed consent and considerate anonymity within their guidelines on conducting 
ethical netnographic research. However, it is important to note that the Internet is very complex, 
and that there are various types of communication that take place within it. The authors of the 
AoIR Ethics Working Committee Report confirm that “No official guidance or ‘answers’ 
regarding internet research ethics have been adopted at any national or international level” (2012, 
p.2).  
Kozinets (2010, 2015) argues that the Code of Federal Regulations asserts that the use of 
spontaneous conversation, if gathered in a publicly accessible venue, is not considered human 
subject research (2010, p.141). Therefore, he suggests that the recording of synchronous 
conversation and interaction should be treated differently from the way asynchronous 
communication, which is clearly intended for public consumption, is treated (2010, p.145). 
Accordingly, conversations, posts and comments that are gathered from a publicly accessible 
social network platform such as Twitter hashtags, or even micro-celebrities’ public accounts on 
Instagram are exempt from the need for ethical consent before being used in research. 
Furthermore, Walther, a leading researcher in computer mediated communication, posits that: 
“While some participants have an expectation of privacy, it is extremely misplaced” (2002, 
p.207). In this context, micro-celebrities’ accounts, such as used in this research, fall within a 
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public setting of social media and thus observing them does not ethically require signing a 
consent form. 
 
In summary, although I used the usernames/handles/userIDs of micro-celebrities, their posts, and 
their profile images, the anonymity of all other participants was guaranteed. Names and details 
were changed to protect the identity of the participants and achieve anonymity. Conversations 
and comments made by regular users on the public accounts of micro-celebrities were also used 
as they are posted on a publicly accessible venue. However, the names were pixelated to avoid 
any risks and to protect the identity of the users who commented. Finally, the researcher strived 
to translate comments that were made in Arabic without compromising their meaning.  
 
5.7 Reflexivity 
Effective use of reflexivity is not only a way to control the validity and reliability of the data in 
qualitative research, but enables the reader to gain insights into the aims, values and decisions 
that prompted the study (Turnbull, 1973). Malterud (2001) argues that the researcher's 
background will influence what subjects were chosen for investigation, the stance and angle of 
the investigation, the methods of collecting the data, the findings considered most appropriate, 
and the framing and delivery of the conclusions (Malterud, 2001, pp.483-484). Furthermore, in a 
study in which the researcher is constructed as a ‘human research instrument’ a true account of 
reflexivity is central to achieving reliability and avoiding accusations of bias. To achieve this 
purpose, I kept a detailed reflexive journal throughout the research, in which I have attempted to 
be systematic and honest about the knowledge construction within this study (c.f. Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985).  
 
My position as a young Saudi woman who has experienced the important years of the 2000s 
when the Internet, and subsequently social media, were introduced into Saudi society, and 
through engaging with social media as a female member of the Saudi collectivity, sparked my 
interest in the topic of this research. Years of observing fellow Saudi women negotiate the many 
legal and cultural limitations imposed on them through their use of this instrumental tool (social 
media), and having done the same thing myself, have encouraged me to reflect on the dynamic 
and ever-changing Saudi society, a collective that is often - mistakenly - depicted as static and a 
religious ‘fly in amber’, especially when it comes to women.  
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From the initial stages of data collection, my knowledge of the way in which Saudi women use 
social media and their reasons for doing so directed me towards certain platforms to observe 
certain practices. I had previous knowledge of female social media influencers and micro-
celebrities from Saudi Arabia, having actually followed their accounts closely for years. The 
proximity of my age to that of the respondents made it easier for them to relate to me and trust 
me and to feel comfortable talking to me about sensitive issues, such as premarital romance and 
love. In several cases, I used my own experiences with social media engagement as ice-breakers 
in the personal semi-structured interviews and as a way to guide debates in focus groups. Indeed, 
several scholars note the researcher's role as a data co-creator is to facilitate conversation in focus 
groups and interviews (Burgess, 1982; Byrne, 2004, p.182; Fontana & Frey, 2000, p.653; Mason, 
1996, pp.36-38; Spradley, 1979; Taylor, & Bogdan, 1984, p.7). My approach resulted in the 
respondents viewing me not as a distant researcher, but as a friend with whom they were having a 
discussion. Knowledge of the latest debates, incidents, and even knowledge of the intricate Saudi 
dialect and local slang and cultural references made the analysis of netnographic data easier, 
faster and more accurate.  
 
Finally, keeping an honest record of reflexivity involves reflecting on factors that may have 
negatively influenced the findings. Being a Saudi woman and the researcher simultaneously 
might have encouraged male participants in the focus group to express progressive liberal views 
in relation to women’s rights to have an individual identity on social media and experience 
premarital love without questioning her national affiliation or jeopardising her reputation. These 
values and attitudes, which are widely accepted as progressive in the public domain, are ones that 
male respondents might have thought I wanted to hear. However, the objective observance of 
data through netnography compensated for this possible shortcoming. Triangulation was 
employed for this specific reason; the multiplicity of methods was intended to increase the 
validity and reliability of the data collected. Even if men’s views during focus groups were 
influenced by the presence of me as a woman (and by the other respondents being female), male 
social media users observed through netnography were not aware of a female researcher 
observing them, and thus their views are entirely impartial.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This study was conducted through a constructivist research framework. Triangulation was used in 
my data collection strategy in order to validate the data and ensure its reliability as fully as 
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possible (Mason, 2002). The three methods used to collect the data were observational 
netnography, focus groups and semi-structured one-to-one interviews. The Kozinets (2015) 
guidelines for selecting online communities that are worthy of netnographic observation were 
used to determine which social media platforms should be observed. Accordingly, Instagram, 
Snapchat, Twitter and YouTube were included, but Facebook was excluded as it is no longer an 
active site for many Saudi users. The sample from Instagram included the accounts of six Saudi 
female social media influencers (micro-celebrities), as well as the private Instagram accounts of 
five females. On Snapchat, 61 accounts were observed that were a mix of micro-celebrity 
accounts and regular users, including individuals from my focus groups. On Twitter, the sample 
was drawn through observing the activities on trending Saudi hashtags that were related to my 
research questions. Finally, on YouTube, the sample was drawn from the comments section 
under videos which discussed a topic related to the themes of this research. Seven focus group 
sessions and six one-to-one interviews of both male and female Saudis were conducted in order 
to increase the validity and reliability of the data. Although the study could not completely avoid 
subjectivity, this is not a threat to the validity of the results as several scholars contest the setting 
of rigid criteria of objectivity when conducting qualitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; 
Geertz, 1973, 1983; Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp.245-251; Lincoln & Guba, 2000, pp.178-179; 
Schwandt, 1989). The analytical approach I used was thematic analysis due to its compatibility 
with a constructivist research paradigm, as well as its flexibility and functionality, which make it 
ideal for analysing large data corpus. Coding the themes was undertaken inductively, free from 
analytical preconceptions. In addition, several deductive themes were expected to arise in relation 
to my research questions, such as veiling and gender segregation. Ethical issues were examined 
and addressed in this chapter, as well as a reflexive account of the knowledge construction in my 
research and my role as a researcher in it.  
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Chapter Six. Social Media: A Space to Challenge Tradition 
6.1 Introduction 
I start my analysis by looking at the use of ‘identity separation’ by Saudi women to overcome 
limitations set on them by the collectivity and to protect their privacy when presenting 
themselves online. I identify a gap in some women’s presentation between the online self and the 
offline self. Drawing on the notion of counterublics to describe these spaces on which alternate 
contemporary feminine identities are being expressed and represented (Fraser, 1992; Senft, 
2008), the analysis will highlight how social media networks can be used as a space where 
shame-honour culture can be challenged. I then move on to address that the ‘gap between selves’ 
is closing up when considering younger women (digital natives), mainly due to their higher sense 
of individual agency, which in return makes them less mindful of the collectivity’s long-held 
notions of family honour and its dependence on women’s modesty/chastity. This move, from a 
close knit social system towards an emphasis on personal autonomy and the individual instead of 
the group, is understood as part of a series of factors leading to the individualisation and 
detradtionalisation associated with modern communities that scholars such as Giddens (1991) and 
Beck (2002) have explored.  These writings are drawn on here to examine Saudi women’s 
engagement with social media networks. The analysis in this chapter begins to answer a key 
question in this research on how social media engagement is impacting and changing the values 
and norms of young Saudi women by recognising social media platforms as a functional tool to 
create shame-free spaces where culture can be challenged. I continue to answer this question 
through the analysis in Chapter 7.   
 
 
 
6.2 Multiplicity in Saudi women’s identity expression ‘identity separation’ 
When examining the online and offline performances of feminine identity among Saudi women, 
it is important to consider two things that Goffman (1959) argues have a considerable impact on 
our choice of self-presentation at a given situation: the audience and the social context (see more 
in Chapter 3). Goffman asserts that a social actor (Saudi women in the case of my research) 
would adjust her performance according to who is watching and where she is. My research 
findings show that Saudi women are highly conscious of these two factors when they present 
themselves online, and that these factors affect their choice of self-representation/identity 
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performance. This results sometimes in divergent performances from one social media platform 
to another depending on the friend list of that platform and the assumed social context for it. The 
analysis in this chapter is informed by Butler’s (1990) understanding of gender identity as 
‘performative’, in which gender identity is socially constructed through the repetition of acts and 
the imitation of the dominant conventions of gender. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the norms and 
ideals of gender identity/performance for women in Saudi Arabia have been long tied with 
conservative notions of veiling, piety, severe restrictions on mingling with the opposite sex, and 
generally a confinement to the domestic/private sphere. These acts became the norms and values 
of the ideal feminine performance through habit and repetition, and they are framed within a 
shame-honour culture (Ruth Benedict, 1947) which guarantees the perpetuation of this ideal 
femininity (Abu-Lughod 1986; Abu-Lughod 1993; Meeker, 1979). As explained in the literature 
review (Chapter 2), in Middle Eastern societies, particularly in Saudi Arabia, any act that deviates 
from what is considered honourable is regarded as ‘eyb’ a very particular Arabic word that could 
be translated as shameful or disgraceful. The notion of ‘eyb’ in Middle Eastern communities is 
especially hyper when it comes to issues concerning women and their reputation (read more in 
Afshar, 1993, p .118-119) and I shall talk more about the issue of reputation later in this chapter. 
However, this chapter argues that since the mid 2000’s Saudi women’s engagement with social 
media networks has ignited what I call a ‘hyper context awareness’ and enabled them to create 
semi-public spaces (through defining the context and controlling the audience) in which they can 
experiment with new identity performance and negotiate the classical norms and values of 
femininity in Saudi. 
 
Discussions arising from my focus groups and one-to-one interviews as well as my observations 
of men and women’s online activity using the method of netnography show that choices of self-
presentation online by the same user might not be uniform across all social media accounts. Some 
women users tend to present themselves using their first and last name on a certain profile while 
choosing to present themselves with a nickname on another. Alternatively, some women share 
their personal photos on one platform but not on another, such as one of the participants in this 
study (Sarah, 32-years-old). Sarah uses her own personal photo as a profile picture on Instagram, 
but refrains from doing so on Twitter. The data in this research show that the reason behind the 
inconsistent identity performance across social media platforms is either to avoid conflicts with 
family members who also use the platform, achieve privacy, or to adapt to the user’s 
preconceived assumption of what the social context of that given platform is, as the following 
		100	
examples will show. For example, upon observing 32-year-old Sarah’s various social media 
accounts, I noticed a distinct difference in her performance from one platform to the other. In her 
comments on this, she said:  
 
“I am much goofier on Snapchat than on Twitter for example or even Instagram. I feel like 
Twitter is more for discussing politics and current affairs.  It’s also very public, and that’s why I 
don’t use my own photograph as a profile picture on it. But Snapchat is just to send your friends 
random stuff. That's why I only add really close friends on Snapchat. I want to be very 
spontaneous and comfortable”.  (Sarah, February, 2016, one-to-one Interview). 
Sarah’s attempt to explain the difference between Snapchat and Twitter in this comment is 
reminiscent of Madianou and Miller’s (2012) argument about the polymedia context we live in, 
where one platform can only be understood in relation to another platform. Sarah’s definition of 
the context on each social media platform is what is influencing her online self-
presentation/identity performance. In a personal interview with her I asked her why she defines 
the context of each platform in this way, and she answered that it is a combination of what “the 
site could do” and “how people use it”. She elaborated that the affordances of Snapchat, for 
example, make it very easy for her to send instant videos and photographs to her contacts, and 
that they are not persistent as they disappear in 24 hours. The non-persistent nature of the 
platform makes it synonymous with silly videos that were funny/relevant at the particular 
moment they were shared, but were not meant to last. The norms of the platform, or ‘how people 
use it’, are also a contributing factor to defining its context. The way Sarah’s friends on Twitter 
and the people she connects with on the site use it has created norms of behaviour and usage on 
the platform (at least for Sarah’s circle), which provoke a certain performance of identity from 
Sarah herself.  boyd (2014) observed how the context is defined not only by technical features or 
affordances of the site, but also by users’ observations of how people are using the platform. 
They later either “reinforce or challenge those norms through their own practices” (boyd, 2014, 
p.39) (see also Chapter 3). boyd (2014) observes how users today might dabble with several 
social contexts spread across several social media platforms, each provoking a different way to 
present the self on. A platform in which the contacts are family members would have a different 
context from a platform where the contacts are one's close friends. These varying contexts might 
even be hosted by the same platform simultaneously. Mai, a 25-year-old Saudi woman I 
interviewed, reported having a designated group chat on WhatsApp with her family members and 
a separate one for her co-workers and a third for her close friends. The way she presents herself 
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and interacts in each group is different due to the different contexts on each one of them. A story 
about a flirtatious text she had received would not be shared in the family group or with the co-
workers, and similarly she would not speak in the same manner that she does in the family group 
with her friends.  
 
“In my family group, I don't think about my dialect, I just speak the way I do at home. I wouldn't 
do that with my friends though. Maybe with some friends when we are alone, but not in the group 
on WhatsApp with all of them”.  (Mai, February 2016, one-to-one interview). 
 
Mai speaks to her family in a distinct Qassimi accent, the region of Saudi Arabia where her 
family hail from originally. However, when speaking with friends Mai switches to a Riyadh 
accent, which is commonly presumed to be more sophisticated. She explains that it is not because 
she is ashamed of where she is from, but that it is simply more “chic” and stylish to speak in a 
Riyadh accent, and it is how all her friends speak. The netnographic data in my research shows 
that young, single Saudi women are highly aware and very concerned with social context when it 
comes to identity performance on social media. I call this concern ‘hyper-context awareness’. 
Mai’s behaviour can be understood as a form of impression management that is motivated and 
controlled by her hyper-context awareness; who is watching her, and the social context that she is 
in.  
 
Defining the context and imagining the audience to determine the identity performance on a 
certain platform is not uniquely Saudi.  boyd (2014) has noticed it with American users as well, 
and it is the basis to what I identify as ‘identity separation’ in young Saudi women’s performance 
of online identity. This finding relates closely to Madianou and Miller’s (2012) Polymedia, where 
users regularly separate aspects of their personality and limit them to a particular platform with a 
particular audience in mind. This practice of identity separation is very strategic in Saudi 
women’s negotiation of classical female identity because it enables them to create spaces that are 
free of one of the main sources of control in shame-honour cultures: people that matter. Young 
Saudi women in these examples are exercising individual agency on social media platforms to 
achieve privacy and reveal a growing sense of autonomy. They can manipulate privacy settings 
and employ scalable sociality (Miller et al, 2016) to create semi-public spaces that exclude family 
members and conservative acquaintances, or even to disguise their names completely, thereby 
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escaping criticism and shaming by the individuals who fix them as representatives of the family 
collectivity’s honour.   
 
This can be seen in the example of Wafa. Wafa (34 years old), a participant in this research from 
a conservative background, reported that she had deliberately chosen not to use her real last name 
in her Instagram profile not only to protect her privacy by preventing family members from 
finding and adding her, but also by not carrying the family name she is relieving herself from the 
task of representing the family’s honour (Mercer, 1994). The reason she was keen on doing so 
was that she had identified the context of Instagram as a place where she can be more liberated 
and flirtatious, which is considered shameful in conservative traditional families of Saudi Arabia. 
In a shame-honour culture, Wafa is pushed and pressured by her family members to protect her 
reputation and refrain from flirting, adding and talking to men, or even posting photos of herself 
publicly. Through social media, Wafa is exercising user agency to manipulate privacy settings to 
disassociate herself from her family and assert her networked individualism by presenting herself 
simply as Wafa81 in a space that is free from anyone (at least anyone that matters) who might 
criticise/shame her. However, she does not escape national public criticism since she identifies as 
a Saudi in her profile (I will expand on the issue of Saudi women and the burden of representing 
the nation in the next chapter when discussing nation and gender).  Wafa might still receive 
comments on Instagram from conservative nationalists she does not personally know who are 
criticising her behaviour given the fact that she is a Saudi woman and that she should according 
to them portray a sense of decorum that matches her nationality.  A typical comment would be 
“How can you call yourself a Saudi, dressed like that? Where is your family from this?”   She 
quickly deletes them, and she reports that they do not really bother her as they are, in her words 
“Just random people.  I do not care what they think”.  By ‘random’ Wafa means that they are not 
of any influence on her or have a real connection to her life (such as family members or personal 
acquaintances) and thus their criticism does not really shame her since they do not even know 
her. By stepping away from the collectivity of the family and close personal ties, an emphasis on 
the project of the self within the trend towards individualism enables Wafa to perform aspects of 
femininity that are unconventional in her social circle and which normally she would be shamed 
into renouncing. For instance, on Instagram social media platform, where she is less conservative, 
she posts photographs of herself unveiled, and she is not hesitant to flirt with men: 
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 “I am not shy to talk to men because I know they don't know my family name, so I am not 
disgracing my family. I am just being myself and it doesn't affect my family in any way”.   (Wafa, 
March 2016, one-to-one interview) 
 
As Giddens (1991) argues, in traditional communities a person simply accepts what has been 
handed to her by the collectivity as convention and custom.  Combined with the burden of 
representing the collectivity’s honour by abiding by these customs, this makes it very difficult for 
women in Saudi to challenge these traditions and reformulate a female gendered 
identity.  However, in modern communities such as the networked publics of social media sites, 
individualism is highly visible and promoted as a positive value. With it, users of social media 
develop their own values and experiment with new lifestyles that “give material form to a 
particular narrative of self-identity” (Giddens, 1991, p.81). Moreover, in the case of Saudi 
women, individualism on networked publics offers women the chance to free themselves from 
adhering to the norms and expectations of a ‘proper’ Saudi woman and representing the 
collectivity in publics where shaming is either completely absent or where it is less impactful as it 
comes from none prominent individuals. By first defining the context on her Instagram account 
as a liberated and romantic/flirtatious context, Wafa controls the audience according to that 
online social context by choosing whom to add on her contact list, adding ‘open-minded’ close 
friends and avoiding those family members and judgmental friends who hold conservative values, 
thereby creating a shame-free space. In addition, she creates and presents an online self-identity 
that disassociates her from the collectivity of the family by omitting her family name in her 
username. Therefore, Wafa is able to ‘perform’ a feminine identity on Instagram that would not 
be accepted in a family context. In fact, due to her hyper-context awareness, she does not share 
photos of herself at all on Facebook, where her brothers and relatives are on her friends list and 
where she discloses her family name on her profile. Yet on Instagram she performs a distinctive 
identity that differs considerably from an offline social context among family members: 
 
 “I share lots of photos of myself on Instagram and I also add men freely, which I don't do on 
Facebook. If I added a random guy on Facebook one of my brothers would surely ask me about 
it, or my relatives would judge me. However, on Instagram I make sure I don't have any relatives 
or judgmental friends”.   (Wafa, March 2016, one-to-one interview) 
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Similarly, in focus group 4 the distinction between some Saudi women users’ performances of 
feminine identity online and offline came up when discussing why some Saudi women might be 
veiled offline and yet share photos of themselves unveiled online. Fadwa (36-year-old female) 
had this to say:  
 
“I know many girls in the company where I work who don’t cover up inside the company but just 
as they step out of the door they do, because they know that their families wouldn’t want her to 
uncover their faces outside in the street so they have to live a contradictory lifestyle. It’s not 
duality; she just doesn’t want to upset anyone. And the same thing with women who don't veil on 
SMN yet veil offline”.  (Fadwa, January 2016, focus group) 
 
The women in Fadwa’s workplace had to disregard their personal views around veiling and 
prioritise their community’s values instead, as they knew that their actions reflected on their 
family’s name and that it would bring shame not only to them but on the family as well. 
However, when they were in a context that was completely detached from their families and their 
families’ supervision, they performed a type of femininity that is marked by an individualistic set 
of values that is distinct from the values that their families hold. The feminine identity they 
performed in a social context that includes their family was conservative and traditional (wearing 
a veil that covers her face), yet the feminine identity they performed at work was modern and 
liberal (unveiled). Similarly, on social media platforms, unconventional performances of 
femininity amongst Saudi women are promoted, as I will explain in detail later in this chapter, 
especially when the social context of the platform excludes family members who might object to 
or obstruct the expression of these contemporary and, somewhat non-traditional, 
femininities/identities.  
 
During the focus group discussion, Lubna (26-year-old) stressed that this contradictory duality in 
self-presentation is not deceptive but rather an adaptation to the context that these women find 
themselves in at a given moment:  
“This doesn’t mean that she [the woman who expresses contradicting dual identities] has double 
standards, but she simply can’t walk the streets of Saudi without it”.  (Lubna, January 2016, 
Focus group) 
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Lubna herself wears a veil offline and yet shares photographs of herself unveiled on her social 
media accounts: 
 
“It is imposed on me [wearing a veil in public].  If it wasn’t, I wouldn’t wear a hijab at all when 
in public and I wouldn’t exhibit this duality in my character”. (Lubna, Jan 2016, Focus group)   
 
Lubna here is referring to the law in Saudi Arabia that states women must wear an Abaya and a 
Hijab when in public. And even though Lubna is referring particularly to legal imperatives, in 
some cases the pressure to wear the veil comes from the woman’s family. Lubna and the women 
in Fadwa’s workplace do not change their self-presentation to deceive or because they have 
double standards; they are simply adapting to the context that they are in and to the audience that 
is watching them. However, in the process they ended up with an online identity that is not 
similar to their offline one.   
 
The collectivity’s power (whether it is the family or the society/nation) to control and restrict 
women’s activities and gendered identities through strong traditions, strict laws and shaming 
(Mercer, 1990) has one major overriding ramification: it fixates subjugated identities and creates 
what Chachhi (1991) dubs ‘forced identities’. An example of this is found in a photograph shared 
by Hala on Instagram (Figure.1). Binary expressions of identity are observed in the photo, where 
she is seen driving her car while in the U.S.A. The caption reads: “Back to my normal life, and 
car selfies #LA #morning #nofilter”. Even though Hala cannot appear unveiled in public on the 
streets of Riyadh where she comes from, and is banned from driving a car, she dubs this lifestyle 
a ‘normal life’ (the end of the ban lift on women driving in Saudi Arabia did not happen until 
September 2017, while this photo was posted in early 2016). The act of driving a car is quite 
significant as it relates directly to limitations on women’s movements in Saudi Arabia and 
confinement to the private domain. This intriguing choice of words implies that life in Saudi 
Arabia, where she is veiled and her mobility is controlled, is not her ‘normal’ self but a self that is 
forced upon her. Her adaptation to a certain set of rules in Saudi meant that her identity was 
dictated to be conservative in the streets of Riyadh, where she is veiled and not driving. It is 
merely obedience to law and custom, not an actual choice of representation. The key issue here 
concerns the central role of social media in managing the contradictory values of tradition and 
modernity that mark the lives of Saudi women (particularly when they experience or come into 
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contact with individualistic values and ideals in western cultures such as the USA, either offline 
or online). 
  
 
Figure 1: post from Hala’s Instagram 
Women in Saudi society are pressured into leading binary lives, whether it is between their 
offline and online identities, as in the case of Hala, or between multiple online identities 
according to a predefined context and a controlled audience, as in the case of Wafa. This is 
mainly due to the restrictions and limitations imposed on them by their families, by tradition, or 
by the law. Importantly, while the integration of online technologies into our daily routine has 
made it hard for western scholars to distinguish between the online and offline worlds (see, for 
example, Livingstone, 2008; van Dijck, 2013), my research findings confirm that this is not the 
case for the Saudi women I interviewed and observed. The possibility of scaling sociality and the 
individual agency that is afforded on social media networks has increased Saudi women’s 
autonomy and enabled them to create spaces where they can experiment and negotiate long held 
values without compromising their privacy and reputation, thereby creating a counterpublic 
where shame-honour culture is being revised and adapted to suit the current needs of young 
Saudis, proving that culture is not static but actually in a constant state of flux. Participants in the 
focus groups are conscious of a mismatch or disparity between the reality the Saudi women live 
offline and what is taking place online in their social accounts. They are compelled to live 
parallel, contradictory lives. However, this online/offline performative disparity is considerably 
narrower for younger Saudi women aged between 25 and younger, who grew up as digital 
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natives. As explained in Chapter 5, digital natives are social media users born during or after 
digital media and technology had become popular. I shall explain next how Saudi digital natives 
are expressing more individualistic values through the performance of new modes of online –
feminine identity that deviate from the classical norms and values of Saudi Arabia.  
 
 
6.3 Closing the gap  
The identities and attitudes of Saudi women adopted online and offline are not always so 
polarised. I observed that older Saudi female participants, aged between 26 and 32, emphasise the 
existence of a gap between online and offline performances of self in relation to Saudi women. 
By contrast the online and offline performances of identity among younger single Saudi women 
(younger than 25 years old) suggests that the gap is closing. Young Saudi women are becoming 
more confident in portraying an individualistic set of values and norms not necessarily consistent 
with those of the collectivity, and they seem to be less susceptive to shaming and criticism. In the 
example below, we see two young women operating a food-truck during a music festival in 
Riyadh, selling sweets and drinks to the concert’s attendees (Figure.2). The situation is 
challenging classical ideals of Saudi femininity in more ways than one; the women are placed in 
a public setting in which they are dealing directly and freely with male customers. Moreover, 
their appearance is not entirely conservative, their hair is barely covered and their make-up is 
heavy. An older male passer-by saw the food-truck and the young women who were dealing with 
young male customers as part of their job, and stopped to film it on his phone while complaining 
about “the state the the Saudi society has reached in which women are trotting in the streets 
uncovered talking and dealing with strange men”.   
		108	
 
Figure 2: A screenshot from a video of two young women operating a 
food-truck on the street. 
 
He then posted the video on twitter (figure.3) to which many were quick to confront and oppose 
his stance and his criticism of the young women. Waheed Al-Ghamdi replied to his tweet saying:  
“we have two models in front of us here; a young man from the new generation who is dealing 
naturally and somewhat nonchalantly with the situation, and an older man from the old 
generation who is filming the incident and whining”.  
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Figure 3:  Waheed AlGhamdi commenting on Twitter.  
 
Al-Ghamdi then continues to say: “my comment on this is; leave the new generation to live their 
own times, they are far more capable than you to cope with the changes”. (@wa7eed2011, 
December, 2018, Twitter).  
As this viral twitter exchange shows, the gap between the younger generations online and offline 
behaviour is closing up with more and more young men and women adopting new values and 
contemporary identities on the street that are very similar to what they exhibit, and what this 
research documents, on their social media accounts. The young people in the video are 
comfortable socialising with the opposite-sex, and specifically the young women are confidently 
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projecting a non-traditional identity of an independent and uncovered woman who is taking an 
active part in the public sphere.   
 
Participants in focus groups and personal interviews suggest that this is because of their inclusion 
(as young Saudis/digital natives) in networked publics from an early age. Being digital natives 
diversified sources of information on mores and values, thereby helping them to develop their 
own values and ideas as well as giving them the chance to exercise individual agency away from 
the traditions of the collectivity. During a focus group, Areeb (23 years old) stated that the life 
she portrays online is the same as the one she lives offline: “They are very close to each other. 
There are a lot of similarities between the two and much more autonomy and ease in society 
today” (Areeb, January 2016, Focus group).  She further stated that even if there is still room for 
improvement in terms of laws that control Saudi women, she believes that today women are more 
willing to challenge customs and traditions concerning identity expression, gender roles, and 
what is considered by conservative nationalists to be the ideal femininity within Saudi culture. 
Areeb claimed that unlike her older female cousins, she is not concerned with what people might 
think or say, and thus does not feel the need to hide her family name on her online social media 
accounts in order to talk to and add complete strangers from the opposite sex (what is commonly 
referred to as ‘strange men’).  A ‘strange man’ is basically any man who does not have an 
immediate relation to a woman (such as her father, brother, husband or cousin).  Accordingly, 
Saudi women need to be veiled around such men and refrain from communicating with them out 
of the fear that this might lead to illicit behaviour. Often, a woman’s relation with a ‘strange man’ 
is a source of gossip that might harm her reputation. Areeb continues: 
  
“Even in terms of integration with men, people are now more tolerant of the idea of friendships 
between men and women. It has become an accepted reality between younger girls. It doesn't 
need to be hidden.” (Areeb, January 2016, focus group) 
  
This suggests that women are gradually freeing themselves from the task of representing the 
family as a collectivity and emphasising their networked individualism, which represents a shift 
of the classical configuration of social arrangements and relations built around large hierarchical 
bureaucracies or social groups that are tightly knit, such as the family, through the use of modern 
communication technologies (Rainie and Wellman, 2012). Correspondingly, the increasing 
autonomy, individual agency and the wider trend of individualism that is found on social media 
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networks is reconstructing the traditions and values of family and community and reconstructing 
the ideal femininity within Saudi culture. This is consistent with Giddens’ (1991) concept of 
individualism and detraditionalisation of communities, which will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
  
Durr, who at 27 is among the older single women in my sample and so experienced the boom of 
social network platforms in Saudi around 2007 during her late teens, confirms Areeb’s statement. 
Durr explained that prior to the rise of social media in Saudi society, young Saudi women had to 
accept gender identities and roles prescribed by family and the wider collectivity. Today, young 
single women can access a limitless array of options in terms of identities and ways of expressing 
femininity. She proceeded to explain how, as a young woman, she and her friends used to be 
intimidated/shamed by their families into performing an ideal of femininity that is very specific 
and conservative: “If you uncover your face, no one would ever want to marry you”. The 
implication is that any deviation from this ideal conservative femininity, whether by choosing to 
uncover or experimenting with romantic relationships before marriage, would render a young 
woman unfit for marriage, condemning her to a life of singlehood.  Durr acknowledges the 
limited choices of identity and gender roles offered to women at that time by portraying marriage 
as “the highest achievement for you as a woman”.  As a result, young women cared greatly about 
achieving that social status. She also adds that even women who dabbled with romantic 
relationships or portrayed an image that challenged societal norms by unveiling have managed to 
get married, proving the older generation’s assumptions (around losing your reputation equating 
to a woman not getting married) wrong. 
 
 “I mean that they use to tell you these things and you can never know if they were wrong or 
right. You don’t want to risk it and then find out that they were right and regret your actions. But 
when you see for yourself on social media that what they are saying is wrong, and that girls are 
not only getting married but even marrying non-Saudis and living a far better life than what you 
are living while you kept yourself from doing things you wanted to do only for the sake of 
marriage, you realize that all this was an illusion that they embed in your mind for you to be 
afraid. I remember being afraid! There were things that I wanted to do but wouldn’t because I 
would worry about what people might say about me?”  (Durr, January 2016, focus group) 
 
Durr compares herself to young women in Areeb’s age who are digital natives, stating that it is 
no longer effective today for families to intimidate young women into conforming to a limiting 
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set of gender roles and traditional conservative ideals of femininity by alleging a bleak future for 
those who challenge traditions. This is because they are simultaneously viewing on social media 
platforms examples of Saudi women who successfully challenged and defied these customs and 
roles and yet did not suffer the dire consequences that Durr and her friends have been warned 
about by their families. In fact, in many cases they reaped rewards, such as the case with social 
media influencers (see below).  
 
 “No matter how many lies you tell them [younger generations of Saudi women], they won’t 
believe these lies because they can see for themselves [ the examples of Saudi women online who 
challenged customs successfully with no consequences]”  (Durr, January 2016, focus group). 
 
Women who contest classical gender roles on social media platforms have turned into vanguards 
of change and modernity. I reiterate here that the terms ‘modernity/modern’ in this thesis with 
reference to Saudi society is concerned with a particular set of developments that I observe in 
relation to traditions and customs in the period after the spread of social media usage in the 
community from around the mid 2000 onwards. As a result, young digital natives like Areeb are 
now becoming less reluctant to accept traditional identity expressions for women and are less 
responsive to the collectivity’s pressure to keep women within a frame of a conservative ideal 
femininity. Najd (25-years-old) and Mai (25-years-old) shared the following sentiments about 
female microcelebrities and social media influencers from Saudi who are publicly challenging the 
traditional conservative ideals of femininity and showcasing an autonomous identity:  
 
Najd: “I hope more and more of them do it so that they can open up the society to these ideas.” 
Mai: “I’m the same.  I wouldn’t like to be famous but I love having famous Saudi women doing 
the work for me. The problem is that I don’t like it for myself but I love the change that comes out 
of it and so I would love to see even more of these types of girls. They are doing us - Saudi 
women - a great favour”. (Mai and Najd, December, 2015, focus group) 
 
The recent development in laws concerning women in Saudi has helped to bridge the gap even 
further between the contemporary femininity that young Saudi women aspire to achieve, and the 
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reality that they live in Saudi. Take for example the recent photograph that Hessah shared on her 
Instagram when she was first granted the licence to drive in Riyadh (July, 2018).  
 
Figure 4: post from Hessah’s Instagram 
 
Hessah captions the photo: “It has been more than a month now, and it still feels like a dream”. 
The captions highlights how the aspirational femininity that Hessah and other young Saudi 
women could only ‘dream’ of a few months ago has now turned into a reality that they live 
everyday in the streets of Riyadh. The juxtaposition of this photograph with the photograph that 
Hala shared (Figure.1) back when driving was banned in Saudi, highlights the role that legislative 
changes play in enabling the realisation of contemporary aspects of feminine identities amongst 
young Saudi women and their normalization. Only a few months earlier, Hala’s “normal” self 
could only be performed in the streets of Los Angeles or on social media platforms, but with 
lifting the ban on women’s driving, the contemporary and unconventional images of Saudi 
women online and their reality offline is a lot more analogous. 
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Figure 5: a post from Ghadah’s Instagram of her and her friend  
 
Similarly, Ghadah Badwai a young woman from Riyadh shared this photograph of her and her 
friend attending a David Guetta concert in Riyadh that was held as part of the Formula E 
Championship in December 2018. The 3 concerts which were held by renowned musicians such 
as Enrique Iglesias, The Black Eyed Peas and One Republic, were unprecedented in Saudi 
Arabia. Men and women celebrated freely in the unsegregated concerts as well as attend the race 
itself and all the accompanying activities. Women were not only attendees, but they were also 
organisers, hosts, and managers in the event as well as competitors in the race (Ad Diriyah E-
prix, 2018). The race and the music festival that accompanied it was brought to Riyadh as part of 
the Vision 2030 led by the Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman who opened the championship 
himself and attended the closing ceremony on the third day. Such a radical challenge to 
conservative traditions of Saudi culture would have been very difficult to bring about in such 
short time if it wasn’t for the governmental support. Such support gives this kind of event a 
legitimacy that silences any possible criticism or backlash. 
 
The photograph that Ghadah posted of herself on social media, unveiled attending a musical 
concert, was for the first time an accurate representation of her reality offline in her own country. 
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She acknowledges this in her caption and reaffirms it in another post in which she thanked 
Mohammed Bin Salman personally for bringing about such change to Saudi Arabia. The caption 
reads: “when I attend a concert [for] my favourite singer and in my own country that’s a 
privilege”. The example of Ghadah showcases how legislative changes and governmental 
support can facilitate the emergence of non-traditional contemporary ideals of femininity and 
bridge the gap between what Saudi women showcase online with the reality that they live offline.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
I conclude this section by stating that corresponding with Giddens’ (1991) argument about late 
modern communities, the changes I highlight in this chapter can be described as part of a process 
of individualisation and detraditionalisation of modern day Saudi Arabia. Young Saudi women’s 
engagement with social media (networked publics) is creating a counterpublic with a shame-free 
culture that promotes individualistic values and withdrawals from traditional family-oriented 
values (1990). More specifically, the findings in this chapter highlight the shift in cornerstone 
values within the shame-honour culture of Saudi Arabia: the association of the family’s honour 
with women’s behaviour. As noted in the literature review, in the early days of the Internet and 
even in studies as recent as Guta and Karolak (2015), Al-Saggaf (2011) and Hayat (2014), 
scholars have identified a strong link between the tendency of Saudi women to self-monitor their 
behaviour and appearance online out of fear of their reputation and that of their families being 
tarnished.  And while the same can be said here about older women users (ages between 26-35), I 
observe from the focus group discussions, such as the above mentioned example of Areeb, and 
from the data I gathered netnographically, a distinct shift in the attitudes of younger women in 
this research (25 and under) in relation to this value.  
 
Women digital natives tend to share photographs of themselves online often, as well as connect 
nonchalantly with people from the opposite sex, even when their social media accounts show 
their family name. Less weight is being given by younger female users to the task of preserving 
the family honour/reputation, something which would necessitate strict self-controlling and 
controlling and self-monitoring their own actions and behaviours online. This showcases a wider 
trend of individualism that is diffusing amongst young women on these social media platforms 
with an emphasis on individual agency and autonomy. Young single Saudi women are 
performing and experimenting with new online identities that form part of new, detraditionalised 
values and norms that underpin new performances of femininity different from the conservative 
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ideals of femininity of the 1980s and 199’s (see Chapter 2). These findings are in agreement with 
the constructivist ontological and epistemological stance of this research, which considers reality 
to be continually revised through social interaction through which individuals in groups create 
and recreate culture, rather than culture being static and to be forever under the dictates of 
conservative nationalist mind-set (Bryman, 2012).  
 
Nonetheless, this chapter also acknowledges there is a distinction between the online and offline 
practices of some Saudi women, especially amongst older participants and participants from a 
highly conservative social background. It is apparent that some of the women who participated in 
this research resort to living binary lives that bar 
e some differences in terms of levels of exposure, choices of self-expression and ways of 
communication with one another or with the opposite sex. These differences between the 
portrayal of their lives online and the reality they live offline is due mainly to one of two reasons: 
either their inability in law to practice these forms of self-expression, such as appearing unveiled 
and driving, or social pressure and the limitations set on them by their families and immediate 
social circle. In any case, both reasons lead them to resort to online spaces to claim their identities 
and express aspects of it that they may not be able to express offline. What this finding highlights 
is the functionality of social media platforms as tools for creating a private space (a 
counterpublic) disconnected from disruptive individuals, where women can experiment and 
negotiate unconventional feminine identities. Moreover, this chapter shows how changes in laws 
are gradually allowing offline and online performances of young women to correspond with one 
another, and for contemporary aspects of feminine identity, once commonly limited to 
counterpublics on social media, to appear offline in the Saudi public sphere. These observations 
constitute the formation of an answer to one of the main questions of this research: How is social 
media engagement impacting and changing the values and norms of young Saudi women? And 
highlights how legislative reforms and governmental support are foundational for this change to 
come about, and to transcend merely social media platforms and phone screens to the actual 
streets. 
In the following chapter, I explore further the answer to this question by examining Saudi female 
micro-celebrities as a prominent example of modern feminine identities on social media. I 
provide an account of how they are influencing the values and norms of young Saudi women 
through their effort to claim identity online. I assess their role as vanguards of change in the 
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community, and address how they are diffusing contemporary ideals of femininity amongst 
young Saudi women.  
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Chapter Seven. Micro-celebrities and the Contemporary Ideals of Femininity 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 3, one of the prominent trends of ‘public’ performances of self in Saudi 
networked publics today is the micro-celebrity (Van de Rijt et al, 2013; Greenwood and 
Kaufman, 2013; Uhls and Greenfield, 2012; Gamson, 2011).  From the netnographic data that I 
collected, together with the focus group and interview findings, I found that the trend is being 
diffused amongst Saudi women as well. The number of female Saudi fashionistas (women micro-
celebrities who are interested in make-up, fashion and the latest trends, see more in Chapter 3) 
and social media influencers is multiplying, with each one of them building an audience base 
rapidly thanks to the scalability and replicability affordances of networked publics that helps 
them to go viral. Young Saudi women such as @model_roz (5.7 million followers), @thehala 
(653k followers) @afnan_albatel (6.2 million followers) @malak_alhusaini (3.4 million 
followers) @adhwaaldakheel (605k followers) @afnansn (1.m followers) @hala_alharithy (81.5k 
followers) and @stylemesausan (31.k followers) to name but a few, are examples of the 
popularity of this form of public performance of self amongst Saudis.  
 
This popularity can be measured in the number of social media influencers and aspiring micro-
celebrities as well as by the millions of young Saudi women (and men for that matter) that follow 
these celebrities’ accounts. This is influencing more and more young Saudi women to aspire to 
do the same. For example, Raghad, a 20 year-old young Saudi woman whom I met as part of the 
focus groups, enthusiastically told me that she intends to become a sensation in the world of 
social media by making her private Instagram account public and becoming a fashionista. She 
reported that she is only waiting for her father to adjust to the idea, she says to me, rather 
defiantly: “Just wait and see…” As noted, public self-performances of this nature among Saudi 
women contradict traditional notions of ideal femininity (discussed in Chapter 2). Firstly, 
achieving celebrity status/fame entails a positioning in the public sphere under the spotlight, 
despite the fact that Saudi have historically been encouraged by tradition and custom to remain 
secluded in the domestic domain (Doumato 2009; Hamdan 2005; Le Renard 2008, Le Renard, 
2014;  DeLong-Bas, 2009, p.19). Secondly, in many cases of micro-celebrity, particularly 
fashionistas, women emphasise attributes such as their body and their face/beauty, which 
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contradicts classical perceptions around veiling and modesty (Almunajjed, 1997; Esposito, 2003). 
Thirdly, the role of being a micro-celebrity itself has turned into an industry and a job opportunity 
that is highly rewarding financially to those who achieve it. This has expanded the array of 
professions available to Saudi women to include entrepreneurial opportunities in creating media 
content, e-commerce, advertising, as well as spinoff professions in designing and cosmetics, all 
of which are a departure from the conventional role of home-maker (Carah and Shaul, 2016; 
Booth and Matic. 2011; Ferberg et al, 2011; Marwick, 2010; Duffy and Hund, 2015). Moreover, 
ventures of this nature are advancing women’s financial independence, which in return amplifies 
their autonomy from the collectivity of the family.  
 
Examining this social trend in this chapter would help understand and answer the two central 
questions of the research on how social media engagement is impacting and changing the values 
and norms of young Saudi women, thereby altering the ideal Saudi feminine identity/image, and 
how it can be used to claim these identities. The next sections will address these points.   
 
7.2 Micro-celebrity: A move from the private to the public  
The role of microcelebrity necessitates a strong presence within the public sphere through self-
promotion. This in itself is a challenge to social norms of Saudi that fixes women in the private 
sphere, to protect the reputation of the family by remaining unobtrusive (Almunajjed, 1997; Le 
Renard, 2008; Hilde Granås Kjøstvedt, 2016). In the early days of social media use in Saudi 
Arabia, women did not only refrain from sharing their photographs but they even refrained from 
sharing their names. Fame was not something women sought, in fact it was something avoided as 
it jeopardised their wider family’s reputation. Instead, anonymity/obscurity was the norm (Al-
saggaf, 2004). The interviews and focus group in my study confirm that, older interviewees (aged 
between 30- 35) assert that early social media engagement among women in Saudi was 
characterised by anonymity:  
 
“It was unheard of even to be famous [as a Saudi woman]! Can you imagine your father’s or 
brother’s reaction? No one would want people to talk about their daughter/sister”.  (Basmah, 32 
years old, December 2015, Focus group) 
  
Customary ideals of femininity in Saudi maintain that in order to express a demure form of 
femininity, women must remain invisible/obscure, both in the literal sense and the metaphorical 
		120	
one; they must not only be veiled in public places or inhabit almost exclusively the domestic 
setting, but also remain ‘untalked’ about. Naturally, one could not be famous while being 
obscure, as being famous necessities being being talked about.  
 
Today, Saudi female micro-celebrities are contesting the norm of exclusion from the public 
sphere/public eye by being the most debated topic both in social circles and in conventional 
media outlets. They are hosted on TV shows and featured in magazines and newspaper editorials 
and have millions of followers that listen to them and talk about them (Abdullah, 2017; Dairani, 
2017; Aldkheel, 2017; YouTube, 2015a; YouTube, 2015b). Drawing on Fraser’s (1990) 
conceptualisation of ‘counterpublics’ (see Chapter 3), Senft (2013) argues that networked publics 
can perform as counterpublics that women use as a reaction to their omission from the public 
sphere. Fraser refers to the employment of counterpublics by marginalised members of a 
community to push back and secure a place for themselves within the public sphere. In Saudi, 
young women are making a bid to position themselves in online spaces, through which they are 
engaging and likely to be influencing large audiences. Therefore, it can be argued that social 
media networks as networked publics are serving as counterpublics for Saudi women, where they 
negotiate and develop a presence in the public and culturally produce contemporary 
representations/images of Saudi women and identities. Female Saudi micro-celebrities embody 
modern ideals of femininity, and, deliberately or not, are disseminating them through the 
affordances and features of networked publics amongst Saudi women, thereby becoming 
vanguards of change within the community. 
An example of this trend is Hatoon Kadi, a Saudi micro-celebrity who is reaching millions of 
viewers through her YouTube channel (Noon Alniswa), which has 26,070,983 views at the time 
of writing. Kadi, a comedienne who started her channel in 2012, discusses and comments on 
various social and cultural issues concerning the contemporary Saudi woman. Topics range from 
discussing the veil, social media usage, women’s rights, and current affairs in Saudi Arabia. In an 
interview on BBC Radio 4, she stated that when she started her YouTube channel, social media 
communication in Saudi Arabia was booming with online comedy shows, but they were all 
fronted by men. So she decided to fill a gap in the market (BBC Radio 4, The Conversation, 28/ 
November/2014). The presence and activities of Saudi social media influencers such as Kadi on 
networked publics leads me to conceptualise these modes of communication as social media-led 
counterpublics organised by and providing admission to previously marginalised members of the 
Saudi collectivity [women]. Kadi’s efforts to produce a YouTube show written and presented by 
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a woman and which discusses current affairs in Saudi Arabia from a woman’s point view 
represents a huge advancement by providing a public space in which women can participate in 
political and cultural debates. Similarly, the chance for other female users of social media to 
comment, ‘like’ and ‘share’ on Kadi’s online videos is a further channel through which women 
can participate in these Saudi ‘counterpublics’ to compensate for their confinement to the 
domestic/private sphere and lack of representation in the public sphere. However, it should be 
acknowledged that, in contrast to being taken seriously as commentators on current affairs, 
women are often pressured to draw upon discourses of beauty and consumerism to express this 
freedom and achieve this status within the counterpublics.  This will be discussed below.   
 
7.3 Fashionista’s and the politics of Visibility 
The second way in which the rise of the female micro-celebrity is impacting societal norms is by 
challenging and negotiating the politics of visibility for Saudi women. Being a social media 
micro-celebrity, particularly a fashionista, requires more than just sharing one's photograph. It 
commonly calls for an emphasis on physical beauty through highlighting body attributes, 
glamour, heavy makeup, and what conservative nationalists would consider ‘revealing’ clothes 
(see figures 7 and 8). None of these factors are consistent with the norms of veiling and modesty 
when it comes to women’s attire in Saudi (Almunajjed, 1997; Abu-Lughod, 2013; Powell, 1982), 
as discussed in Chapter 2. To understand the magnitude of what are interpreted as audacious acts 
of self-representation in relation to Saudi norms it is necessary to assess them against the 
backdrop of traditional social norms. Take into account what participants in this study recounted: 
until very recently in Saudi Arabia, women posting photos of themselves, even wearing a hijab, 
was controversial. In focus group (5) Shikhah (28 years old) notes the change in the attitudes of 
young women regarding the ease with which they are now prepared to share their photos publicly 
compared to the early days of the internet:  
 
“In the early days, who used to share their photo on social media accounts or have it as a profile 
picture?” she asks rhetorically, implying that the answer is (no one). She goes on saying: “Now 
every girl does it and it’s completely normal because of how exposed we are to girls doing it, it 
became normalised”.  (Shikhah, 28 years old, January 2016, focus group). 
As discussed in the literature review (Chapter 3), a 2011 study of Saudi women’s engagement 
with social media platforms by AL-Saggaf reported apprehension about even sharing/sending 
their photographs online with their female friends due to a constant fear of these photographs 
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falling into the wrongs hands. At that time, displaying a photograph as a profile picture was not 
even considered. However, participation on social media today is becoming increasingly visual 
(Miller et al, 2016) and sharing personal photographs of oneself has become a central part in 
presenting the self online to wider society (Marwick, 2015). As concluded from Shikhah’s earlier 
response, women’s attitudes towards visibility online are changing. They are less reluctant to 
represent themselves visually through the use of personal images. Among the women I 
interviewed, more than half share their photographs online and display them as profile pictures on 
social media platforms as they do not see it as an indecent or defamatory act as, in the words of 
one of my participants, “There is nothing wrong with it”.   
This attitude towards visibility and being seen unveiled is gradually being adopted offline as well. 
Ghadah Badawi, one of the young women I observe in this research, shared the below photograph 
on her Instagram of herself hiking in Saudi Arabia unveiled (Figure. 6).   
   
 
Figure 6 : post from Ghadah’s Instagram, September 2018. 
Ghadah is not only sharing a photograph of herself unveiled, but she is actually hiking unveiled 
in Abha City in Saudi Arabia. Her ease towards visibility and being unveiled is practised both 
online (on her social media accounts) as well as offline, but this was not always the case. Ghadah 
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started using Instagram early 2015, and her 237 posts on the platform went through 3 different 
phases. The first phase was from starting the account in August 2015 up until March 2016. In this 
phase, Ghadah never shared a photograph of her self, and her posted photographs were limited to 
food, landscape and inspirational quotes. The second phase started in March 2016, when Ghadah 
shared the first photograph of her self albeit wearing a head scarf (veiled) attending a convention 
in Riyadh. She continued to share photographs of her self and her daily routine in Riyadh 
sporadically for the next couple of years, while always appearing veiled. However, from July 
2018, Ghadah started sharing photographs of herself unveiled, thereby commencing the third 
phase, where she stopped wearing a head scarf completely both online and offline. Ghadah’s use 
of Instagram throughout the years, documented the shift in her attitude towards veiling and 
visibility, both in her online and offline activity. Incidentally, this gradual shift in attitude and 
behaviour is noted in the accounts of all eight young women that I observed in this research. 
What is drawn from this is that attitudes are changing, and that this change in behaviour is not 
limited to online activity in and by itself, rather it is a change in the Saudi society as a whole not 
just on its virtual public sphere.    
 
 
 
Figure 7: post from Hala’s Instagram 
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Figure 8: post from Roz’s Instagram 
A critical reading of the types of images that are commonly shared by female Saudi social media 
influencers (see figures 7 and 8) reveals how the images are disputing the norm of veiling. 
Moreover, there is a strong emphasis on the beauty and body, with the young women being the 
centre of both photographs with large parts of their bodies exposed. In addition, the pressure that 
these women are under to draw on discourses of consumerist lifestyles can also be noted, (see 
below).   
 
However, it is important not to overgeneralise this shift in attitudes of Saudi women on social 
media platforms. Costa (2016), who studied a conservative Islamic community, found that 
women in the Muslim collectivity of Mardin in Turkey were influenced by two contradictory 
ideals of femininity/identities: a liberal/westernised image much like the ones depicted above in 
figures 7 and 8, and a pious, modest conservative femininity. Women who defined their public 
selves through displays of piety refrained from sharing photos of themselves at all. Instead, their 
profile pictures were of their family’s children, and photographs they shared on Instagram or 
Snapchat were either of beautiful natural landscapes or of food platters and feasts from social 
gatherings they had attended. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, I observed online in my netnographic 
research that some women avoided sharing photographs of themselves, even photographs in 
which they were wearing a Hijab.  Some micro-celebrities - such as @afnan_albatel (6.2 million 
followers), @om_shahoooody (1 million followers), and @afnansn (1 million followers) - have 
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not once shared a photo of themselves on their accounts. In this way, these micro-celebrities are 
perpetuating traditional social norms around Saudi women’s veiling and visibility, even though 
they are challenging societal norms in other ways (i.e. by projecting an image of a confident, 
outspoken, and financially independent female entrepreneur, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter).  
While some women social media users refrain from sharing their photographs out of the religious 
belief that strange men (i.e. all men who are not immediate relatives: husband, father, uncle, 
brother, son) should never see them unveiled, others stop themselves from doing so due to fears 
of “What would people say?” (Noura, 33 years old, January 2016, focus group). The concept of 
‘reputation’ is central within a shame-honour culture such as Saudi Arabia and is a way of 
policing women. The reputation of a woman in traditional shame-honour culture is tied to her 
practices and way of dressing, and accordingly so is the reputation/honour of her family, which is 
why many families tend to object to their daughters displaying their photographs unveiled for 
everyone to see. It does not matter whether the person views the act as wrong or right, what 
matters is if others think it is ‘eyb’ (shameful) or not. Yet, many young Saudi social media 
influencers are rejecting this notion. Particularly in Roz’s post (Figure.8), the caption “Don’t 
Worry about those who talk behind your back; they’re behind you for a reason” acknowledges 
the controversial nature of such images where young Saudi women appear unveiled, and that they 
would most likely stir a wave of gossip which might harm a young woman’s reputation. 
Nevertheless, Roz conveys defiantly that she is not concerned by it, and she urges her followers 
to do the same: “Don’t worry”. Her nonchalant stance in the photo further asserts her 
indifference to maintain a good reputation by retaining and showcasing the conservative ideals of 
femininity, in particular veiling.  
 
The focus groups and one-to-one interviews indicate that young Saudi women who follow these 
social media influencers and fashionistas are quite susceptible to such contemporary radical 
messages. Raghad, a 20 year-old participant in the focus groups (whom I have mentioned earlier 
in this chapter), expressed her strong desire to be a fashionista. Even though Raghad comes from 
a conservative family, she states that she no longer has reservations about the idea of sharing her 
photographs publicly. However, her father’s objection is still keeping her from doing so.   
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“I no longer think it’s a big deal. Everyone is doing it now. It has become normal and accepted. 
I’m totally fine with having an open account with my photos that anyone can view. I’m only 
keeping it private for now because of my father”.  (Raghad, December 2015, focus group)  
 
Raghad did not always hold this view. When she was younger, she thought that the idea of 
publicly sharing her photographs online was extreme. Yet, after being subjected online to many 
other young Saudi women who do it, the idea has become normalised and she no longer thinks it 
a ‘big deal’.  
 
When I asked her whether her father’s reasons for forbidding her from exhibiting photos were 
religious, Raghad told me that he was not that religious: “But you know our society. I mean it's 
difficult for him to face his friends and colleagues who see his daughter’s photographs 
everywhere”. Raghad used the male pronoun to refer to the friends and colleagues of her father. 
This reveals that women are used as symbols of honour amongst the men in the collectivity, 
which necessitates controlling them and their sexuality (Chhacchi, 1991; Rozario, 1991). 
Raghad’s father’s objection to his daughter revealing herself (through her photograph) is not 
based on a religious or ideological belief that the behaviour is intrinsically immoral but rather on 
conformity to a social convention around the collectivity deems ‘eyb’ (shameful). The social 
invisibility of women is central for male relatives to maintain their sense of pride/honour in the 
collectivity as it signifies their chastity, in contrast to women who are unveiled and visible to the 
gaze of men. Although it appears that many Saudi families have moved forward from this 
outlook (as evident by the young Saudi women on social media and in interviews who see 
nothing shameful to themselves and to their families in displaying unveiled photographs online), 
it appears that this outlook still persists and is still a reality for many young women. Even though 
Raghad herself is less inclined to conform to the traditional conservative ideals of femininity and 
honouring the collectivity on the expense of her own individual agency, needs and desires, she 
must still abide by her father’s rules as the head of the household. This could possibly be 
attributed to her young age or financial dependency on him, but it is understood from her 
comment that she does not intend to confirm for much longer: “I’m only keeping it private for 
now”.  
 
Assigning the task of policing and controlling a woman to a male guardian is what provokes 
comments such as the ones in figures 9 and 10 on one of Roz’s ‘risqué’ photographs, where 
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@remo5234 wonders “I just have one question: where is your husband in all this?” and @nx.6m 
comments “The problem is that she says that her father approves what she does!” The 
collectivity expects the men to control ‘their women’ to protect their name/reputation. This is 
because the men in a shame-honour culture take it upon themselves to be the ‘protector’ of their 
honour, which might be jeopardised by the actions of their women, thereby tarnishing their 
reputation (Herr, 1969).  Each member in the collectivity within a shame-honour culture has a 
role and their honour is dependent on carrying out the duties of this role, which in return would 
grant them acceptance in the wider community. While in western societies individualism is 
valued, in traditional shame-honour communities, obligation to the collectivity and conformity 
and policing the honour/shame dichotomy is of greater value, and is in many cases the reason 
behind one’s actions. It is the men’s duty to control their women and it is the women’s duty to 
honour their name and maintain a good reputation by conforming what society expects and 
demands of them.  
  
  
  Figure 9: comment from @remo5234 on Roz Instagram post 
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Figure 10: comment from @nx.6m on Roz Instagram post 
This highlights another societal norm for Saudi women: that of male guardian approval. The 
consent of the woman’s male guardian, whether it is her father, brother, or husband, is essential 
for her to dare to break the norms of the community in Saudi Arabia. Another participant 
(Meshaal, 27 years old) reported that she could not post photos of herself “Because my family 
wouldn’t want me to” (Meshaal, December 2015, focus group). While Tuqa (22 years old), in a 
different focus group, when asked about sharing photographs online stated: “I have my own 
picture as a profile picture on all my social media accounts, and it’s completely fine by me and 
my family” (Tuqa, December 2015, focus group). Both responses highlight the constancy of this 
social norm in Saudi Arabia.  Even Tuqa, who identifies herself as a ‘liberated’ woman, could not 
behave in a liberated way without her father's consent (i.e. she would not share her photograph 
publicly without her father’s support). Women who wish to share their photographs unveiled 
publicly, but do not have their male guardian's approval of such behaviour online, resort to 
‘identity separation’, as in the earlier example of 35 year-old Wafa, whereby they hide their 
family name and control their audience (see Chapter 6). Recently married Najd (25 years old), 
another young woman I talked to in one of the focus group, told me that one of the main factors 
that encouraged her to marry was that she wanted more freedom to do the things which her father 
did not consent to, such as going away on ‘girl trips’ and enjoy freedom of mobility without 
having to explain where she is, call home or ask for permission. Changing her male guardian 
from her father to her husband (as her husband is legitimately her legal male guardian once she is 
		129	
married) was a way to escape the strict rules of one guardian to the more lenient rules of the 
other. 
  
Even though it is debated heavily by feminist activists on Twitter, the Saudi norm of male 
guardianship is rarely openly contested or debated by apolitical users, including micro-celebrities. 
In fact, in many cases it is reinforced, albeit unintentionally. For example, fashionistas Hala and 
Darin try to confront the aggression and criticism they face from conservative nationalists who 
constantly criticise their attire and appearance in some of their photographs on Instagram by 
posting photographs with their male guardians to insinuate their approval of these actions on 
social media (see figures 11 and 12).  
 
 
Figure 11: post from Hala’s Instagram (Hala and her father) 
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Figure 12: post from Darin Instagram (Darin’s parents) 
 
In figures 11 and 12, Hala and Darin respectively are displaying photographs of their fathers with 
the main objective of showcasing that they enjoy good relationships with them. This is meant to 
counter accusations and assumptions by conservative nationalists that either the parents are 
unaware of their daughters’ activity on social media, or that these women’s relationships with 
their parents is strained because of their daughters’ behaviour, or that these young women are 
estranged from their families and thus no one is there to control and discipline them. I 
encountered hundreds of comments referring to families, fathers or brothers by conservative 
nationalists on these young women’s posts while observing the accounts, such as “Her father 
must have disowned her” and “She has no family, she is disobedient and they have forsaken her”. 
Mendelson and Papacharissi (2010) note how relationships are a main aspect of imagery on 
social media, demonstrating significant bonds between family and friends, which in turn 
communicate something about a user’s ‘image’.  In this way, relationships are key building 
blocks in the presentation of the self online. Similarly, this thesis recognises the use of 
photographs by Saudi women to display family relations and national belonging in an effort to 
push back against attacks from conservative nationalist users over women’s unconventional 
portrayals of femininity. The responses of the young women in this research, whether through 
focus groups or one-to-one interviews, suggests that parental/male guardian approval is enough 
for some people to stop criticising a woman’s untraditional behaviour or appearance. However, 
perpetuating this specific value of male approval means that no deep shifts in the patterns of 
gender power relations within their community is occurring.  
 
In the photograph shared by Roz (Figure.13), one comment attempts to defend Roz from other 
users’ criticisms of her ‘shameless behaviour’ (referring to her wearing a bikini on the beach), 
not by asserting her free will and individual agency to dress how she pleases, but by assuming 
that she has asked her family and got their approval of her choice of attire, and is therefore 
allowed to wear a bikini. The comment reads: “Why are you interfering in Roz’s business? She 
had asked her parents and they have approved. Why do you hate her? You are jealous.” Even if 
the commentator (@rx.lo) intends to support Roz’s unconventional choice of dress, this response 
reinforces the norm of male guardian approval within Saudi culture. Thus, even if women’s 
participation on social network sites is negotiating and altering some norms and values around 
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the politics of visibility, it can also perpetuate norms that naturalise gendered power relations. For 
a significant shift in gendered power relations, women need to have the freedom to behave as 
they please regardless of their male guardian’s approval and a higher emphasis on their right to 
individual agency and autonomy needs to be made. The value of the legal guardian for women is 
indeed so strong that it is yet to be challenged by the arrival of the new Crown Prince 
Mohammed Bin Salman. While he made significant legislative changes in regards to women 
(from lifting the ban on driving to allowing them more access to public areas in the community) 
he is yet to accredit women full rights to travel and marry without a male guardian’s approval. 
This highlights how these ‘radical’ behaviours online are merely scratching the surface of the 
reality of Saudi society, and that there is much more still to be done. Nonetheless, what is being 
observed from Saudi women on social media is no way negligible as it still impacts culture and 
norms in all the other ways we discuss in this analysis.  
 
Figure 13: comment from @rx.lo on Roz’s Instagram post 
 
7.4 The Unconventional Modern Role of the Female Entrepreneur 
Another way that female microcelebrities are disrupting traditional gender norms in the Saudi 
community is through their creation/development and popularisation of a new role for Saudi 
women: as business owners, or entrepreneurs. Considering the large audience that micro-
celebrities have, they are thought of by many companies as social media influencers and thus as 
great marketing tools for products and consumer goods. Recent research shows that being famous 
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on social media and turning oneself into a brand has become a job in and by itself in western 
societies, and the Arab world and Saudi Arabia are quickly following suit (Carah and Shaul, 
2016; Booth and Matic. 2011; Ferberg et al, 2011; Marwick, 2010; Duffy and Hund, 2015). More 
and more Saudi young women are attempting to be ‘instafamous’ through what Marwick (2013) 
dubs ‘aspirational production’. Saudi Fashionistas and social media influencers are building their 
audience base through creating and branding a self that users aspire to by projecting a glamorous 
life of travel and luxury (see figures 14 and 15). This further supports the findings of Duffy and 
Hund (2015), who explored how fashionistas can successfully build an audience through 
depicting a ‘glam life’.  
 
As social media influencers, all the Saudi micro-celebrities observed in this study benefitted from 
advertising and brand collaborations, and many of them even went on to start their own business 
that corresponded with their branded selves, thereby turning fame on social media platforms into 
an entrepreneurial springboard for them to jumpstart their professional ventures. For example, 
Afnan Albatel (6.2 million followers) started her own makeup line, while @aqwa83 (550k) 
opened an interior design business. Similarly, influencers such Om.shahoooody and Sausan 
Alkadi benefit financially from product placement in their accounts and from being paid to attend 
fairs/festivals and events and covering their visits through their social media to promote these 
events. I address here how their role as social media influencers and their entrepreneurial 
endeavours have encouraged other women to pursue the modern identity of the independent 
businesswoman.  
 
For Saudi women, the consumable image becomes more aspirational when it is tied to financial 
independence and business accomplishments, as this insinuates a further weakening of the norm 
of the male guardian and provider. In Figure 15, social media influencer Afnan Albatel posts a 
photograph of her wrist wearing six Cartier Love diamond bracelets, each costing over £7000. 
The caption reads: “I want to wear your love, not the shackles of your love. I want to enter your 
vast universe, not your golden cage”.  A Cartier Love bracelet is customarily a gift from one 
partner to the other to express feelings of love and affection. The connotation of Afnan’s post and 
caption is that she refuses to be caged or controlled by a man for financial security; instead, as a 
successful business woman, she will buy herself six bracelets with her own money. This display 
of self-accomplished wealth and success, and the connotations of independence that comes with 
it, is a form of aspirational commodity and branding which young Saudi women are very 
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susceptible to. A young woman I interviewed (Anoud, 29 years old) spoke enthusiastically about 
how much she admired Afnan for her utilisation of social media networks to accomplish a 
business women status, and enviously longed to do the same herself. 
 
Figure 14: Hala in a Louis Viton scarf and a Dior handbag on 
Instagram 
 
Figure 15: Afnan in Cartier bracelets and a Channel shopping bag 
When examining the images of female Saudi social media influencers, the pressure that these 
women are under to draw on discourses of beauty and consumerist lifestyle in order to achieve 
popularity and fame should be noted. This has a significant implication when the 
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fashionista/micro-celebrity herself is veiled (wearing a Hijab). Examining the Instagram accounts 
of female Saudi micro-celebrities who share their photographs veiled, such as Sarah Alwadaani 
@sarah_wad3ani (1 million followers) and Darin Al Bayed @darin00013 (4 million followers), 
for instance, raises the issue of commodification of the veil and the commercialising of feminine 
Islamic identity. One such example is the photo of Sarah Alwadaani (see Figure 16), which she 
shared on Instagram: 
 
 
   Figure 16: Sarah in a veil and Abayah on Instagram 
In Figure 16, Alwadaani is advertising the designer of her garment (who is incidentally also a 
young Saudi woman) and promoting her Abayah line. By doing so, she is expressing a feminine 
Muslim identity through commodities (Abaza 2001; Sandikci and Ger 2001; Salamandra and 
Katz 2008; Gökariksel 2007) yet it is not exactly a traditional conservative femininity as the veil 
in this instance is situated within a rhetoric of beauty and fashion. The implication of the 
popularity of veiled Saudi social media influencers like Sarah Alwadaani is that the veil becomes 
a brand or a label of a consolidated Saudi Muslim femininity. Scholar Minoo Moallem (2005) 
considers whether the veil in this case is an actual site of agency or merely an empty signifier and 
a way to insert the image of the Muslim woman into the world of fashion and consumer culture, 
especially if we take into account the endless products that are being marketed to veiled Saudi 
women by other Saudi women, from Abayas, modest clothing, scarves and veils such as the 
Abayah fashion line that Alwadaani is advertising in this post. Gökariksel and Secor (2009) note 
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how commercialising the veil and marketing it as a fashion item blurs its meaning as a religious 
disciplinary practice pivotal to the cultivation of piety (Mahmood 2011; Gökariksel 2009). 
Pushing this analysis even further, it can be argued here that the whole urban/modern 
‘unconventional’ female Saudi identity is being commercialised and used by major global 
companies to market consumer products to the Saudi/Arabian Gulf market.  
 
Figure 17: Roz promoting hair vitamins on Instagram 
In Figure17, Roz is advertising the famous Sugerbearhair Vitamins to her 6.8 million Saudi 
followers in Arabic (using distinctly Saudi slang). Considering the strong buying power of the 
Arabian Gulf/Saudi market, it is not surprising for big companies to approach this market through 
the reach of female Saudi social media influencers. It does, however, raise a concern very similar 
to that about the veil on whether the identity of the modern, urban ‘unconventional’ young Saudi 
woman is being commercialised.  
 
The benefits of social media platforms in creating job opportunities for Saudi women is not 
limited to influencers, micro-celibrities and fashionistas. Many regular Saudi women have started 
small businesses that are run entirely on social media platforms. As noted Chapter 2, 
traditionally, a Saudi woman’s primary role was that of homemaker and caregiver, and the 
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professional opportunities available for Saudi women were very limited and commonly 
determined by gender segregation (Almunajjed, 1997). As a result, women were confined to the 
gender-segregated schools and colleges to teach other women, or a few positions in the medical 
sector, mainly as gynaecologists (and even that was frowned upon as it required mixing with men 
and working late hours/night shifts). However, Saudi women’s engagement with social media 
platforms has created new and unconventional opportunities for them to work while still avoiding 
integration with men. Internet-based businesses founded and run by women are flourishing, and 
entrepreneurship is becoming an aspiration for many (AlEsa, 2016). Consequently, a new identity 
of the financially independent business owner, or the ‘entrepreneur’, has emerged amongst Saudi 
women. My netnographic research uncovered hundreds of Instagram-shops and home-businesses 
owned by Saudi women operated via social media. In the comments section of a randomly 
chosen photograph in @Afnan Albatel’s account on Instagram, over 130 business Instagram 
accounts owned by Saudi women were being promoted. Moreover, several posts on Afnan’s 
account itself were promoting the accounts of female Saudi makeup artists, hairdressers, 
designers, bakers, chefs as well as other professionals, all running their business from home 
through a social media account on Instagram or Snapchat (known as a ‘Matjar electrony’, or e-
shops). 
 
Aseel (a 30 year-old mother of triplets), who had just launched her e-business on Instagram a few 
months prior to our interview, told me that she started her catering/wedding planning business 
when she saw how many Saudi women were successfully promoting their home-based business 
on Instagram. She noted: 
 
 “It was very encouraging to see women and mothers like myself suddenly running popular e-
shops on social media! It made me think: well I can do that too! I made a couple of initial designs 
for chocolate trays and I advertised my business on @aqwa83’s account and it rapidly boomed”.  
(Aseel, March, 2016, one-to-one interview) 
 
She now has 18.6k followers on her business account on Instagram (@Guzel.sa). There is no 
physical store and the business is run entirely from her home and through the account to avoid 
face-to-face contact. In addition to opening up opportunities for women to work, the home 
business trend has also normalised several ‘hands-on’ professions such as makeup artist, 
hairdresser or cook (which all used to be considered ‘eyb’ and beneath a woman from a middle-
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class status) and glamorised them to the point that they have become desirable. On this particular 
point, Aseel says: “Before, it was ‘eyb’ for a woman to sell home-cooked food or go from house 
to house as a make-up artist. People would say ‘Does she not have anyone to support her 
financially? Does she need the money?’”. By saying ‘before’, Aseel is referring to a very recent 
history just before the trend of social media took off in Saudi Arabia, particularly the platform of 
Instagram in 2012. This significant change in the attitudes of Saudis towards women undertaking 
manual jobs is evidence of how social media can be used to negotiate values and norms in Saudi 
society.  
 
Moreover, Aseel’s experience sheds light on the central role that social media 
influencers/fashionistas are playing in supporting and promoting other Saudi women’s start-up 
businesses.  Indeed, the observed accounts of social media influencers in this research were full 
of paid ads and ‘collabs’ with local e-businesses by fellow Saudi women. Therefore, the rise of 
female social media influencers in Saudi is changing norms and values relating to paid 
employment/financial independence and labour in two ways: firstly, by inspiring women to take 
on the role of a working-woman and turning the female entrepreneur into an aspirational identity, 
and, secondly, by supporting and promoting e-businesses operated by Saudi women through 
featuring them on the account. These women are becoming both the embodiment of the modern 
Saudi entrepreneur as well as becoming the channel that successfully accelerates the popularity of 
this identity by promoting and building the career of more female Saudi entrepreneurs.     
 
The next section analyses in detail the new ideals of femininity that are emerging online through 
the activities of women micro-celibrities, influencing many young Saudi women and encouraging 
them to adopt them. 
 
7.5 The new ideals of femininity amongst Saudi Woman on Social Media Networks 
From the findings and discussions above, we can observe how young women’s practices 
on social media/networked publics is impacting the classical image/identity of the Saudi woman 
and updating it. They are hyper in terms of the accelerated speed of which they are moving away 
from classical and traditional Saudi femininity. We must acknowledge that Saudi women did not 
move through waves of organised feminism as women in the west did. Saudi women were 
somewhat ‘frozen in time’ due to the social relations of their society and the Sahwa-inspired 
marginalisation in the 80s and 90s, before being suddenly thrust into the hyper world of the 
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digital age. And this is the first reason why I refrain from using the term ‘post-feminism’ to refer 
to what is observed from Saudi women as the term post-feminism is used to refer to a particular 
moment within the western culture and the history of feminism.   
Following from this (in fact, largely as a result of this), the second aspect of Saudi women’s 
engagement on social media is that they are using the digital context as a progressive force to 
‘improve’ their circumstances (empowerment, agency, etc.) rather than merely use the internet as 
a forum for body sexualisation/exposing (as western post-feminists tend to do and which is 
criticised by second-wave feminists). Instead, the emphasis in the posts of Saudi women which 
have been analysed above is on social/cultural representation through visibility rather than overt 
sexual display. Therefore, while Dobson, along with other feminist scholars (Phelan, 1993, Wolf, 
1991; Mulvey, 1975/1989), argue that women’s visibility in western cultures might not 
necessarily lead to self-actualisation and empowerment, I argue differently for the case with 
Saudi women. The level of visibility associated with expressions of unconventional modern 
identities online within the conservative, shame-honour culture of Saudi Arabia might actually 
translate into self-actualisation and empowerment amongst Saudi women. Yet I refrain from 
using the label of feminism to term define it. The reason is that these new emerging identities, 
modes of self-representation and public /popular representations of Saudi women are not feminist 
in the classical sense as they do not act politically in an explicit manner. In addition, women 
participants in my research retain several features of traditional femininity that contradicts with 
feminist ideologies. These values that underpin and express traditional feminine identities are 
exemplified by the following pastimes and practices: a constant projection of consumer goods 
and a fixation on beauty, fashion and make-up products. This raises a pertinent question: how 
liberating are these new feminine identities for Saudi women? At the heart of these feminine 
expressions and images of Saudi women is a project to market and sell consumer goods. These 
values and practices are replacing one set of cultural chains - overt legal tyranny of patriarchy – 
with another set of cultural chains -  commercial imperatives. Nonetheless, because of their 
aspiration and search for agency within the site of popular culture it is suggested here that in their 
effort to claim their identities both online and offline, these young women are developing 
contemporary ideals of femininity. 
These newly emerging ideals are conceptually similar to Dobson’s ‘post-feminism’ in 
terms of their relationship to neo-liberalism but at the same time acutely specific to Saudi 
circumstances in terms of the values and customs that they are challenging. The below three 
		139	
examples show how young Saudi women’s activity and representation in the digital context can 
be understood as displays of empowerment, in its assertion of power and aspiration for agency. 
 
As reviewed above (see Chapter 3), a number of scholars have observed a shift in representations 
of femininity today on networked publics in which qualities such as energy, vitality, confidence, 
independence, entrepreneurial spirit, along with public visibility and self-exposure are 
emphasised in the performances of femininity by women online (for example, Gill, 2007; 
Hopkins, 2002; Aapola, Gonick, and Harris, 2005; Harris, 2004; McRobbie, 2007; Banet-Weiser, 
2012; Ringrose, 2013; Dobson, 2014, Dobson, 2015). Similarly, we see these attributes being 
emphasised in Saudi women’s performances of self as well, with less regard being given to other 
people’s opinions, criticism, or attempts at shaming. A central attribute that is observed in Saudi 
women’s performance of identity on social media is confidence and a sense of defiance that 
contrasts with the traditional conformity of shame-honour cultures. In the photograph shared by 
Hala on Instagram (Figure 18) she writes: “Birds born in a cage think flying is an illness”.   The 
caption is most likely directed at the many women conservative nationalists who criticise her 
unconventional behaviour, excessive visibility and ‘immodest’ choices of clothing which they 
browse on her her Instagram and Snapchat activity. Hala appears unapologetic in her expression 
of self on social media and very self-assured showing confidence in what she is doing even 
though critics might mistake her ‘freedom to fly’ or to be who she wants as an ‘illness’ as they 
themselves (women who criticize her) are ‘caged’ in a shame-honour society/culture that is 
controlling them with rules, traditions, and dictating how they should look and act. The 
illustration of qualities such as defiance, confidence and reassurance that sharply contrast to the 
conformity of the classical Saudi femininity (whether it is conformity to customs and traditions, 
or conformity to the rules of the legal guardian, the family and the wider society) substantiates 
the recognition of the sentiments that are communicated in theses posts as new ideals that are 
emerging amongst Saudi women.  
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    Figure 18: post from Hala’s Instagram 
This quality of confidence and self-assurance can also be linked to broader discourses of 
individualisation (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 2002) in which this young woman would discover and 
practice her own values and preferences which might not necessarily conform to the values of the 
collectivity/society. Similarly, Dobson (2015) observes in the practices of young women on 
social media that idealised postfeminist femininity elides with the broad neoliberal political 
discourses of individualisation and self-actualisation. Hala’s analogy describes the strong sense 
of collectivism in Saudi society that she is part of (cage), and how some might perceive 
expressions of individualism by Saudi women as wrong or immoral (an illness) for their failure to 
align with the collectivity’s values/customs. The accentuation of individualism in networked 
publics is recognised here, which in return is promoting the development of new ideals that are 
aligned with with the notion of individualism on social media networks amongst Saudi women as 
they move away from the collectivity and its shared values. 
 
We can see the same thing in the example of Sausan in Figure. 19, in which the caption reads: 
“My advice to you people, you never need anyone’s approval and make sure to always put your 
happiness above anything else”.  
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    Figure 19: post from Sausan’s Instagram 
Again, connotations of individual agency and confidence are provoked through Sausan’s choice 
of words. Her advice to other people, which can also be understood as her own personal ‘motto’ 
in life, encourages the adoption of individualistic values, preferences, lifestyles, advocating active 
choice-making in relation to the self instead of conformity, just as she did with her bold choice of 
blue hair in the photograph.  
 
However, as noted above, the assertion of individual agency and “not needing anyone’s 
approval” is in tension with the perpetuation of male guardian approval in some of these micro-
celebrities’ posts. This tension can be explained by understanding the amount of pressure these 
young women are under from conservative nationalists to conform.  In today’s digital cultures, 
young Saudi women are expected to be on display, not only to make their bodies visible but also 
to speak, to be heard, to express their inner selves confidently, authentically, and transparently, 
and thus to make themselves known. Anita Harris (2004) has documented the cultural push for 
girls and young women to display, confess, speak up and generally participate in public 
discourse. But the kind of intense visibility and self-exposure of women is not only about self-
actualisation, power and producing the self as valued and valuable. Rather, women make 
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themselves open to public judgment, shaming, critique and surveillance, especially in shame-
honour societies, while the cultural promises that circulate around their visibility may or may not 
be realised. Thus, to fend off conservative nationalists’ scrutiny of their behaviour is to actually 
conform to the strong value of male guardian approval in order to challenge other traditional 
restrictions on visibility and choice.  
 
Despite these young women’s push for freedom and nonconformity on social media in terms of 
traditions of veiling and visibility, it frames this femininity within a context of consumerism and 
an avid interest in fashion, style and makeup. Such as the case in the below example: 
 
    Figure 20: post from Sausan’s Instagram 
Sausan’s caption reads: “Do what they think you can’t do”. The tone is very energetic and 
defying. It encourages and positions women as active subjects, illustrating a specific ‘can-do’ 
feminine subjectivity that is commonly idealised in the postfeminist, late-modern neoliberal 
context (Harris, 2004), As young women are viewed as most adept at consumption and image-
management, Harris (2004) argues that the image of a self-reliant, earnest, ambitious, 
materialistic and highly visible ‘can do girl’ has become the symbol of achievement and success 
in today’s individualised and meritocratic neoliberal society. Nonetheless, even though the 
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performance of Sausan in this Instagram post exemplifies attributes that are new to Saudi 
feminine performances, such as vitality and independence, as well as the overt visibility in 
relation to the Saudi custom of veiling, it still retains some facets of traditional femininity. For 
example, Sausan herself is an attractive young woman posing in the photograph heavily made up 
and beautified. Gill (2007) documents the gender-typical attractiveness that is maintained in 
illustrations of postfeminist narratives. Additionally, the majority of Sausan’s posts are focused 
on consumption, a traditional feminine attribute (McRobbie, 2009), such as the case in this 
specific photograph (Figure. 20) where Sausan links the details of where to buy her outfit from. 
As noted in the literature review (see Chapter 3), Dobson (2015) argues that post-feminism on 
digital cultures maintains some key aspects of traditional femininity that are tied to fashion and 
style and consumption (Zaslow, 2009). Similarly, in this research I note how Saudi women’s 
effort to claim their identities online can sometimes do the same.  This is also noted the posts of 
Hala and Afnan in figures 14 and 15, where there is a fixation on material items that relate to 
fashion and style (the Cartier bracelets, the Luis Vuitton scarf) in order to express wealth and 
financial independence. Thus, even though the aim of the posts is to communicate 
unconventional ideals of femininity that relates to qualities of meritocracy, entrepreneurship, 
financial success and independence, it is still depicting and encouraging traditional feminine 
attributes of consumption and interest in fashion and style.  
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights young women’s effort to claim identity online and offline in Saudi 
Arabia. This effort is brining about some depictions of femininity that are unconventional and 
new to Saudi culture, which contrasts with the traditional Saudi femininity that is promoted 
within a shame-honour culture. Unlike traditional ideals of femininity, these new and 
contemporary ideals endorse neoliberal qualities such as confidence, self-assurance, 
independence, defiance and a strong sense of individual agency. It gives less value to conformity 
and the shaming that might ensue from insubordination. However, some traditional values of 
femininity are still evident, such as portrayal and consumption of classical ideals of feminine 
beauty, and, more importantly, very often these unconventional portrayals of femininity are 
achieved by inadvertently endorsing the male guardian approval which is still prevalent in Saudi 
society.  
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Many of the young women’s posts analysed in this study portray notions of confident self-belief 
and meritocracy; that success is achieved through ambition, determination and hard work. The 
identities observed on social networks amongst Saudi women and micro-celebrities are 
commonly affiliated with the rhetoric of individualisation and meritocratic self-making. This is in 
a way very similar to Dobson’s (2015) observations on post-feminism in western and anglophone 
digital cultures. Dobson details how young women she observed on MySpace were keen to align 
themselves with post-feminist traits of being a ‘can do girl’ (Harris, 2004) “that is self-reliant, 
ambitious, materialistic and highly visible” in order to “construct a publicly valued post-feminist 
feminine self” (Dobson, 2015, p.111). However, this has many repercussions when it happens in 
a conservative Islamic community that is more aligned with patriarchal discourse and 
collectivism, as is the case in this study. It invites a backlash and a wave of judgment by other 
users, as we will see in the next chapter because it challenges classical ideals of femininity in 
Saudi culture. 
 
The efforts of social media micro-celebrities in particular are challenging and impacting the 
values and norms of Saudi women significantly in more ways than one. This phenomenon is, 
first, negotiating women’s move towards a prominent space within the public sphere. Secondly, it 
is normalising the debut/appearance and presence of women publicly (whether veiled or 
unveiled) and neutralising the shame that surrounded it before. Finally, it is giving way to new 
and modern gender roles for women, such as the female entrepreneur. Although long-established 
norms such as male guardian approval persist on these social networks, the impact that social 
media engagement is having on traditions and norms cannot be overlooked.  Not all norms are 
being contested on networked publics; the actions of some micro-celebrities and some users alike 
are perpetuating some norms around male guardianship and gender power relations, for example. 
Accordingly, women who do not have the support of male figures in their lives were found in this 
research to either express forced identities or resort to ‘identity separation’ to protect their 
privacy when expressing a self that deviates from the collectivity’s norms and values. 
 
Yet, in general women micro-celebrities are acting as vanguards of change that young Saudi 
women are looking up to and emulating. The presence of vanguards of change and the diffusion 
of such paradigms of Saudi women through social media has led to young digital natives now 
becoming less reluctant to challenge traditions when claiming their identity. The activity 
observed in this chapter by Saudi women and micro-celebrities online is compensating for 
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women’s seclusion within the domestic sphere and successfully bringing about a Saudi 
counterpublic on social media networks, in which women play a crucial and instrumental role.  
Additionally, these women are negotiating gender roles by challenging norms around the 
placement of women within the domestic and private sphere and around limiting their role to that 
of home-maker. They are also challenging norms of veiling. The high demand for visibility on 
social media is urging women to reassess their values around veiling and visibility. Finally, the 
neo-liberal emphasis of individual agency and autonomy on networked publics is gradually 
emancipating women from their conventional placement as representatives of the collectivity’s 
honour and carriers of the family name.  
 
The findings in this chapter answer the question regarding the values and norms that are being 
challenged on social media platforms in relation to women by mapping out and framing the 
emerging unconventional and contemporary ideals of femininity amongst Saudi women on digital 
networks. The next chapter will examine the cultural impact of this non-traditional femininity 
once it is linked to the Saudi nationality and detail the pushback from conservative nationalists 
against it.  
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Chapter Eight. Social Media and the National Public Image of Saudi Women 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the findings relating to the second question in this research, namely 
how social media usage in Saudi Arabia is contributing to changes in the public images of young 
Saudi women, emerging from the data collected through netnography and focus groups. The 
previous chapter analysed the ways in which the engagement of Saudi women with social media 
networks is impacting norms of veiling, working and their seclusion to the private sphere. These 
norms, as Chapter two described, are established as the defining codes of traditional gender 
identity in Saudi. Therefore, the alteration of these norms would indeed impact the public images 
of young Saudi women, moving them away from a collective ideology to an individualist identity 
that does not necessarily subscribe to these collective traditions and norms.  
 
Upon the initial examination and analysis of the netnographic data that I have collected, themes 
of nationhood, religion, national identity and westernisation emerged in relation to Saudi 
women’s expressions of unconventional ideals of femininity on social media networks. In this 
chapter, I will demonstrate the way in which conservative nationalists uphold women as symbolic 
border guards and markers of a unique and pious Saudi nation distinct from other nations. This 
will emphasise the centrality of the need to secure and police women’s subscriptions to the 
collective ideology for the conservative nationalistic project and therefore explain the severe 
backlash from conservative nationalists in cases of resistance. I shall do this through analysing 
the attacks and aggression against young Saudi women from these conservative nationalists on 
social media upon depicting an identity that is divergent from the classical norms that have long 
been held as defining codes of the Saudi woman.  
 
I will start by comparing conservative nationalists’ reactions to two extreme images that are often 
conjured up on thinking of the Saudi woman today: the pious woman and the glamorous, 
cosmopolitan woman, as well as addressing the regulatory gaze that these conservative 
nationalists use to police women. I will then move on to detailing and categorising the types of 
digital aggressions that are manifesting as a result of this gaze. Throughout this analysis, I will be 
asserting how young Saudi women’s engagement on social networks is allowing the exhibition 
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and the cultural production of new modern and fresh images of Saudi women, therefore 
successfully renegotiating gender identity within the Saudi nation and moving it away from 
collective ideologies to embrace individual agency and autonomy. Throughout this chapter of the 
analysis, I will be mainly drawing on the work of Al-Rasheed (2013) and Yuval-Davis (1997), as 
well as Anthony Smith (1986) on nationhood, Dobson (2015) and Harris (2004) on digital post-
feminism, and Giddens (1991) on individualism.  
 
8.2 Contradictory Images 
Chapter 2 discussed the emergence of a specific type of nationalism in Saudi Arabia heavily 
marked by religion, specifically an orthodox, ‘Wahhabi’ interpretation of Islamic text. I detailed 
how this ‘religious nationalism’ (Al-Rasheed, 2013) became increasingly focused on women, the 
way they dress, their exclusion from the public sphere, segregation from men, and restrictions of 
certain civic rights such as driving, and the enforcement of male guardianship on travel, marriage, 
and obtaining a passport, amongst other things. The international pressure on the Saudi Arabian 
government after 9/11, combined with the cultural and economic influences of globalising 
capitalism, pushed the state towards a more lenient modern nationalistic narrative, even if it was 
not yet significantly freed from a religious conservative motif with the aim of painting the state as 
a champion of women (Al-Rasheed, 2013). Nonetheless, not all Saudis were willing to update the 
religious national identity that was popularised in the 1980s as part of the Sahwah movement and 
adopt this modern identity instead, especially with regard to women and their image and role 
within the nation. Conservative views on the vitality of the veil as an identity signifier (which is 
often misinterpreted by western feminists as an oppressive patriarchal practice) is well 
documented in Islamic feminist research (Badran, 2009; Shaikh, 2003; Syed, 2010; Shirazi, 
2003). The tension between these conflicting views has resulted in the manifestation of two 
contradictory images of the Saudi woman and a disagreement amongst Saudi social media users 
over which one is to be considered a ‘true’ representation of Saudi women. As noted Chapter 3, 
the term ‘true Saudi’ that emerges from the netnographic data collected in this research is 
referenced by conservative nationalists in an effort to dismiss women who challenge or deviate 
from the conventional traditional Saudi femininity. Thus, the word ‘true’ is always placed in this 
analysis within quotation marks.  
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Figure 21: Google search results for ‘Saudi Women’  
 
 
Figure 22: A collection of images from Saudi fashionistas’ accounts on Instagram. 
 
The juxtaposing of the two collections of photographs in figures 21 and 22 captures the 
contrasting images that are conjured up when referencing Saudi women. She is either the pious, 
conservative, heavily veiled housewife, segregated from men and dependent on the male 
guardian in her life (father, brother or husband), or she is the glamorous cosmopolitan 
entrepreneur who jet-sets around the globe, drives her own luxury car and manages her own 
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business with a social circle that includes both men and women. In this section, I shall examine 
the contradictory images of Saudi women, with a main focus on women’s appearance and attire, 
as it is easy to assess and observe on social media networks in which personal photographs and 
images are a central component of identity expression. Of course, not all Saudi women fall within 
either one of these two polar images; rather, they are two polar ends on a scale. However, 
juxtaposing them in this way highlights the progress that Saudi women are making in 
renegotiating their gender identity within the Saudi nation, and traces the development of modern 
new ideals of femininity that are gradually being tied to their Saudi nationality.  
 
8.2.1 The Pious Woman 
Conservative nationalists deem this particular type of woman to be the ‘true’ Saudi female. 
Religious conservative Saudi women are not only accepted but are celebrated within the 
traditional Wahhabi nationalistic narrative. Veiling, as I have explained in Chapter 2, is a central 
signifier within this traditional classical female Saudi image. As a result, women who subscribe 
to this viewpoint refrain from sharing any personal photographs of themselves online. Amongst 
the Saudi female micro-celebrities that I observed, Khawater Al-khuwaiter @om_shahoooody (1 
million followers on Instagram) embodies this traditional classical identity. By never sharing any  
 
  
Figure 23: two posts from Khawater’s Instagram 
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photos of herself and primarily focusing on her duties as a mother and a home-maker, Al-
khuwaiter is an ideal representation of the Saudi women in the eyes of conservative nationalists. 
 
In these randomly selected posts from Al-khwaiter’s Instagram account (see figures 23 and 24), a 
fixation on cooking, cleaning, tiding up the household is evident. Over 70% of Al-khwaiter’s 
posts concern her role as a mother and a housewife, where she shares recipes to cook with her 
followers and ideas to organise the fridge and the cabinets, and properly clean the house. Her 
posts always place her in the private domain of the house, and she often invokes religious notions 
in the captions. Take, for example this photograph of Al-khwaiter’s living room, which she 
shared on Instagram at the end of the summer holidays and before the return back to schools (see 
Figure 24).  
 
   Figure 24: post from Khawater’s Instagram 
 
The caption reads: “The end of the longest vacation in the history of the Kingdom. We have 
witnessed two pillars of Islam falling within the same holiday (Ramadhan and Hajj) and two eids 
(Al-adh’ha and Al-fter). Alhamdullelah (Thank you Allah) for this blessing”. She then ends with 
a prayer thanking God for blessing “us” (meaning her and her followers) with a holiday full of 
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joy and happiness and with no loss or agony. This religious motif is commonly invoked and 
highlighted in Al-khwaiter’s posts and similarly in the posts of women who subscribe to a 
traditional classical feminine Saudi identity. A critical reading of this specific photograph shows 
that it embodies every aspect of the traditional conventional Saudi woman which conservative 
nationalists idealise and celebrate. It places Al-khwaiter in the private domain within her home, 
in a house that she cleans, cares for and maintains, in front of a feast that she has prepared for her 
husband and children, displaying a religious spiritual sentiment (despite the fact that such 
sentiment is not associated with going back to school), ands most importantly, concealing 
(veiling) a very important element: Al-khwaiter herself.   
 
The conformity of Al-khwaiter to a religious conservative traditional Saudi female identity does 
not provoke any aggression from conservative nationalists despite her activity on the platform 
Instagram. I have examined nearly 300 different photographs posted by her on Instagram in 
search of a single attack in regard to her national affiliation, with no success. In comparison, it 
was easy to find critical, even aggressive comments by conservative nationalists on the accounts 
of Saudi fashionistas. Posts that highlight national affiliation are commonly an active space 
where such attacks on women reside, yet in the nationalistic posts of Al-khwaiter, there are none. 
This asserts Armstrong’s (1982) argument on the role of cultural codes such as styles of dressing 
or behaviours in identifying individuals as members or non-members of the mythical nation, 
particularly when it comes to women, who are fixed as ‘symbolic border guards’ of the nation in 
nationalistic projects (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Mercer, 1994). 
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Figure 25: post about the national day on Khawater’s 
Instagram 
 
Figure 25 shows a photograph that Al-khwaiter shared on the national day of Saudi Arabia.  She 
writes in the caption a little prayer to keep the Kingdom, the King and ‘our soldiers’ safe.  All the 
comments under the post were positive. Not one comment criticised Al-khuwaiter with the usual 
“You do not represent Saudi women”, or questioned her national affiliation, or accused her of 
being a disgrace to the Saudi nation. This is contrary to comments examined under similar 
national posts by women who are promoting non-traditional aspects of femininity in their effort 
to claim their identities online, which will be detailed later in this chapter. The domesticated and 
pious woman is fully accepted by religious nationalists as a reputable representation of Saudi 
women. She fits in neatly with the narrative of religious nationalism, which highlights piety and 
conservatism, and thus does not provoke any attacks from conservative nationalists because it 
does not threaten the unified identity of the imagined nation and she preserves the boundaries that 
differentiate ‘us’ from the ‘others’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997). In many cases, she is an active 
conservative nationalist herself, believing that female identities in Saudi should remain defined 
by a Wahhabi interpretation of Islamic texts that places them within the private domain, regulates 
their attire and movement, and restricts their civic rights. Examples of such vocal ‘true’ Saudi 
women will be presented within this chapter upon analysing the ‘regulatory gaze’.  
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Dobson (2015) follows poststructuralist theorists in suggesting that we understand women’s 
efforts in media production on digital networks not as reflective of a pre-existing ‘reality’ but as 
producing and constituting our sense of the real through repeated discourse and representation. 
She suggests that young women are “centrally caught up in power struggles as they interact with, 
via, and in postfeminist techno-social mediascapes to produce self-representations in the course 
of everyday life”. Furthermore, Dobson (2015) (in line with feminist poststructuralist 
epistemology) argues that gendered identities and femininity are not inherent properties, but 
are rather constituted and produced together with performative and complex acts of self-
presentation (Butler, 1990; Barad, 2003; Cover, 2012). Thus, in relation to Saudi women, 
unconventional social media self-representations should not be understood as inauthentic or 
unreal representations of a pre-existing conservative/traditional Saudi femininity, but rather as a 
production and constitution of a contemporary Saudi femininity that is produced performatively 
and discursively through symbolic, repetitive, and normative expression (Butler, 1990). Which 
brings us to the second type of Saudi femininity found on social media, the glamorous 
fashionista. 
 
8.2.2 The Glamorous Cosmopolitan Woman 
The image of the glamorous, cosmopolitan Saudi woman contrasts sharply with the 
aforementioned image of the traditional and conservative woman. Amongst the female micro-
celebrities I observed, fashionistas in particular embody this acute image of an autonomous, 
independent Saudi woman (see Chapter 3). Thus, I shall draw my examples in this section from 
the Instagram accounts of two Saudi fashionistas: Roz (@model_roz) and Hala Abdullah 
(@therhala). In contrast to the conservative women, the women within this category do not 
subscribe to the Wahhabi conservative nationalists’ traditional imagining of how women should 
appear and behave. They are often unveiled, liberal, have no reservations about mingling with 
men, and are interested in occupying the public rather than the private domain. Their 
presentations of such an image on social media and the association of it with being Saudi 
nationals prompts a backlash from conservative nationalists in the form of verbal attacks, as the 
following examples will illustrate.  
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Figure 26: comment from @hayon_141 on Roz post 
 
In Figure 26, Roz appears unveiled in a short, revealing dress in the streets of Los Angeles posing 
on top of her car, which she drives herself. She is actively engaging in the process of taking a 
‘selfie’, presumably to share on social media. She captions the image saying: ‘Keep calm and 
take a selfie’. The rise of a selfie culture has been well documented by scholars (Madden et al, 
2013; Schwarz, 2010; Winston 2013; Twange and Campbell 2009; Lee, 2005), particularly their 
utilisation for representing an idealised self. Similar to Nicolescu (2016) observation on Italian 
women, I note here how Roz is ‘staging’ the perfect selfie to construct a branded-self that would 
be aspirational and appeal to her followers (Marwick, 2015). The identity that is being idealised 
here is that of a carefree young woman who is dressing and behaving in an unconventional, 
westernised manner, apparently not necessarily perturbed by the criticism she might inspire in a 
shame-honour culture that considers her choice of dress and mannerisms ‘eyb’ (shameful). 
 
More importantly here, in the mini-biography on Roz’s Instagram account on which she shared 
this photo, she states that she is a ‘Saudi Arabian model’. By labelling herself as Saudi Arabian, 
Roz is tying this image of a modern dynamic and somewhat liberal woman, who is untroubled by 
what people might say about her, to the Saudi nationality, thereby culturally producing and 
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idealising, whether deliberately or not, an alternate image/identity of the young Saudi woman. 
This result further supports the idea of women utilising social media for cultural production 
(Dobson, 2015), which feeds Senft’s (2013) recognition of social media networks as 
counterpublics of cultural production for women in which they compensate for their exclusion 
from the process of cultural production in the public sphere. In this image, a Saudi woman is 
placed in a public setting (in the street), as opposed to being confined to the private domain. She 
is a dynamic active woman who drives her own car and enjoys autonomy of movement. And, 
more importantly, she does not abide by conservative dictates of modest dressing and does not 
hesitate to share her photograph publicly. This image is in stark contrast to that of Al-khwaiter’s 
which was analysed above.  
 
Once attached to the label of Saudi national, such images invariably provoke a sever reaction 
from conservative nationalists in the form of verbal attacks in the comment section. Under this 
same photograph by Roz, a female user (@hayon_141) comments: “Sadly you have destroyed the 
Saudi reputation. Erase the words ‘From Saudi Arabia’ from your bio and look for a nationality 
that befits you and what you’re wearing”. She adds in her next comment, while talking to other 
users in the comment section who are defending Roz’s right to choose what she wears: “Don’t 
tell me that this is none of my concern. Since she wrote ‘Saudi Arabia’ in the bio then she is our 
concern”. The user @hayon_141 is a typical example of a conservative nationalist. Critical 
reading analysis of @hayon_141’s comment indicates that women in secular and religious 
nationalistic ideologies, their actions and their choice of dress, are considered a representation of 
the entire nation’s honour (Mercer, 1994). Roz’s individual actions here are blamed for 
“destroying” the entire nation’s “reputation”. Such sentiments reveal the predominance of the 
collective over the individual for religious nationalists, which is being contested by the 
emphasised sense of independence, agency and autonomy in the lifestyle that Roz narrates 
through her posts (Giddens, 1991, p.81). Thus, Roz’s engagement with social media platforms 
can be understood as part of a wider process of individualisation which some scholars argue is 
detradtionalising communities (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2000; Beck, 2002). The aggression of 
@hayon_141 towards Roz’s unconventional lifestyle is further accentuated in her desire to strip 
Roz of her Saudi nationality when she demands that Roz “remove the words ‘from Saudi Arabia” 
from her bio and “look for another nationality that fits [her]”.  The user @hayon_141 here is 
bluntly refusing to acknowledge Roz as a Saudi woman.   
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This type of attack is visible under almost every photograph of the 1500 photographs on Roz’s 
Instagram account. And such aggression is especially vivid when the photograph portrays a 
slightly more provoking attire or behaviour. For example, in Figure 27, where a man at Coachella 
festival embraces Roz, the comments surge from an average of 3000 (the average number 
underneath a photo posted by Roz) to 11,500 comments. 20% of these comments are general 
words of admiration, while a staggering 80% are a wave of criticisms and an intense debate 
between two types of followers: conservative nationalists who are castigating Roz’s behaviour 
and other Saudis who are defending her. User @Ftoom_abdulkareem excoriated Roz under this 
photograph saying:  
 
“I just want to know where are [her men] from her? They are [semi-men] those who let their 
daughters and sisters strip off their clothes under the name of freedom. This is not freedom; this 
is a disgrace to our whole Muslim society, to the whole nation of the Prophet Mohammed. Where 
is your fear of God? Where is your jealousy over your women?” (@Ftoom_abdulkareem, 
comment in Instagram, April 2017)  
 
 
Figure 27: Roz in Coachella embraced by a man 
(Instagram) 
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The rhetoric in @Ftoom_abdulkareem’s comment is reflective of the main ideas in conservative 
nationalists imagining of the ideal Saudi woman; she should be monitored and controlled by the 
male figures in her life to ensure her conformity to a religiously pious identity that ‘fears God’. 
Any deviation from this conservative identity is considered a shame on her whole family and 
especially a shame on the men who have failed to control her. More importantly here is that the 
user considers Roz (and by extension all Saudi women) to be direct markers and signifiers of an 
imagined religious Saudi nation - ‘the nation of the Prophet Mohammed’. This is consistent with 
Madawi Al-Rasheed’s (2013) arguments around the centrality of women in the conservative 
nationalistic project in Saudi Arabia and the use of them as ‘symbolic border guards’ of the 
nation and its culture (Yuval-Davis, 1997).  
 
Here, not only the norm of veiling is being contested but also the norm of gender segregation. 
Gender segregation, as explained in Chapter 2, is the reason veiling is such a central component 
in the religious national imagining of the ideal Saudi woman to begin with (Doumato 2009; 
Hamdan 2005; Le Renard 2008, 2014). Veiling is meant to ‘shield’ the pious woman from the 
eyes of men and minimise the potential of infatuation and illicit sexual relations that might result 
from it. This perhaps explains the significant rise in the number of aggressive comments under 
this specific photograph. Even though Roz challenges the norms of veiling in every photograph 
on her Instagram account, the image of a Saudi woman being touched by a man proved to be 
even more infuriating to Saudi conservative nationalists judging from the significant upsurge in 
the number of negative comments.  
 
The implication of losing control over women is the loss of the nation’s defining cultural signifier 
and consequently represents a transformation of the unique (and uniquely moral) national Saudi 
identity. Thus, I argue that the aggression that is observed on the accounts of unconventional 
Saudi women is an outcome of a ‘regulatory gaze’ performed by conservative nationalists to 
monitor, evaluate and seek to discipline Saudi women into a specific performance of identity that 
is consistent with a religious national narrative and an imagining of a pious nation (Benedict 
Anderson, 2006). The next section analyses examples of the regulatory gaze being applied on 
Saudi women while categorising the aggression that ensues from this gaze into three distinct 
categories, each representing a typical accusation or criticism of these unconventional women.  
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8.3 The Regulatory Gaze 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, I develop this term against the backdrop of a doctrine that is used in 
media studies to analyse visual culture and how the audience views the people that are being 
featured (Said, 1978; Sartre, 1956; Derrida, 2008; Kaplan, 1997). However, I use this term to 
contribute to and advance the debate around the gaze through a feminist focus on gender within 
conservative communities and shame-honour cultures, specifically Saudi Arabia. The regulatory 
gaze of conservative nationalists on Saudi women’s social media activity and digital expressions 
of identity is driving a backlash against unconventional depictions of femininity. Conservative 
nationalists’ efforts to denounce these expressions of non-traditional identities and reject them as 
representations of Saudi women commonly fall within one of three archetypal 
attacks/accusations: undermining a woman’s Saudi citizenship, using ethnic slurs to marginalise 
her status within the nation, and branding her as a victim of westernisation, all of which are 
meant to communicate that these women are not to be considered ‘true’ Saudi women. As noted 
in Chapter 2, the data collected netnographically shows an emergence of the word ‘true’ 
proceeding ‘Saudi’ when referring to women’s nationality. Similar words such as ‘real’, 
‘authentic’ or ‘original’ might be used instead; however, they are all used to communicate the 
same thing: a two-level categorisation of Saudi women that conservative nationalists on digital 
networks refer to in order to marginalise and dismiss modern identities that do not conform to the 
ideals of conventional, religiously pious femininity. In this section, I will analyse examples of 
each of the three archetypal accusations/attacks on women in order to confirm conservative 
nationalists positioning of women as symbolic border guards of culture. This will then frame my 
argument about how idealising non-traditional attributes of femininity online can be understood 
as a renegotiation of women’s national image and what being a Saudi woman means today. This 
national image is no longer a singular unanimous form but rather several diverse, and sometimes 
contrasting, identities and images.  
 
8.3.1 The Undermining of Women’s Saudi Citizenship  
The first common reaction from religious Saudi nationalists upon coming across a Saudi woman 
on social media who is expressing an identity that challenges the classical traditional feminine 
national identity is to doubt her nationality to begin with. Even if the woman claims to be Saudi, 
conservative nationalists hesitate to accept it; she is assumed to be non-Saudi until proven 
otherwise. This is especially the case if the woman in question is withholding the announcement 
of her last name or her tribe. This particular type of aggression is something that I have 
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documented on all the accounts of Saudi women I have observed in which the offline identity of 
the woman was ambiguous, either because of omitting the family name (as in the case of Hala) or 
because of using a pseudonym (as in the case of Roz). Conservative nationalists’ 
acknowledgment of a woman as a member of the nation seems to be conditional on her 
compliance to the customs and norms of classic traditional Saudi femininity, as detailed in 
Chapter 2. Conservative nationalists’ views are consistent with ethnosymbolism scholars’ 
emphasis on the adherence to tradition and custom for the nation to endure (Armstrong, 1982), 
except that Saudi conservative nationalists expect the woman’s compliance to this image to 
persist even beyond the physical boarders of the state itself. For example, in the comment section 
on this photograph (Figure 28) shared by Roz of tanning herself on a beach in Los Angeles, user 
(18_sm_18) comments: “No way is she actually a Saudi. Even the filthiest family in Saudi 
wouldn't let their daughter appear this way”. Similarly, user (roOory5677) comments on the 
same photo with: “I reckon she is Moroccan. All the so-called ‘Saudi celebrities’ turn out to be 
Moroccans in the end”. 
  
Figure 28: post by Roz on Instagram 
 
The ambiguity of Roz’s offline identity (since she is using a pseudonym) encourages this specific 
type of aggression. Until Roz proves her citizenship somehow, the primary reaction of 
conservative nationalists is to dismiss her claim to be a Saudi citizen and instead accuse her of 
being an imposter from a neighbouring Arab country who is just using the Saudi label as 
publicity stunt. This type of accusation has been repeatedly posted on both the accounts of Roz 
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and Hala. From my observations of Roz and Hala’s Instagram accounts netnographically, I have 
found that conservative nationalists have alleged that these women are in fact Egyptian, 
Moroccan, Yemini, or Syrian on several different occasions. Dismissing these women as non-
Saudi would certainly relieve conservative nationalists of the problem of associating this non-
conservative image with Saudi feminine identity. Moreover, and within the same aforementioned 
comment by (@18_sm_18), we can detect conservative nationalists’ imagining of the Saudi 
nation as a collectivity of pious conservative citizens in which ‘no family would ever let their 
daughter appear this way’.  User @18_sm_18 certainly did not meet every family in Saudi 
Arabia, yet this does not stop him/her from assuming how all Saudi citizens would behave and 
how they would look. This proves that the nation itself is somewhat imagined by the national 
conservatives. It is therefore an idea that can be re-moulded, re-shaped and re-imagined through 
the use of imagery. Benedict Anderson (2006) argues that media images play a central role in the 
imagining of the nation and that they can perpetuate certain stereotypes. Similarly, and from a 
constructivist ontological and epistemological stance, I argue in this research that these non-
conventional social media images of Saudi women can negotiate the imagined nation of Saudi 
and re-imagine the way women look and act within it. The repetition of these new modern images 
of women and associating them with the Saudi nationality can succeed in perpetuating new 
stereotypes, thereby successfully turning social media platforms into counterpublics where, as 
Fraser (1997) states, counter discourses are invented and circulated by subordinated social groups 
which in turn permit them to formulate and culturally produce oppositional interpretations of 
their identities, interests, and needs (Fraser, 1997; Dobson, 2015; Senft, 2010). 
 
One last thing to be drawn from this example is the predominance of customs and traditions 
within the shame-honour culture of Saudi Arabia over the law. Even though Roz in this 
photograph is beyond the borders of the Saudi state where women are controlled by law to dress 
modestly (since Roz here is in the USA), @18_sm_18 still asserts that a ‘true’ Saudi family 
‘would never let their daughters appear this way’, thereby emphasising the role of women as 
‘cultural carriers’ within religious national projects (Yuval-Davis, 1997) and underlining the 
family’s duty to control women and their movement if the state is not in the position to do so. 
The notion of tradition trumping law for conservative nationalists is also evident in their reaction 
to a selfie by Faisal BaDughaish, which he shared on Twitter (see Figure 29). Just a few days 
after the ban on women’s driving was lifted, BaDughaish posted this selfie of himself next to his 
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wife in the driving seat of their car, saying: “I started training my wife to drive in a private car 
park in a safe and legal way, preparing for the implementation of the new law”. 
 
Figure 29: post by Fasial Badughaish on Twitter 
 
The tweet went viral, getting retweeted over 8,000 times, and generating over 3,000 comments 
and even being reported on several national and international news outlets (BBC News, 2018). 
The comment section under the tweet was filled with many encouraging and supporting 
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responses that celebrated BaDughaish and his wife. However, despite the fact that women’s 
driving was fully legal at that point, conservative nationalists were quick to voice their 
resentment of BaDughaish’s behaviour, specifically his failure to “handle” and “control” his 
wife, who is not only driving the car, but also not covering her face. Despite both acts (not 
covering the face and driving the car) being legal, conservative nationalists were triggered by the 
public display of them in the photograph alongside the Saudi national flag hanging from the 
windshield mirror. What is interesting is that all the verbal attacks were directed towards Mr. 
BaDughaish himself, not his wife, even though technically she is the one disturbing tradition. 
This further indicates conservative nationalists’ belief that men should be in control of ‘their’ 
women. It can be argued though that Mr. BaDughaish himself is also breaking a norm and a 
tradition in society; he is endorsing women’s autonomy, visibility, freedom of mobility and 
occupancy of the public sphere.  In this case, he is also threatening the distinctive conservative 
identity of Saudi Arabia. 
 
What is drawn from this is that conservative nationalists expect Saudi women to maintain a 
national identity that is defined by the cultural codes of veiling, modest dressing, and sexual 
segregation even beyond the limits of the state and regardless of state legislation. Furthermore, 
women’s adherence to this identity (inside and outside the geographical borders of the nation) is 
central for them to be regarded ‘true’ members of the nation. In addition, it undermines Al-
Rasheed (2013) argument, in that it is not only the state and its legislation that are to be blamed 
for Saudi women’s confinement to these cultural codes, but rather a complex socio-cultural 
architecture of political, legal and historical processes. While Al-Rasheed’s argument has some 
truth in it (in that some laws in Saudi Arabia are filling in for the patriarchy of the family, such as 
male guardianship, veiling laws in public places and the - former - ban on women driving), it is 
still evident that Saudi women do not escape these confinements even when they escape the laws 
that facilitate them, either when abroad or online or even when the law itself changes. The 
pressure of a shame-honour culture persists and the ‘regulatory gaze’ is employed by 
conservative nationalists to determine who is a ‘true’ Saudi with no regard to what is ‘legal’ or 
not, but to what is eyb (shameful) or not.  
 
However, the accusations of conservative nationalists are challenged by the women themselves 
through their posts on social media. In an effort to prove they are in fact Saudi, these women 
would display signifiers of their citizenship in their posts in a very similar way to what I have 
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analysed in Chapter 6 when it comes to displaying family relations. Commonly in these attempts, 
the signifier of citizenship would be the Saudi passport. Take for example this photograph by 
Hala Abdullah, who is commonly accused by conservative nationalists of being a Moroccan 
impersonating a young Saudi woman (see Figure 30. In this photograph, she is casually 
displaying her Saudi passport in the background of the photograph in a calculated move to silence 
the accusations. The constant association between non-traditional identities and signifiers of 
Saudi citizenship is culturally producing a new ideal of Saudi femininity and a new national 
image of Saudi women. This image is being created and disseminated on social media platforms, 
reaffirming women’s role as cultural producers on social networks (Senft, 2010) and thereby 
functionally turning these platforms into counterpublics where alternate interpretations of their 
identities and public national image is being generated and circulated (Fraser, 1997). 
 
Figure 30: Hala’s passport on Instagram and a comment 
by @thebeauty8 on it 
 
This, however, does not silence the attacks by conservative nationalists. Once citizenship is 
proven through a signifier of this nature, conservative nationalists turn to another type of 
accusation/attacks: ethnic slurs. 
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8.3.2 Ethnic Slurs 
If citizenship were not a matter of dispute (because the woman in question is displaying her tribal 
or family name publicly, for example), then the aggression might take the form of ethnic slurs. 
The use of ethnic slurs is meant to dismiss the woman’s validity as a ‘true’ representation of 
Saudi women based on her ethnic roots under the assumption that only a direct lineage to specific 
tribes is to be considered a ‘true’ national. The idea of pure blood and lineage has often been 
associated with nationhood. Anthony Smith (1986) focuses on the inherent connection between 
the nation and its ethnic origins, linking the nation to notions of kinship and extensions of family. 
This approach to understanding nationhood acknowledges the centrality of ethnic homogeneity to 
the nation and the role that the ‘myth symbol context’ plays in the durability of the collectivity’s 
imagined ethnic origin (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Smith, 1995). I observe through my 
netnographic data that the myth of common origin or shared blood is palpable in the use of slurs 
by conservative nationalists in Saudi Arabia. Words such as ‘asil’ (origin) or ‘mojansah’ 
(‘naturalised citizen’) often accompany comments that contain racial slurs, further cementing the 
idea that not everyone who holds a Saudi passport is to be regarded a ‘true’ Saudi in the eyes of 
conservative nationalists.   
 
For example, under a YouTube video posted by Htoon Kadi, in which she discussed 
unconventional views on gender roles within the Saudi community, a male user proceeded to call 
her ‘sea vomit’ in the comment section. Kadi was advocating for a lift on the ban on women 
driving, which evidently did not agree with the views of the conservative nationalist user who 
attacked her. The slur (‘sea vomit’), which is used for Saudis from the western region by the Red 
Sea, is implying that the person is an immigrant that came overseas from Africa or East Asia and 
was later naturalised as a Saudi citizen. The abuser is insinuating that this makes Kadi a non-
‘real’ Saudi compared to a woman who was born with original Saudi roots, and therefore Kadi’s 
views on lifting the driving ban are not only irrelevant but also non-representational of what 
‘true’ Saudi women want. Similar ethnic slurs are used in accordance with other women who are 
being attacked, such as Shia if she is from the Eastern Region, Yemeni or Yazidi if she is from 
the south, or Levantine if she is from the north. In any case, the slur is meant to demote the 
woman in question to second-class membership within the collectivity, the intention being to 
marginalise her, her views, or the way she looks in relation to the imagined pious nation.  
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         Figure 31: Hala driving a car in Daubi (Instagram) 
In the selfie image in Figure 31, Hala is driving a car unveiled in Dubai. Here again, the woman 
in question (Hala) is not breaking any laws; she is beyond the borders of Saudi Arabia practicing 
perfectly legal acts in the UAE, where neither driving nor unveiling in public are illegal. 
Nonetheless, Hala’s identification of herself as a Saudi woman and the subsequent association of 
the Saudi label with such acts provokes a strong reaction from conservative nationalists. A 
user (aabbbbaabbl) commented on Hala’s photo by saying: “God help us, anyone who is anyone 
nowadays claims to be Saudi. It is impossible that her (roots) are Saudi 100%. But this is the 
price we pay for having such a consumed [sic] nationality”. We witness here again the reference 
to origins and blood and the myth of a certain lineage that is somehow ‘more Saudi’ than other 
Saudi nationals.  Similarly, on the previously mentioned selfie of BaDughaish (see Figure 29), a 
user commented: “You should have stayed in your own country Hadhramaut, why come here and 
change our traditions!” Despite the fact the Mr. BaDughaish and his wife are Saudi citizens, the 
user is ethnically slurring them by referring to their origins from Hadhramaut in Yemen 
(identifiable from their surname) in an effort to belittle their contribution to the public 
discourse/debate on the issue of women driving. This particular outlook, in which the opinions 
and representations of some groups in society are marginalised whether because of their class, 
ethnic background or gender, is in a way very reminiscent of Habermas’s (1991) notion of a 
public sphere that is exclusive to bourgeoisie men, and which was criticised heavily by largely 
feminist scholars (see Chapter 2).  
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As Fraser (1992) argued, marginalised groups such as women, lower classes, or certain 
ethnicities can compensate their exclusion by forming counterpublics that challenge the exclusion 
from the public sphere. Here, the user who made this racial comment is imagining an exclusive 
public sphere where only ‘original’ Saudis, with noble bloodlines, and preferably only men, are 
allowed to weigh in on matters of public interest such as the lift on the driving ban. Yet, by 
considering the reception and the wide reaction to these digital posts, it can be argued that social 
media platforms can be utilised by people from marginalised groups, such as BaDughaish and 
Hala, to create a counterpublic on which their contribution to public debate and cultural 
production is influential.  
 
The next section analyses the third type of digital attack on unconventional Saudi women: 
victims of westernisation.  
 
8.3.3 Victims of Westernization  
The netnographically collected data in this research shows a continuous attempt by conservative 
nationalists to invoke the threat of westernisation to the Saudi Islamic nation and its unique 
identity as they denounce expressions of non-traditional identities on social media networks. In 
this category of accusation, conservative nationalists’ placement of Saudi women as symbolic 
border guards is even more conspicuous than it is in the aforementioned types (see 8.2.1 and 
8.3.2). Women are regarded by conservative nationalists as the signifier that distinguishes the 
nation from other nations and for this reason their appearance, behaviour and attitudes must 
reflect a collective national identity over an individualistic identity (Al-Rasheed, 2013).  
 
The aftermath of the following Tweet by Malak Al-shehri is a clear example of the above. In 
December 2016, Malak Al-shehri tweeted that she will go out of her house in the city of Riyadh 
without wearing an Abaya, and posted a photograph of herself doing so (see Figure 32). The 
Tweet reads: “Today I decided to go out in the morning with no Abaya.  I will wear my skirt with 
an elegant coat. I will start by having breakfast at McDonald’s, then coffee and cigarettes with a 
friend [male friend]. Then I will go to buy glasses”.  The tweet is infused with several innuendos 
of an identity that is far from the traditional pious gender identity that fits in with the religious 
nationalists’ narrative. It depicts a young woman as an active subject who is ‘deciding’ for herself 
what she wants to do, despite society’s disapproval of her unveiling, smocking or mingling with 
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men. She is confident, highly visible, independent and has male friends. In the photograph itself, 
Al-shehri appears in the streets of Riyadh without Abaya or veil. This image cannot be compared 
to any of the other images I have analysed in this study as it is the only one where the act of 
unveiling is actually taking place in the public domain within the Saudi state itself, as opposed to 
the other images (which were either in private domains within Saudi Arabia or in a public domain 
abroad). Al-shehri’s attire in the photograph is not extremely revealing; in fact, in many ways 
what she is wearing looks a lot like a traditional Abaya in the sense that it is black and relatively 
modest. Yet it is her defiance to a national symbol - the Abaya - that enrages conservative 
nationalists, especially that her mocking contempt for tradition is taking place inside the 
geographical borders of the state itself: in the capital city and seat of government, Riyadh.  
 
 
Figure 32: Malak Alshehri post on Twitter (photo + tweet) 
 
The Saudi collectivity on Twitter immediately picked the news up and a hashtag was created in 
which conservative nationalists denounced Malak’s action, with some even going as far as to 
demand her arrest, while other Saudis in the hashtag defended her. Malak was indeed arrested but 
she was quickly released as no actual crime was committed. However, the hashtag was flooded 
with tweets warning of foreign forces that are orchestrating such ‘seditionary’ incidents. A Saudi 
woman tweeted: “They are jealous of the Saudi woman and they want to strip her just like they 
stripped the women of the world. Never! We do not want liberation of that kind like this sheep 
here”.  The user is referring to Malak as a ‘sheep’, since she is presumably being manipulated by 
western media to express a ‘liberated’ identity with the aim of westernising Saudi women and 
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compromising the Islamic Saudi identity. Usually, in this type of allegation by conservative 
nationalists, the reference to the ‘west’ is very general and ambiguous with no specification of a 
particular country or institution that is doing the ‘westernising’. Similarly, in this comment, 
‘they’ refers to the west in a general, non-specified manner, while the reference to Saudi women 
is singular and defined in ‘the Saudi woman’. The use of a singular defined noun to refer to all 
Saudi women as a sole entity highlights the conservative nationalists’ favouring of collectivism 
over individualism in the sense that the many millions of Saudi women are assumed to be the 
same and presumed to share the same qualities, attitude, beliefs, and most certainly the same 
appearance. Yet the identity that Al-shehri is displaying is quite distinct and liberal in that it does 
not conform to the demands of collective identity and therefore it is disrupting the imagining of a 
homogenous nation with a one-size-fits-all gender identity.  
 
Such a sense of individualism as invoked in this photograph of Al-shehri could be very 
threatening to the customs and traditions of a society (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2000; Beck, 
2002), and so to preserve a classic traditional/conservative national identity collectivism must be 
endorsed in the religious national narrative. In addition, the critical comment highlights 
conservative nationalists’ exploitation of women as symbolic border guards that define the nation 
and distinguish it from the rest of ‘the world’. This finding is consistent with that of Al-Rasheed, 
who found that women in Saudi “have become boundary markers that visibly and structurally 
distinguishes the pious nation from other ungodly polities” (2013, p.16). Therefore, it is vital that 
their dress, behaviour, segregation, body and sexuality are controlled to ensure their purity.  
 
The netnographic data that was collected from Al-shehri’s hashtag also indicated that the 
politicisation of women’s issues and association of modernity with westernisation is interrupting 
a much-needed update to the status of women in Saudi society as well as hampering the 
reconstruction of their image. Another user tweeted in the hashtag, saying: “If she was a normal 
girl she wouldn't be released, but these so-called activists have foreign embassies behind them 
and international organisations to get them out without any consequences to their actions”. 
Again, the user is implying the interference of foreign (western) countries in the case of Al-
shehri.  It is important though to note that Malak Al-shehri is not a political activist, as the user 
claimed. Nonetheless, conservative nationalists on Twitter did not hesitate to politicise her act. 
She was an obscure young Saudi woman until the day she went out without an Abaya.  
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Such references to a foreign conspiracy or an orchestrated attack on the Islamic Saudi identity 
through the women of the nation casts a negative shadow over processes of emancipation. For 
example, under the photograph in Figure 30, which shows Hala’s Saudi passport, a user attacked 
the news channel [Al-Arabia] for hosting Hala on a talk-show in which she was introduced as a 
young Saudi fashionista, and proclaimed that Al-Arabia channel was only hosting Hala to ‘incite 
Saudi girls to rebel and liberate, and this is what America wants”. Indeed, Saudi women’s 
liberation from the strict cultural codes that currently define their national identity has come to 
signify a broader inclination towards social change and modernity (Lawrence, 1994; Pfister & 
Hacısoftaoğlu, 2016) which many feminist Islamic scholars have been critical of, such as Abu-
Lughod (1998), Miriam Cooke (2001), Saba Mahmoos (2005) and Haideh Moghissi (1999) for 
example. Kandiyoti (1991) and Chatterjee (1990) observe the role that women played in many 
decolonisation projects, in which they were symbols of a move towards modernisation. This, 
however, raises concern about whether, and if so the extent to which, modernity can be 
associated with westernisation (Thong, 2016; Beck et al., 2003; Jung & SpringerLink, 2017). The 
equation, which often occurs between the two notions, has led many conservative nationalists in 
Saudi to resist the process of modernisation, believing that women are being used as tools of 
westernising (under the guise of ‘modernising’) their community to weaken the distinct unique 
identity of the entire Saudi nation (Al-Rasheed, 2013).  
 
Additionally, the way these incidents concerning women in Saudi Arabia are being reported by 
western media does not really help with anxieties over about attempt by foreign governments to 
undermine the national Islamic identity of Saudi Arabia. A title in the British newspaper the 
Independent, which reported on the incident of Al-shehri, read: “When a Saudi woman daring not 
to wear a hijab leads to calls for her beheading, maybe it's time the UK paid attention” (Ahmed, 
2016). The article soon turns political in the second paragraph, discussing Saudi’s war on Yemen, 
instead of maintaining its focus on the incident itself. Al-shehri’s name is not mentioned once in 
the article; it is only referenced under her photograph, and even there, her name is misspelled 
(Malaka) instead of (Malak), with no surname. All of this made the reader (howmarvelous) in 
Figure 33 wonder about the real motives behind the article: is it really about Al-shehri, or is Al-
shehri’s story being used to foreign interference in the kingdom’s internal affaires in the name of 
human rights. The article's tone, and its misleading information around the likelihood of Al-
shehri being ‘beheaded’, offended some readers in the comment section (see Figure 33).   
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Figure 33: the comment section on a UK article about Alshehri 
 
Four comments out of five were not about Al-shehri at all, but rather about the foreign and 
internal policies of Saudi Arabia, which accentuates how women in Saudi are being used as 
political pawns both by conservative nationalists and the western media alike. The news article 
reproduces what Edward Said termed an ‘orientalist gaze’ (Said, 2003) driven by relations of 
power between colonising counties and the colonised, in which the west is presumed to be 
superior to the barbaric orient. Reporting of this nature is what incites conservative nationalists 
and further feeds their obsession with maintaining women as symbolic border guards and markers 
of the nation, as they find the western media’s constant interest and coverage of Saudi women's 
news insidious or suspicious as it might be used as a justification for interfering in Saudi’s 
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internal affairs or tampering with the distinct Saudi culture. When social media influencer Khalid 
Alwabil @kwabil shared on Twitter that the story of Al-sheheri is being reported in several 
western publications, a number of his followers were outraged and sceptical of the publications’ 
motives (see figures 34 and 35). In Figure 34, @mansorbinm writes in reply to @kwabil: “These 
are the ones that work abroad [meaning the journalists] and want to ruin the reputation of Saudi 
Arabia. They are liberals and seculars, and the majority of them are women who live abroad”. 
Similarly, @mghazzawi replies to Alwabil’s tweet in Figure 35, saying: “This is the true meaning 
of fabrication and propaganda. Saudi women now seem to be like the sauce for the western 
news”.  
 
Figure. 34 reply from @mansor on Alwabil’s tweet 
(Twitter) 
 
Figure. 35: reply from @maghazzawi on Alwabil’s tweet 
(Twitter) 
 
The story of Al-shehri itself, how it was reported and how it was received and debated by readers 
is an example of how women in Saudi Arabia are being turned into political nationalistic pawns. 
Yuval Davis (1997) shows how women in nationalist projects that resist westernisation or 
colonisation are constructed in the role of ‘carriers of tradition’ rather than being seen as symbols 
of change (p.61). Symbolic acts that might mark women's emancipation, such as driving or 
unveiling, are seized on and resisted by fundamentalist nationalists as attempts to westernise the 
community and demolish the uniqueness of the Saudi identity. Conversely, they see in women’s 
honouring of these customs “the safeguard of the national cultural essence” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, 
p.62). And so when a woman challenges the culture and customs of Saudi Arabia, the critics 
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proceed to question the ethnicity, excluding her as an ‘other’/‘not a real Saudi’, an agent or a 
traitor to her country, or at the very least a naive woman who is falling victim to western media’s 
efforts to ‘corrupt’ her. Yuvan-Davis notes that when fundamentalist nationalists mark national 
affiliation with the adherence to certain practices and customs, they are functioning as a mirror 
image to the ‘colonial gaze’ which focuses on these practises to establish ‘otherness’ (Yuvan-
Davis, 1997; Chhachhi, 1991; Maini, 1989).  
 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed two polar images of Saudi women that can be found online today: the 
pious woman and the glamorous cosmopolitan woman.  I have also shown how the depiction of a 
pious conservative gender identity is central to the conservative nationalist project. Therefore, the 
findings show that a particular type of gaze, which I term the ‘regulatory gaze’, is used by 
conservative nationalists in Saudi Arabia to assess and evaluate Saudi women’s performance of 
gender identity, and a deviation from the pious identity is reprimanded, criticised and attacked in 
various ways. The analysis of these attacks indicates conservative nationalists continuous 
positioning of Saudi women as, firstly, symbolic border guards and markers of the nation and 
representatives of its honour and piety (which accordingly distinguishes the pious nation from 
other, ‘ungodly’ nations), and, secondly, as political pawns in the conflict between a 
fundamentalist religious national group and the liberal west. For this reason, conservative 
nationalists find it necessary to maintain a national gender identity that is heavily marked with 
religious ideals of veiling, gender segregation, and confinement within the private sphere.   
 
Despite this, young women on social media networks persist in depicting a modern and 
contemporary identity that is very different from the imagining of religious nationals of an ideal 
or ‘true’ Saudi woman. The argument that has been made in this chapter is that these young 
women’s efforts are renegotiating and restructuring what it means to be a Saudi woman today, 
shifting female identity from being ingrained in a collective ideology to expressions of femininity 
that are defined by the neo-liberal characteristics of individual agency and autonomy.  In this 
way, social media platforms are successfully turned into counterpublics in which women can 
culturally produce a fresh public national image and contribute to the public debates that are 
reshaping the culture of contemporary Saudi Arabia. 
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While previous studies (reviewed in Chapter 3) on Saudi community and online engagement 
found that women online are still heavily tied to familial and national reputation (Saggaf, 2004; 
Hayat, 2014; Guta and Karolak, 2015), I find that Saudi women are actually contesting this 
notion and a focus on individual agency is emerging as a result of activity on social media 
networks that are in many ways ‘modern communities’.   Kazys Varnelis (2008) points out the 
many similarities between the network digital culture that we find on social media networks and 
the social structures that are found in the culture of late modernity.  Similarly, Chapter 2 
reviewed a number of scholars such as Giddens (1991), Bauman (2000), and Beck (2002) who 
argue for a link between modernity and the detraditionalisation of societies, mainly posited on the 
belief that individualism is one of modernity’s defining characteristics and main driving forces. 
 
Similarly, and despite the noted aggression shown by conservative nationalists, I document that 
young women’s engagement on social media networks can be understood as an expression of 
individualism through which they are reflexively approaching self-identity, as opposed to 
accepting a pre-defined national – collectivist – identity they inherit from past generations.  This 
suggests that social media networks are facilitating a re-negotiation of the traditional classical 
ideal of Saudi femininity and promoting alternate identities. The netnographic data indicates that 
many Saudis are indeed embracing and acknowledging women’s right to think and behave 
independently from the collectivity and gradually free themselves from the burden of 
representing the family’s (and by extension the nation’s) honour and acknowledge instead that 
the only people they represent is themselves.  As a Saudi male user on Instagram said in reply to 
claims that a certain fashionista did not represent Saudi society: “No one is representing anyone 
else but him/herself. Let everyone live the life they want. We don't all have to be copies of each 
other”.   
Indeed, participants in the focus groups and the interviews reported being very optimistic that the 
participation of women on social media networks is bringing about a progressive change to the 
notion of the ‘true’ Saudi woman and her public national image. A recurring theme in the focus 
groups interviews was a sense amongst participants that laws could control (and have controlled 
in the past) the collective sentiment towards traditional practices that has long been defining 
national attributes of the nation, specifically in relation to women. This trend of law leading 
change in culture is reflected in Annemarie van Geel’s study on Saudi women’s occupancy of 
public spaces (2016), in which she reflects on how law is leading the way for the formation of 
mixed-gender spaces in certain universities (such as King Abdallah University for Science and 
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Technology) and in public fora (such as the shura, the King’ Consultative Council). However, 
this study appeared before the enactment of more transformational laws, such as opening 
stadiums to women for the first time, or opening cinemas and opera houses and arranging mixed-
gender public events through the General Authority of Entertainment which was established in 
May 2016. Despite resistance on social media from conservative nationalists, participants in this 
study believe that it is only a matter of time before society adapts to this new culture. They equate 
what society is going through right now in terms of modernising the image of the Saudi woman 
with what it went through when women’s education was first permitted in the 1960s. Both are 
seen as examples of how legalisation can control/shape national identity and culture.  
 
Ali, in focus group 2, calls it “the bottleneck”, referring to the critical debates Saudi society 
underwent when women’s education was first allowed. While girls’ education was ‘eyb’ 
(‘shameful’) in the 1960s, just like driving and unveiling is today, the national attitude towards it 
changed when the state allowed and began enforcing girls’ schools. Al-Rasheed (2013) discusses 
the 1960s when King Faisal opened the first school for educating girls and kept it open despite 
public opposition in villages around Saudi Arabia. Al-Rasheed documents the change in the 
national attitude towards girls’ education as time passed and how education eventually became a 
defining attribute of the Saudi woman.  Ali went on to explain that the same thing is taking place 
on networked publics today, where Saudis dispute and discuss, thereby bringing about a 
movement in Saudi culture in relation to the image of the Saudi woman. Similarly, the same 
analogy was brought up by Areeb in focus group 4: 
 
“I always go back to when the first girls school was opened in Saudi. Everyone objected and 
many of the people who objected were fundamentalists, religious clerics who feared that the 
Islamic identity of Saudi Arabia would be lost. But look how it is now. Women’s education has 
become commonplace”.   (Areeb, January 2016, focus group) 
 
All of this, of course, begs the important theoretical question: who is driving whom? Are the laws 
driving our imagining of the nation and its identity, or is it the nationals’ imagining of the nation 
that is driving the laws?  The answer lies in the public sphere; those who have access to the 
public sphere are in a position to debate, negotiate and reformulate national identity and the laws 
that define it. This is why women’s admission to the Saudi public sphere is crucial for the 
advancement of their position and to update their national feminine identity. Saudi women’s 
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participation in networked publics, in their own right ‘counterpublics’, and their contentious 
control of the production of their own images on social media networks is certainly locating them 
in a position of renegotiating and reimagining the nation despite the interruption of conservative 
nationalists. This is something that is unique in Saudi society, as women prior to the Internet and 
social media had limited (if any) control over producing media, which is directly responsible in 
imagining the nation. As noted in Chapter 2, Anderson (1983) emphasises the role that the media 
plays in producing images and illustrations of what the nation is, and what members in it should 
look/act/talk/be like, thereby forming this imagined collectivity. Thus, for a very long time, the 
imagining of Saudi women was not up to them at all, but was rather dictated by individuals in 
charge of media production, who were, of course, almost exclusively men (Sakr, 2008).  
This chapter, then, answers the question of how social media usage in Saudi Arabia is 
contributing to changes in the public images of young Saudi women. 
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Chapter Nine. Analysis of Mixed Gender Interaction and Intimate 
Relationships on Social Media 
  
9.1 Introduction 
While chapters 6 and 7 explored the first research question on how the rise in social media use in 
Saudi Arabia is influencing the values and norms of young Saudi women (with a particular focus 
on norms of veiling, male guardian approval and work), this chapter focuses on changing 
attitudes towards romance and wider intimacy practices. As noted in Chapter 2, Saudi society is 
heavily marked by gender segregation, a value that was particularly promoted and has been 
strictly enforced since the rise of the Sahwa movement in the 1980s (ICG, 2004; Lacroix, 2004; 
Le Renard, 2008). Gender segregation became a cornerstone value in the shame-honour Saudi 
society (schools, hospitals, companies, public spaces such as restaurants, cafes and parks, even 
social occasions such as weddings and gatherings are strictly gender segregated), impacting 
relationships between Saudi men and women as a result and, in particular, limiting the chances of 
pre-marital romance. This chapter argues that the introduction of social media platforms to this 
cultural setting offers a novel opportunity for Saudi men and women to mix more freely and 
frequently, thereby undermining gender segregation in practice and also as a societal value, 
developing new forms of mixed-gender intimacies and reducing the shame that surrounds pre-
marital romantic relationships. 
 
The analysis in this chapter can be broken down into two main themes: romantic relationships, 
and wider intimacy practises. Romantic relationships here mean the distinct attachment/bond one 
shares with a significant other. Though this type of relationship involves sexual desire and 
attraction, it does not necessarily include sexual relations/acts, as most Saudis believe in 
abstinence from sex until marriage. This is very distinct from what I mean by wider intimacies. 
This term is a more general sense of affection and care that is found in friendships and family ties 
and which specifically excludes sexual desire or attraction. With regard to romantic relationships, 
it is necessary to flag that as this study is focused on social media platforms (not dating 
sites/apps) the aim is to examine the elision of the social with the romantic. Thus, I am restricting 
my analysis to romantic relationships that originate in, and are cultivated through, social media 
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platforms and excluding the analysis of using designated dating sites as it is beyond the scope of 
my research.  
I recognise four practices that social media engagement has facilitated within the Saudi romantic 
scene: democratisation, re-spatialisation, changing temporality, and shifts in gender etiquette. I 
draw on the notions of scalable sociality (Miller et al, 2016) and Polymedia (Madianou & Miller, 
2012) to examine the dynamics of romantic relationships on social media platforms. As for wider 
intimacy practices, I suggest that intimacy is becoming dis-embedded from its traditional 
romantic/sexual meaning. Instead, social media is opening up the possibility for other forms of 
intimacy to emerge based on mixed gendered friendships. Privacy and commodifying 
relationships are subthemes that are also analysed in this chapter, and I further identify the status 
of ‘accountability suspension’ that permits young Saudis to gesture to their romantic relationship 
somewhat publicly.   
 
9.2 Romantic relationships 
Perhaps the most obvious assumed role of social media in Saudis’ lives is its central role in 
initiating and maintaining pre-marital romantic relationships. With no possibility for integration 
in schools and universities and with limited chances of integration in the workspace, as well as a 
lack of cafes/bars or public spaces/social settings for the two sexes to mingle, social media has 
become the most prominent place for a person to meet a romantic interest. The turn to social 
media to facilitate romance and the significance thereof can only be fully comprehended when 
we consider that engagement in pre-marital romance is yet to be fully accepted in Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi society’s reluctance to accept pre-marital romance is due to the heavy sexual connotations 
that such a relationship ensues in a culture that deems such sexual relations not only immoral but 
also shameful. This complicates the engagement in romantic relationships, particularly for 
women as representatives of the honour of the family/collectivity and the high emphasis on a 
woman’s chastity to maintain this honour. Thus, engagement in premarital romantic relationships 
would often subject Saudi women to criticism, harassment, reprimand or worse. A participant in 
one of the focus groups stated the following: 
 
“You shouldn't have any say or judgment on a girl who is talking to boys or even having a sexual 
relation with one. This is one of the things that is holding us back as a society from evolving. 
That women turn on other women, you judge her even for things that are none of your business 
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and don't affect you or your friendship with her. We are simply a judgmental society” (Durr, Jan 
2016, focus group) 
 
Durr’s statement demonstrates the severe backlash that some Saudi women might have to deal 
with if a relationship of this nature were to be exposed in Saudi’s shame-honour culture/society. 
Thus, in a cultural setting that forbids and obstructs/hampers romantic relationships, the Saudi 
youth I interviewed and observed in my study turn to social media to negotiate romance in a 
networked public (boyd, 2008) that not only brings the two genders together, but also allows a 
certain level of privacy, thereby collapsing the social with the romantic. Of course, the use of 
social media in initiating and maintaining romantic relationships is not a Saudi novelty; several 
scholars have recognised and investigated the use of digital communication in general and social 
media in particular for romantic and sexual relationships in several other societies (see Chapter 4) 
(Costa, 2016; Gershon 2010; Pascoe 2010; Lenhart and Madden 2007; boyd, 2010). However, 
particularly in relation to Saudi society, I identify four distinct ways in which the values and 
norms of young Saudi women in relation to romantic relationships are being impacted through 
social media engagement: democratisation, re-spatialisation, changing temporality, and shifts in 
gender etiquette. The four processes are all detectable in a quote shared by a participant in one of 
my focus groups, and so this quote would be a fitting start to analysing them in detail:   
 
“I feel social media helps you find a boy since we don't see much of each other offline. For 
example, I once met a boy online whom I liked very much from his Instagram account. I mean I 
had no idea who he was before. There was absolutely no relation between us, but we started 
talking when he added me and I liked him and something started off. I won't necessarily marry 
this guy, but I mean social media is making up for the limited chances to meet a boy in Saudi”. 
(Raghad, December, 2015, focus group) 
 
9.2.1 Democratisation 
The first thing that is suggested in Raghad’s comment is a process of democratisation in relation 
to romance. Giddens (1993) observes the democratisation of personal life and ‘plastic sexuality’ 
in modern societies.  Giddens develops the theoretical concept of plastic sexuality, which means 
sex that is unconcerned with reproduction as a consequence of effective contraception and 
women’s financial independence. While Giddens’ approach to democratisation focuses on sexual 
needs and relations both heterosexual and homosexual, democratisation in this research and 
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particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia does not necessarily refer to sex and sexuality but rather 
to romance and love (which may or may not include sexual elements), and focuses particularly on 
heterosexual relations. Yet democratisation here does resemble Giddens’ approach in its 
emphases on autonomy and agency when it comes to administrating and conducting romantic 
relationships. The democratisation of romantic relationships in Saudi Arabia from what I observe 
here is a result of women’s social independence, or rather their netwo§§§§§§§§rked 
individualism on social media networks which engenders a degree of enhanced personal 
autonomy in the modern age (Wellman and Rainie, 2012), as opposed to Giddens’ emphasis on 
financial independence. As noted in Chapter 2, people have become to a greater extent networked 
as individuals, rather than entrenched in groups, and so the world is arranged around networked 
individualism through the use of modern communication technologies rather than group 
solidarity or local consensus.  
 
Not only is there now more scope for women to meet men on social media, but who they are able 
to meet has also changed. As previous states of romance were commonly bound to official 
marriage proposals, which were closely connected to familial and communal ties, social media, 
as Raghad puts it “helps you find” a significant other independently by putting you in direct 
contact with a larger pool of people. It is providing a space where lovers/partners can find each 
other, a modern-day agora (Turkle, 1995, p.249) where weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) are 
functional in expanding one’s social circle, which ultimately raises Raghad’s chances to 
encounter potential partners. So, in Raghad’s example, there are multiple ways and chances for 
the young man, from whom she received a follow request on Instagram, to find her and vice 
versa, whether by coming across her account through a comment she made on an Instagram post, 
exploring her Instagram page, or the suggested friendship feature (which Instagram promotes). 
This highlights the democratic nature of romance on social media platforms, in which both men 
and women have equal chance to meet and initiate a relationship of this nature independently 
from their families and the larger community.  
 
In another example, Muneerah (a participant in this study who I observed and interviewed) had 
met her current boyfriend on Twitter, where they have both been following a common contact 
(Norah), who is both Muneerah’s classmate in university and the young man’s cousin. They both 
kept commenting on Norah’s tweets and engaged in public exchanges on Norah’s feed until 
finally he sent her a follow request. The fact that 95% of adult Saudis (both male and female) are 
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active users of social media (Globalmediainsight.com, 2017), and no physical boundaries to 
segregate them according to their gender exist on these digital networks, is further stimulating 
this process of democratisation. As one participant in my focus group notes:  
“There is no ‘women’s door’ and ‘men’s door’ on social media. You can meet whoever you want 
to meet as long as they are online”.  (Ali, 31, December 2015, focus group) 
 
What Ali refers to when saying ‘women’s door’ and ‘men’s door’ is the classical traditional way 
of designing houses, hospitals, schools, and even restaurants in Saudi Arabia, where there is a 
designated door to a section for women (and families, where lone women should enter) and a 
door to a separate section for men, thereby limiting the chances of mingling even further.  In 
contrast, on social media, 95% of adult Saudis are free to mix/mingle on gender inclusive social 
media platforms, impacting their romantic practices by democratising romance and giving the 
chance to both men and women to meet each other equally without having to rely on 
arrangements made by the family.  
 
9.2.2 Re-spatialisation 
The second process that Raghad’s comment illustrates is a re-spatialisation of the context of 
dating. Raghad’s comment highlights the use of social media to overcome the control of 
movement that many Saudi women are subjected to, thus permitting the relationship to 
commence and be sustained.  There is no need to arrange a place to meet privately away from 
people’s gaze, figure out an excuse to leave the house, drive (which Raghad cannot do) or figure 
out a way to get to the location where the meeting is to take place. Instead social media makes it 
much simpler logistically to ‘meet up’ and communicate virtually, whether through texting on the 
instant messaging service that all the networks observed in my study provide (Instagram, 
Snapchat, Twitter), phone-chatting on apps like WhatsApp and Snapchat, or even video-chatting, 
which is also facilitated on several platforms like WhatsApp, Snapchat or Skype.  
 
However, as detailed above, it is not only mobility restrictions that complicate physical dates for 
Saudi women, but also the fear of jeopardising one’s reputation if these secret dates were 
exposed.  Even the young women I interviewed who were from wealthy families and had their 
own drivers still hesitated to go out on dates out of fear that the driver might inform on them (to 
their families) if he understood the nature of the trip. Aziz, a participant in the study, highlighted 
the obstacles that young Saudis might face when trying to logistically arrange a romantic date by 
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noting that 
 
“[It is] 10 times harder on a woman because she also has to worry about her reputation, let alone 
the fact that it is harder for her to go out of the house and come back as she pleases, 
unsupervised”. (Aziz, March 2016, one-on-one interview) 
 
Thus, it is much easier and more convenient to move romantic practises into digital spaces such 
as social media. Indeed, for most women, it is the only option.  
 
This is consistent with many studies that recognise the use of social media as a dating space to 
compensate for the lack of physical meetings in situations of limitations on mobility, whether it is 
due to age (as may be the case with teenagers in western countries, Van Ouytsel et al, 2016) or 
for logistical reasons such as long distance relationships (Billedo et al, 2015), or due to social and 
ethical restrictions as in conservative religious communities (Costa, 2016). The traditional spaces 
that have shaped dating practices are becoming reconfigured. In many ways, the borders that 
have been used to designate dating have become loosened, meaning that one can date at work, in 
the university, or even at home, suggesting a process of re-spatialisation to the romantic scene in 
Saudi where dates are quite literally in the palm of your hand on your mobile phone.    
 
9.2.3 Changing temporality 
The third way I suggest that social media engagement is impacting romantic relationships is the 
shift in the temporal management of dating. All unmarried participants, both male and female, in 
my study stated that they utilise social media for romantic flirtations and for keeping in touch 
with their love interest throughout the day. Dating has thus become loosened from the time that it 
occurs. Unlike traditional settings, where a date might be at a family gathering, a community 
event, or even a stolen rendezvous, here dating becomes characterised by the continuity of time. 
Several scholars have documented lovers’ tendency to communicate flexibly and frequently 
through social media platforms (Baron 2008; Gershon 2010, Pascoe 2010), thereby intensifying 
the relationship. Regular check in’s and several IM messages and texts daily become expected 
from each other and a lack of them could trigger jealousy, anxiety and even digital surveillance 
(Marshall et al, 2012; Muise et all, 2009). This aspect of digital romance has extended the 
timeframe of a date. Partners enjoy a non-constraining temporality, where a date is no longer one 
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single event that has a starting time and a finish; instead, they have the capacity to engage 
romantically throughout the whole day.  
Interestingly, the participants in my study never used the word ‘dating’ to describe digital 
interaction with their partners. Instead, they used the word talking. The word (date) is preserved 
for the actual physical meeting between them and their loved ones. However, physical meetings 
are usually sporadic due to the reasons noted above; months could go by without partners 
succeeding in arranging a physical date. Thus, I consider even digital phone calls videocalls and 
chats on social media platforms to be a form of dating. For example, Muneerah (a 23 year-old 
participant in my study) has only gone on two physical dates with the young man she has been 
‘dating’ for 6 months. However, they have exchanged thousands of texts on WhatsApp and 
photographs on Snapchat, and they talk daily using the calling features offered either one of these 
two platforms. They also follow each other on Twitter and Instagram. Thus, their engagement 
with social media is changing the temporal management of their dates in the sense that they think 
of their dates as an extended practice that spreads and takes place throughout the day as opposed 
to a certain block of time in which they physically meet.   
  
9.2.4 Shifting gender etiquette 
Finally, the fourth way in which engagement on social media is impacting romantic relationships, 
women’s values and attitudes towards love and romance in Saudi is the transformation of gender 
etiquette. Returning to Raghad’s earlier comment, we can draw from it how social media is 
equipping women with agency and autonomy to administer their own social relations, specifically 
romantic ones. Prior to widespread social media use, women had to wait passively for romantic 
connections to be orchestrated by their families in the form of arranged marriages.  However, the 
fraying of gendered etiquette of dating on social media amongst Saudis can be noticed in the data 
collected. In the aforementioned example of Raghad, she did not have to rely on her family to 
arrange her connection to a man they thought was suitable for her, which would happen only for 
the purpose of matrimony. Instead, she made the choice to be involved with this man 
independently from her family, even though their romantic involvement might be fruitless in 
relation to matrimony. This finding again highlights the networked individualism nature of 
relationships on social media networks (Wellman and Rainie, 2012) and their influence on 
collectivities and kinship systems in conservative communities. As noted in Chapter 2, Giddens 
(1991) notes that late modern communities are moving away from collectivism and systems of 
kinship towards individualism, which is in return directly responsible for detraditionalising these 
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communities (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2000; Beck, 2002). This finding in relation to shifting 
gender etiquette confirms this.  
Moreover, other young women I have spoken to in this study are even taking the first step 
themselves in approaching a person they like or are attracted to on social media platforms. Norah, 
for example, reported that she has done this several times on Twitter or on Instagram:  
 
“If a man grabbed my attention on a hashtag or in a friend’s feed, I would add him in order to 
get to know him better. I once liked a guy’s witty comment in a hashtag (on Twitter) about a viral 
commercial and so I followed him, he followed me back. After a while he DMed me [sent her a 
direct message on Twitter] and that’s how we started”.  (Norah, March 2016, one-to-one 
interview) 
 
The agency can be sensed in Norah’s behaviour and in how she approached this situation. In a 
traditional cultural setting in the shame-honour culture of Saudi, Norah would be prohibited from 
talking to men all together, let alone from initiating contact. However, with digital culture she is 
more inclined to adopt an identity that is independent, autonomous and active. The implication of 
this is that the gender etiquettes when it comes to romance are changing and being 
detraditionalised. Women (and men) no longer think that it is inappropriate for women to make 
the first move. Now that I have detailed the ways in which social media engagement is impacting 
Saudi women’s values and norms in relation to romance, I shall explore the manner in which 
romance is structured on social media platforms and how is it being negotiated. 
 
9.3 The Structure of romance on social media networks, exploring the dynamics 
A notable and central theme that emerged from the findings on Saudis’ engagement in romantic 
relationships on social media is that of private and public areas on these platforms. Marking and 
defining the perimeter of what constitutes a public or a private area is very functional to the 
dynamics of romance on social media platforms. I draw here on the notion of scalable sociality 
(Miller et al, 2016) in order to understand the emergence of both public and private places on 
social media that complete each other and balance the equation of online romance in Saudi. As 
noted in Chapter 4, scalable sociality is a term developed by Miller et al (2016) to describe users’ 
ability to adjust the scale of sociality on social media or the audience addressed from the most 
private to the most public and from dyadic communication to mass communication. The findings 
in my research show that young Saudis define a public area of a certain social media platform not 
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necessarily by the number of people viewing it, but rather depending on who is viewing it. A 
group on WhatsApp that holds 5, 6 or even 10 of your closest friends would still be considered a 
somewhat private area, mainly due to the user’s intimacy with the group members. Interviewee 
Sarah (32 years old) was speaking about her stance on sharing her own personal photographs and 
videos on Snapchat, saying:  
 
“I wouldn’t share them in public, no”. (Sarah, February 2016, one-to-one interview)  
 
Nonetheless, Sarah does actually share both videos and photographs on her cousins’ groups on 
Snapchat (which has 9 members) more than once a day.  When I asked her how it was possible 
that she does not think that she is sharing her photographs publicly on Snapchat, she explained to 
me that sharing with her cousins “does not count [as public sharing]”. The implication of her 
statement is that she defines public/private areas on social media platforms (in this case 
Snapchat) depending not on numbers, but on members. Accordingly, posting on Snapchat Story, 
which all contacts can view, is considered public, while posting on a closed Snapchat Group that 
only hosts her cousins is regarded as private even if it holds 10 or 20 people. Similarly, Twitter 
Feed, Facebook Wall, and Instagram Feed are all thought of as public as long as the account itself 
on these platforms is an open account. On the other hand, closed groups where the users control 
the audience and define the context are private; accordingly, even the public feed of a closed 
account where the user controls the audience and defines the context is also private.  
 
However, particularly in romantic communication, there is a high emphasis on it being dyadic 
communication for it to be regarded as private. So what was considered private in relation to 
wider intimacy practices might not necessarily be regarded as private in relation to romantic 
practices. The added reservations when it comes to romantic practices is understandable in light 
of Saudi’s shame-honour culture, which I have previously explained and which specifically 
places a high value on a woman’s demeanour in relation to love, romance and sexuality. This 
renders privacy a central theme in relation to Saudis’ romantic practices on social media, which I 
will return to in this analysis. The data suggests that areas that allow for dyadic closed 
conversations, such as the direct messages on Instagram, Twitter, WhatsApp or Snapchat, are 
what constitutes a private area where romantic communication can take place. This structure of 
public and private areas on social media platforms, in addition to the distinct affordances of each 
platform, is what guides the digital dynamics of courtship amongst Saudis. A participant in this 
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study (Ali) explained that public areas are used to scan and scout for a romantic prospect. Once a 
person of interest is found, the communication is moved to a private area of social networks such 
as personal direct messages and private WhatsApp conversations.  
 
“You would start talking to a girl you like who you saw on your Twitter timeline, you know like 
subtweeting her and replying and so on. If you see there is a mutual interest from both of you, 
then you would send her a direct message and start talking privately more freely with each other, 
exchange numbers and move to a more intimate platform such as WhatsApp or some other 
instant messaging service, start sending photos to each other or video chatting. If she is cool with 
it, then you would arrange a physical meeting”.  (Ali, March, 2016, one-to-one interview) 
 
In addition to the significance of the public/private structure of social media platforms in relation 
to young Saudis’ romantic practises, what we can draw from Ali’s comment is that there is an 
interplay between different platforms of social media. As social media propagate, each platform 
develops its own niche in users’ communicative practices as the technological affordances of 
each platform lend themselves to particular social norms and contexts. What surfaces as a result 
of this, is a complex environment of multiple evolving social media. Correspondingly, Ali 
perceives video calls on skype or FaceTime to be more intimate than chatting on an instant 
messaging service. Yet messaging on WhatsApp is more personal than just sending direct 
messages on Twitter, presumably because adding someone on WhatsApp would require knowing 
their personal mobile number and so it would be reserved to personal intimate 
connections/contacts. Romantic relationships are thus navigated and moved from one platform to 
another as they progress, moving them from impersonal/public areas of the internet such as a 
Twitter timeline to a more private location such as Twitter direct messages, before finally moving 
them to a more intimate platform which would entail constant and continuous communication 
throughout the day, such as WhatsApp.  
 
Within the context of Polymedia that we are living in today (Madianou & Miller, 2012), it is not 
surprising that romantic practices are not limited to one single social media platform, but are 
rather spread across several ones in accordance with what each platform affords. I have detailed 
in Chapter 4 how several scholars have documented the Polymedic utilisation of social media 
platforms to manage relationships in general and romantic relationships in particular (Miller et al, 
2016, Madianou & Miller, 2012, Chambers, 2013). Raghad’s quote earlier in this chapter 
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exemplifies the emergence of a romantic etiquette/dynamic that makes use of the availability of 
several platforms.  Her relationship with the young man started on Instagram, where he added her 
and sent her direct messages on the platform, but after the initial ‘introductory’ stage the 
relationship was moved to a more suitable platform in terms of affordances. Raghad explains that 
she proceeded to add him on WhatsApp, where they could text, call and video-chat together. 
They also added each other on Snapchat, where they would send momentary short-lived images 
and 10-second videos to each other throughout the day. Raghad explains the interplay between 
the different media to manage the relationship: 
 
 “WhatsApp is where we would have a continuous flow of conversation throughout the day. 
Snapchat is just a good way to keep each other posted on the little details of our day. It is like a 
way to keep him with me moment by moment”.  (Raghad, December, 2015, focus group) 
 
The endurance of texts on WhatsApp makes it a more suitable platform for long talks and 
detailed discussions.  However, the temporality of texts on Snapchat makes such a discussion 
hard to maintain as the sentences keep disappearing, thereby interrupting the flow of the 
conversation. On the other hand, the very same affordance of non-persistency on Snapchat 
becomes appreciated when sharing mundane moments with the significant other that are not 
intended to be followed up for long. In a different example, Norah told me that she would 
incorporate more social media platforms, specifically the ones that require sharing one’s personal 
mobile number, only once she can trust the man she is talking to. She professes that she would 
not add a man on WhatsApp (which necessities her giving him her personal mobile number) until 
a significant amount of time had passed on their relationship and he had gained her trust. Instead, 
she would use the call feature on either Snapchat or on Line App and exchange text messages on 
the direct messages of Twitter or Instagram. This highlights the interplay between several social 
media platforms within a Polymedia context as an attribute of digital romantic practices and it 
suggests the emergence of a romantic etiquette that shifts between and incorporates several of 
these different platforms amongst young Saudis. In addition, it suggests how each platform might 
correlate to a certain stage in the relationship. Platforms that require more details about the user 
in order to facilitate the communication (such as a telephone number for WhatsApp) are 
persevered for meaningful romantic attachments, while insignificant/mundane flirtatious 
communication would take place on a platform with nondurable communication, such as 
Snapchat. Similarly, the work of Pascoe (2010) and Haythornthwaite (2005) (see Chapter 4), 
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highlights the move of a digital romance between platforms in accordance with the stage it is at, 
where more media channels (in this case more social media networks) are added to the social 
intercourse in a calculable configuration of media multiplexity.  
 
The implications of Norah’s remark, is that Saudi women today have the ease/flexibility, capacity 
and tools needed to be able to engage in casual romantic relationships, and not just 
significant/serious ones. Prior to social media, romantic relationships required far more disclosure 
and revelation from both partners for them to take place. This would be either by exchanging 
personal numbers (at a point in time when it was even a shared household number) or meeting in 
person, which raises the stakes and as a result pushed women to reserve their romantic adventures 
to only the most significant relations. However, the inclusion of social media with its 
convenience in customising one’s social circle, and the ease of managing relationships on the 
platforms in a context of networked individualism with lower stakes, has resulted in Saudi 
women tolerating and undertaking casual romantic relationships more often than before. Not 
every romantic relationship they engage in is a significant one; some are merely casual flirtations. 
This sentiment of casualness is also exemplified in Raghad’s earlier comment in this chapter 
where she states: 
 
“I won't necessarily marry this guy”.  (Raghad, December, 2016, focus group) 
 
The aforementioned explained the emergence of public spaces and private spaces on social media 
platforms that are central to the negotiation of romance amongst Saudis.  I also examined the way 
in which the multiplicity of these platforms is being utilised to arrange digital romance and how, 
thanks to their distinctive affordances, they are catering to both serious and casual romantic 
relationships. However, the social media multiplicity that young Saudis grapple with when 
negotiating romantic relationships raises an added issue that impacts significantly on the 
dynamics of Saudi digital romance: the issue of privacy. What I mean by privacy here is 
maintaining such relationships unobserved by those you do not want to know about it. With so 
many media platforms to manage, how one avoids a context collapse when the stakes are so high 
in the shame-honour culture of Saudi Arabia is a crucial question.  This question becomes even 
more urgent if we consider some of my participants’ eagerness to express their feelings of love 
rather publicly. In the next section, I examine some of the approaches that young Saudis resort to 
in order to gratify their desire to boast about their relationships and engage in romantic 
		188	
expressions somewhat publicly, yet avoid context collapse and keep these relationships 
unobserved by/unknown to/away from an undesirable judgmental audience.   
 
9.4 Privacy, Avoiding a context collapse, and accountability suspension  
The most obvious solution for Saudi women to keep a digital romantic relationship concealed 
(thus achieving privacy) in the age of social media would be either to restrict such romantic 
communication to the private areas of social media platforms or resort to identity separation (see 
Chapter 6). Identity separation is having multiple accounts, one for each identity, and is 
facilitated by the multiplicity of social media platforms in a Polymedia setting which is very 
closely linked to Goffman’s (1959) argument on the importance of audience and social context 
when ‘performing’ identity. The user defines a context and controls the audience on a given 
platform, making it suitable for the expression of a particular identity/practise, shame-free, which 
in a way turns even the public areas of that specific controlled accounts into private ones.  
 
The use of identity separation to achieve privacy in relation to romantic practices is exemplified 
by the behaviour of Wafa.  Wafa has created a profile on Instagram which she predetermined 
would be used for initiating and engaging in romantic relationships, or, as she puts it, “for 
flirting”. She accordingly withheld from stating her last name in her profile, sent and accepted 
friend requests from men, and most importantly posted her photographs on that profile unveiled. 
However, her behaviour on this Instagram profile is very different from her behaviour on her 
Facebook profile, on which her contact list harbours her family members and distant relatives. On 
her Facebook profile, Wafa states her family name, does not display any photographs of herself, 
and behaves rather chastely (in accordance with her family values) by not publicly commenting 
or engaging with strange men in a suggestive manner. Wafa resorted to separating two parts of 
her identity and expressed them independently from each other (one in each platform) in order to 
be able to engage in romantic relationships privately and safely with no shame. However, identity 
separation is not something that all Saudi woman favour or resort to as a solution. From the 27 
women I spoke to in focus groups and interviews, only six openly told me they did it. 
Furthermore, while the rest of the respondents might have resorted to the former solution and 
chose not to disclose this to me, five women explicitly said they did not favour identity 
separation. This leaves them with the option to limit romantic communication to dyadic 
communication in the private areas of social media platforms. Yet, from the social media 
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accounts I observed and from the discussions I had with the women in my research, I noticed that 
ornaments of love and romance were still exhibited on public areas of social media. 
Several studies, albeit with a focus on western societies, have examined and explored the use of 
social media platforms to profess love attachments and display love (Robards & Lincoln, 2016; 
Utz and Beukeboom, 2011; Bazarova, 2012; Saslow et al., 2013, Orosz et al., 2015). This is done 
in several ways, whether through couples changing their relationship status on Facebook, sharing 
romantic photographs of themselves with a partner, or by publicly exchanging romantic messages 
on each other’s wall/timeline. There are many possible reasons why users might want to place 
such private practices in a public context. It could be caused by feelings of insecurity about the 
relationship, or more commonly to self-promote and show off, thereby utilising the social media 
platform for relationship “impression management” which displays the connections between 
users (Utz & Beukeboom, 2011, p. 512).  
 
Saudis are not excluded from wanting to affirm superiority amongst their peers by displaying 
success in love/romance. The implication of this, however, is that the consideration of social 
media platforms as a stage from which we perform to an audience is inviting young Saudis to 
commodify romantic relationships, treating them as products that we possess and display for 
attention or peer approval. Tuqa, a young female participant in my focus groups, responded to a 
question on whether she judges a young woman who initiated a romantic relationship with a 
young man online that ended in marriage saying: “Not at all!”, she laughed. “On the contrary, 
I’m actually jealous of her. I want the same!”   Another female participant in the group, Meshaal, 
laughingly declared: “Me too! I’m jealous of her”.  This interaction exemplifies the inclination of 
young Saudis towards romantic relationships today on social media platforms and how these 
relationships are turned into desired acts/items, much like commodities, sought after and 
displayed for status, attention and approval amongst peers, even though these young Saudis might 
still prefer to conceal them from their relatives and wider social circle. 
 
All this begs the question of how this desire to display romantic attachments publicly (whether to 
show them off, gush, or because of personal insecurities) is managed in a context that might 
include family members, distant friends, relatives and acquaintances who consider premarital 
romantic relationships to be shameful/dishonourable. From analysing the data, I determined that 
young Saudis manage the predicament of wanting to display the relationship on social media 
platforms while still averting the blame for engaging in it by what I call ‘accountability 
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suspension’. Accountability suspension is achieved when public expressions of romance are 
marked with ambiguity and are not directly addressed at someone specific. When digital romantic 
expressions are cryptic, opaque and camouflaged, the individual’s accountability for these actions 
is suspended as they are no longer solid acts of professing love, but rather circumstantial 
evidence that could be explained elsewise.   This is in a way very similar to boyd’s notion of 
social stenography (see Chapter 4) except that it specifically relates to avoiding blame/shaming in 
relation to love and romance in shame-honour cultures rather than just generally excluding some 
people (teenagers’ parents in boyd’s case) from a certain narrative on social media platforms.  
 
One way to achieve ‘accountability suspension’ is through the use of social stenography. While 
observing Mai’s Snapchat account as part of the netnographic research in this study, I noticed 
that Mai had posted a snapshot of a black screen with a blue heart emoji on it and the number 7 
next to it. The message is very obscure and might not mean anything to someone who does not 
know Mai well, but it does however imply a romantic entanglement of some sort. When asked 
about it in a personal interview, Mai explained that 7 is her nickname for her boyfriend, Hamad 
(which is written in Arabeezy ‘7amad’).  
 
“Only my friends who know about Hamad would get this [and Hamad himself, obviously].  
“People who don't know me that well, or my brother who follows me on Snapchat, would not be 
able to get anything out of this. It's like a nod to Hamad that only he and my closest friends would 
get. Our little secret”.  (Mai, February 2016, one-to-one interview) 
 
Mai’s use of social stenography enables her to publicly display her affection to her boyfriend at 
that moment without jeopardising her privacy or appearing immodest. She was able to gush over 
her love/affection to her boyfriend and even to parade the relationship in front of her friends, and 
yet exclude information from other members of the audience who might be watching, such as her 
brother. In doing so, Mai is suspending the accountability of posting a romantic ornament (the 
blue heart) in a public area of social media (her Snapchat story) that everyone can see. She 
managed to engage in public digital romantic expressions while still averting the possibility of 
shaming by relative or acquaintances. The same thing can be done through the use of insider-
jokes and personal and cultural references shared between the couple. 
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In another example, Muneerah (22 years old) said in a personal interview that she often shares 
meaningful song lyrics publicly on her Path timeline whenever she has a quarrel with her 
boyfriend to get his attention and let him know what she is feeling at that moment.  
 
“The other day I was feeling very insecure and I felt something was off between us, so I shared a 
song of Abdulmajeed Abdullah [a popular Saudi singer] on my Path timeline and he got it. He 
asked me about it and we talked about it. I would do things like that to get his attention or to send 
an indirect message sometimes about how I am feeling”.   (Muneerah, March 2016, one-to-one 
interview) 
 
The lyrics of Abdulmajeed Abdullah’s song translate to: 
 
It is not just tonight that you are acting different 
It has been a while now that your mind is not with me 
Your body is there but not your heart 
Has someone told you something about me? 
 
This particular example highlights the use of innumerable linguistic and cultural tools such as 
song references and lyrics and anecdotes from popular culture to conceal the relationship itself 
yet display coded references to it that are public and functionally accessible by everyone, thereby 
succeeding in suspending the accountability of these public expressions of love/digital romance. 
Muneerah was able to communicate her insecurity about the relationship indirectly with her 
boyfriend without compromising neither her pride (by talking to him first after the quarrel) nor 
her public modest image (by posting a public rant which would disclose the existence of the 
relationship). She managed to find the perfect balance by sharing a public message but with a 
very private meaning that is ambiguous to the common reader. Thus, I conclude this section by 
proposing the condition of accountability suspension, in which young Saudi women are able to 
profess and engage in public displays of digital romance while still preserving honour and 
abiding by cultural norms in a constant effort to reclaim agency and achieve privacy on social 
media platforms. Now that this has been noted, the data suggests that mixed gender interaction on 
social media between Saudis is opening up the possibility for other forms of intimacy to emerge 
and develop between the two genders that are disconnected from romantic/sexual meaning. The 
following section addresses this theme. 
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9.5 Overcoming gender segregation and developing wider intimacies 
A significant finding that emerged from the data collected through focus groups is that the mixed 
gender environment of social media networks has not only facilitated romantic relationships 
(both serious and casual), as argued earlier, but that it has also produced wider intimacies 
between the two genders that are disconnected from romance and sexuality. As a result, definitive 
boundaries were constructed around the romantic which distinguish them from other forms of 
wider mixed-gender intimacies. What is meant by wider intimacies in this research is feelings of 
affection and care that are commonly felt towards friends or family members, which is very 
distinct from feelings of love/romance or sexual attraction that are found in romantic 
relationships. New discourses of intimacy have emerged that revolves around nonsexual 
relationships like family ties (Chambers, 2013), and digital platforms have made it possible for 
people to network and develop intimacies, or ‘personal connections’ as Baym (2010) calls it, both 
as individuals and as groups that are mediated through these platforms. Several other scholars 
discuss a wide range of mediated intimacies developing terms such as ‘mobile intimacy’ 
(Hjorth& Lim, 2012) and ‘ambient intimacy’ (Reichelt in Deuse,2012, p.231).  
 
The gender segregation of the Saudi community has definitely halted the development of these 
wider intimacies even amongst members of the same household, such as between brother and 
sister. However, the data suggests that the increased mixed-gender communication that is taking 
place on social networks is making up for it. Mohammad, a participant in one of my focus 
groups, asserts that social gender segregation in Saudi has impacted even his relationships with 
his own sister, who lives in the same house, with their occupation of two separate social settings 
(her amongst other women, him amongst other men) isolating them from each other. Yet they 
overcame this social gender segregation by occupying a socially integrated networked public that 
includes both of them: 
 
“I’ll give my sister as an example. We live in the same house and I never had an idea about what 
is going on in her head. I found out many things about her, her opinions and her orientations 
because of us both existing online [on Twitter]. Things I never knew about because she had 
always discussed them in the privacy of women gatherings that I was excluded from. I mean, just 
look at what is going on now! I never thought that I would be in a focus group with 3 girls just 
talking normally and exchanging ideas!” (Mohammed, December 2015, focus group) 
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A level of intimacy between Mohammed and his sister emerged as a result of their increased 
communication that was facilitated through the use of social media. Achieving this level of 
intimacy was much more challenging when Mohammed and his sister occupied gender exclusive 
social circles. Now, the existence of a mixed-gender Saudi public on digital networks is enabling 
Mohmmed and other Saudi men to develop such wider intimacies with women outside his 
immediate family circle, intimacies that are disconnected from romantic/sexual relationships such 
as the ones he shared with the three women participants in the focus groups. Prior to social 
media, there were limited opportunities to initiate and sustain intimate relationships of this nature 
with a woman outside the immediate family as there were very few opportunities for them to 
even meet, not even in family gatherings. As a result, such intimate relationships were often 
homological.  
 
However, the rise of social media has facilitated the formation of mixed-gender relationships and 
created many opportunities for like-minded people who share similar interests from both genders 
to meet each other. Moreover, in many cases these relationships are not only limited to a digital 
context, rather they progress and develop to result into actual meetings as in the case of Ghadah 
and her hiking group on Instagram (Figure.36)   
 
Figure 36: a post from Ghadah’s Instagramwith her hiking group. 
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Ghadah followed the Instagram account @Saharah_club, which aims to connect people from 
both genders who live in Riyadh and are interested in hiking. They then organise hikes and 
meetings to socialise and discover new hike trails around the city. Even though their relationship 
with each other started in a digital context, Ghadah and her hiking friends have moved this 
relation from social media platforms to offline socialising.  
   
The data suggests that the continued increase of mixed-gender communication, along with the 
emergence of wider intimacies between Saudi men and women, has further distinguished 
romantic relationships from mere mixed-gender friendships and that young Saudis are thus 
finding it easier to set more definitive boundaries around romantic relationships. This is a 
fascinating insight as it suggests that a process of ‘normalisation’ or maturing of socio-gender 
relations is taking place in Saudi. If platonic non-sexualised friendships are on the increase, it 
would imply that men are seeing women less stereotypically as humans that have specific roles in 
life and more as ‘complete’ humans almost de-gendering certain relationships with females. Aziz, 
in another focus group, explained that Saudi men today make a distinction between a friend who 
happens to be a woman and a ‘girlfriend’. He spoke about a modern Saudi male mentality that is 
able to have female friends without confusing these feelings as romantic:  
 
“I know ‘her’ and I know other girls, but those are just friends while she is the one I love and 
want to spend my life with. And the same goes for her, a girl that has male friendships is not 
necessarily a loose woman who is involved romantically with all of them at once”.  (Aziz, Jan 
2016, focus group) 
 
What we can draw from Aziz’s comment is that attitudes are changing from both young Saudi 
men and women towards mixed-gender relationships. Men no longer confuse every relationship 
with a woman to be one with romantic/sexual implications. Instead, they acknowledge the 
existence of wider intimacies that are disconnected from the romantic and the sexual. Further 
evidence to support this finding was found in a different focus group in which two female 
participants engaged in a conversation about how both young Saudi men and women are no 
longer occupied solely by the thought of striking a romantic relationship. They added that there is 
a wider array/spectrum of relationships between the two genders in contemporary Saudi Arabia. 
They compared it to a time, in the early days of the Internet and social media, when they felt 
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Saudi men would confuse any form of communication or intimacy with a woman to be 
necessarily romantic or sexual, to which the participant Hadeel:  
 
“Everyone now knows their limits, and knows when a romantic relationship is to be considered 
or not”. (Haddel, December 2015, focus group) 
Hadeel’s comment is evidence of the definitive boundaries that are developing around romantic 
relationships and how they are distinguished from other forms of mixed-gender wider intimacy 
relationships. The statement also acknowledges the existence of both forms of mixed-gender 
relationships, romantic and non-romantic. Her comment, along with Aziz and Mohammed’s 
remarks and other comments collected through the focus groups narrate young Saudis’ attitudes 
toward intimacy between the two genders on social media today. As a young woman from focus 
group 5 states:  
 
“I met many girls and boys online whom I formed friendships with. We have grown so close that I 
even ended up inviting many of these male friends to my sister’s wedding”. (Tuqa, December 
2015, focus group) 
 
This suggests these intimate relationships are significant even if they are detached from 
romantic/sexual sentiments, and that in some cases they even transcend the borders of digital 
communication. In conclusion, what this section has argued is that engagement on social media 
has developed several types of relationships and forms of intimacy between Saudi men and 
women that are distinct from the type of intimacy that characterises romantic partnerships.  
 
9.6 Conclusion 
My respondents perceive that social media platforms are facilitating their engagement in romance 
and developing wider intimacies between the two genders. This result corresponds to the findings 
of Costa (2016) in the conservative city of Mardin (see Chapter 4). This chapter showed that 
social media platforms are a new, gender-integrated space where women and men can connect 
and interact more frequently than in the past. It draws on the concept of networked individualism 
(Wellman and Rainie, 2012) to highlight the configuration of opposite-sex relationships amongst 
Saudis on social media networks. I found that social media is playing a transformative role in 
initiating and maintaining romantic relationships in this cultural context, with young Saudis 
naturalising them as a digital liaison tool between lovers and courtship perceived to be their 
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distinct and vital purpose. Thus, I acknowledge the role that gender-integrated networked publics 
(boyd, 2008) play in complementing the offline gender-segregated public of Islamic conservative 
communities.  I also explained the functionality of private and semi-private areas of social 
networks in creating a shame-free space where my respondents were able to negotiate 
controversial themes and performances such as premarital romantic relationships. The data also 
indicates that the values of young Saudi women towards love and romance are changing due to 
their frequent engagement with the opposite sex on social media platforms and the low-risk 
environment of these platforms, which is encouraging them to experiment with romantic 
relationships regardless of their prospects of sustainability. The privacy that is facilitated on 
social media networks combines with the ability to socialise independently from primary social 
groups such as the family, leading the female respondents in my study to tolerate even casual 
romantic relationships and flirtations rather than preserve romantic endeavours to the most 
meaningful significant romantic attachments.  
 
The data in the chapter indicated four ways in which social media engagement is impacting the 
norms of romance amongst young Saudis: democratisation, re-spatialisation, changing 
temporality, and shifts in gender etiquette. It also illustrated the ways in which my respondents 
are managing the tension between avoiding shaming their families and wanting to display 
romantic relationships to their peers. I proposed a condition of ‘accountability suspension’ that 
my respondents resort to in order to handle this tension. With accountability suspension, displays 
of romance can be made on public areas of social networks as long as they are opaque and 
indirect. The ambiguity of these social steganographic posts frees them from accountability while 
still achieving recognition amongst peers for what they really are.     
 
Finally, I argued for the emergence of wider intimacies, completely detached from the 
romantic/sexual, between the two genders in Saudi Arabia due to an intensive and sustained 
engagement on social media platforms. The respondents in my research convey that the 
development of wider mixed-gender intimacies is further constructing the boundaries around the 
romantic ones and distinguishing them from other relationships. The underlining outcome from 
all of this data is that young Saudis have a positive attitude about gender integration and the 
mixed-gender relationships it produces, whether romantic or non-romantic. This finding is 
contrary to a study by Mona Almunajjed (1997), which suggested that Saudi women two decades 
ago were in the main against gender integration. This indicates the decisive impact social media 
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engagement is having on young Saudi women’s values, norms and attitudes towards gender, love, 
intimacy and romance.   
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Chapter Ten. Conclusion 
10. 1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews and summarises the main findings of this research. By identifying the 
emergence of contemporary non-traditional ideals and values on social networks, social networks 
are framed as counterpublics for Saudi women where oppositional feminine identities are being 
developed and popularised. These contemporary oppositional interpretations of feminine Saudi 
identity are representing and promoting individual agency and a growing autonomy that might be 
impacting values and norms in relation to veiling, work, visibility, and sociality with the opposite 
sex in both a romantic and a non-romantic context. In addition, the findings suggest that social 
media engagement is facilitating Saudi women’s negotiation of their public national image and 
role within the nation. To assert these claims, a bigger research with a significantly larger sample 
must be conducted. Nonetheless, the thesis in hand has provided an interesting preliminary 
examination that explored an under-researched area of study, and therefore can be used as a 
useful and informative starting point for future research on Saudi Arabia and particularly on 
Saudi women. The thesis builds on existing literatures of identity studies and individualisation 
theories. Recommendations and implications for further research are also discussed in this 
chapter.     
 
This research employed a range of theoretical paradigms such as individualisation theories, 
identity theories, and gender theories in relation to nationalism. I worked through these theories 
in order to investigate Saudi women’s identity construction through social media engagement and 
the way it is impacting their norms and values. Rather than adopting a classical interpretivist 
point of view and positioning myself as an uninvolved observer (Bernstein 1983; Hirsch 1976; 
Prus 1996, p. 196), I saw myself as a constructivist researcher with a particular gendered and 
cultural biography and spoke self-reflexively with certain moral values (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, 
p. 18; Rouse 1996; Schwandt 1989).  
 
10.2 Summary of Findings 
Based on the data collected through netnography, focus groups and one-to-one interviews, a more 
self-centred individualised approach is observed to be adopted by Saudi women on social media 
both to represent themselves and to conduct their sociality. This builds on existing literature 
examining the rise of individualism in modern contemporary communities and its relation to 
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detraditionalising these communities (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2000; Beck, 2002). In addition, 
these findings are an advance on contemporary understandings of feminism particularly in Saudi 
Arabia. The findings in this research can be summarised into five, as detailed below.  
The creation of shame-free spaces 
The first key finding of this research is that social media platforms are enabling young Saudis 
observed in this study to create a shame-free space on which they can engage and experiment 
with non-traditional identities, attitudes and practices. This is central to challenging traditional 
cultural values and norms in a shame-honour society such as Saudi Arabia. The affordances of 
social media platforms and the possibility of achieving privacy on them is encouraging some 
Saudi women from conservative social backgrounds to turn to these platforms in order to 
overcome limitations set on them by the collectivity. In some cases, especially amongst older 
participants (aged 26-35), this is creating a case of what is termed in this research ‘identity 
separation’. This multiplicity of identity performance is very strategic in Saudi women’s 
negotiation of classical female identity in which they manipulate privacy settings and social 
media affordances to create semi-public spaces that exclude family members and conservative 
acquaintances who are the main sources of control in shame-honour cultures.  
 
Nonetheless, the empirical data collected in this research shows that this practice is adopted less 
by female ‘digital natives’ (25 and under).  Less weight is being given by younger female users to 
the task of preserving the family honour/reputation, which necessitates controlling and self-
monitoring their own actions and behaviours online. This showcases a wider trend of 
individualism that is diffusing amongst young women on these social media platforms with an 
emphasis on individual agency and autonomy. Young, single Saudi women are performing and 
experimenting with new online identities that form part of new, detraditionalised values and 
norms that underpin new performances of femininity starkly at odds with the conservative ideals 
of femininity of the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapter 2).  
 
The complexity of being a Saudi woman 
One of the key findings of this research is the documentation of young Saudi women’s efforts to 
claim identity online while balancing the complex demands of contemporary digital culture and a 
traditional conservative society. What I observe is indeed closely linked to Dobson’s (2015) 
observation of emerging postfeminist identities amongst women in digital cultures. However, and 
as I explained in the literature review, the limitations of the term ‘postfeminsim’, as well as my 
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preservation on terming the practices I observe as “feminist”, renders the term incapable of 
encompassing the specific circumstances facing Saudi women at this juncture in Saudi Arabia 
history and their expressions of an aspirational femininity on social media and their search for 
agency within the site of popular culture and heterosexual romance. 
The virtual ‘freezing in time’ of social relations for Saudi women during the period of 1980’s and 
1990’s due to the influence of Sahwa movement is one of two factors that set the contemporary 
context, in which Saudi women grapple with expressions of identity and self-image in the digital 
age. The second is the appearance of digital technologies just 20 years ago and their now routine 
use especially by young digital natives. Combined, these two factors thrust Saudi women from an 
era of strict marginalisation directly into an age – the digital context – where they have the tools 
and space to re-imagine their identities at their fingertips. The implication of this, is that Saudi 
women’s experience of ‘feminism’ is very particular.  
 
These non-traditional identities are defined by neoliberal qualities such as confidence, self-
assurance, independence, defiance and a strong sense of individual agency and autonomy, which 
is very different from the classical traditional attributes of Saudi femininity that highlights values 
and norms of conformity to traditional collective values such as veiling, gender segregation and 
confinement to the private sphere. In agreement with feminist poststructuralist epistemology, this 
particular finding in my research suggests that gendered identities and femininity are not inherent 
properties but are rather constituted and produced together with performative and complex acts of 
self-presentation (Butler, 1990; Barad, 2003; Cover, 2012).  
 
According to Giddens (1991), late modern communities are moving away from collectivism and 
systems of kinship towards individualism, which is in turn directly responsible for 
detraditionalising these communities (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2000; Beck, 2002). Similarly, my 
research finds that the new identities that are emerging through social media activity amongst 
Saudi women I observe in my research, are starting to undermining/disrupting ultra-conservative 
values and norms dictated by the collectivity in relation to veiling, work and gender segregation, 
and promoting the adoption of more liberal personal values and norms. These cultural changes, 
observable when comparing my data with data from Al-Munajjed’s 1997 study, confirm the 
association between individualism and the detraditionalisation in modern communities. 
According to Dobson (2015), girls and young women on social media today are regarded as 
cultural producers, and similarly my research observes that young Saudi women are producing a 
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novel and contemporary Saudi femininity characterised by non-traditional norms and values. 
That said, in their effort to claim identity online, Saudi women observed in my research are found 
to also reaffirm pre-existing gendered scripts in their portrayal of women mainly as consumers, as 
well as perpetuating norms that naturalise gendered power relations, such as male guardian 
approval. This particular finding highlights the complex ways in which Saudi women can now be 
in the world. Sometimes they reinforce values and norms of the traditional Saudi society in 
relation to beauty, class and male guardianship, and other times they challenge them whether it is 
by unveiling or engaging in pre-marital romantic relationships, or even by seeking fame and 
becoming micro-celebrities (which I discuss further in the next finding).  
 
This finding answers the first question in this research about how increased social media activity 
is impacting the values and norms of Saudi women. The answer to this question is that the 
identities that are emerging as a result of increased social media activity and which emphasise 
individualism and defiance to collective values are starting to produce a modernised set of values 
and norms that are more liberal, specifically in relation to the following practices: veiling, gender 
segregation, work and seclusion in the private sphere.  Certainly, there is yet a long way to go, 
but what is taking place on social media today is a start that is worthy of documenting, and I 
aimed to do so in this research. Therefore, while Dobson, along with other feminist scholars 
(Phelan, 1993, Wolf, 1991; Mulvey, 1975/1989), argue that women’s visibility in western 
cultures might not necessarily lead to self-actualisation and empowerment, I argue differently. 
The level of visibility associated with expressions of identity online within the conservative 
shame-honour culture of Saudi Arabia might actually translate to self-actualisation and 
empowerment amongst Saudi women in the near future. The emphasis here is on social/cultural 
representation through visibility rather than sexual display. The recently provided opportunities 
to be visible culturally and socially on social media, is granting Saudi women a sense of agency 
and self-confidence, and providing them with an important platform on which they can present 
alternate ideals of femininity.  
 
Female micro-celebrities as the vanguard of change 
The second finding of my research is recognising Saudi female micro-celebrities on social media 
as vanguards of change amongst young Saudi women who are producing a modern culture and 
therefore turning networked publics into counterpublics where Saudi women are able to live, 
represent and promote oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs. My 
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netnographic observation of Saudi women’s activities on social media has documented the 
emergence of a new trend in public self-presentation on these networks, termed by Senfit (2010) 
‘micro-celebrity’. Saudi female micro-celebrities I observed in this research are either social 
media influencers, fashionistas, or entrepreneurial business owners. I identify the ways in which 
Saudi micro-celebrities are commonly challenging norms of Saudi femininity on social media. 
Firstly, they are placing Saudi women in the public sphere, which de facto challenges the norm of 
fixing women in the private sphere to protect the reputation of the family by remaining 
unobtrusive (Almunajjed, 1997; Le Renard, 2008; Hilde Granås Kjøstvedt, 2016). Secondly, and 
particularly in relation to fashionistas, the emphasis on physical beauty through highlighting body 
attributes, appearing with heavy makeup and revealing clothes, is challenging and negotiating the 
politics of visibility and the norm of veiling for Saudi women. Finally, micro-celebrities’ 
entrepreneurial endeavours are developing a new norm of financial independence amongst Saudi 
women and further weakening the norm of the male guardian and provider.  
 
The celebrity status of these women and the fact that they are followed by millions of young 
Saudi women is starting to popularise their newly produced culture, norms and values amongst 
their followers, thereby turning them into vanguards of change that are expressing an alternate 
feminine identity online which is influencing young Saudi women observed in this research, and 
encouraging them to do the same. The data collected through focus groups and one-to-one 
interviews highlight the role of these women as vanguards of change and their idealisation by the 
young Saudi participants in my research. This suggests that networked publics on social media 
are turning into a counterpublic, defined by Nancy Fraser as “parallel discursive arenas where 
members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn 
permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” 
(1997, p.81). This feeds into and further confirms Senft’s (2013) recognition of social media 
networks as counterpublics of cultural production for women in which they compensate for their 
exclusion from the process of cultural production in the public sphere. 
 
Saudi micro-celebrities’ hyper visibility and activity online is compensating for women’s 
seclusion within the domestic sphere and successfully bringing about a Saudi counterpublic on 
social media networks, in which women are playing a critical role.  Additionally, identities 
expressed by Saudi women and micro-celebrities online are negotiating gender roles by 
challenging norms around the placement of women within the domestic and private sphere and 
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around limiting their role to that of home-maker. They are also challenging norms of veiling. The 
centrality and importance of visibility for engagement on social media, in addition to how 
frequent Saudi micro-celebrities are appearing unveiled is urging women in my research to 
reassess their values around veiling and visibility. Finally, the neo-liberal tendencies of 
contemporary identities on networked publics and their emphases on individual agency and 
autonomy can be viewed as a step towards gradually emancipating women from their 
conventional placement as representatives of the collectivity’s honour and carriers of the family 
name.  
 
Reconstructing the public national image of Saudi women 
An unexpected finding in my research is the impact of social media engagement in reconstructing 
the national public image of Saudi women and reimagining their relation to the nation. The 
netnographic observation of Saudi women’s activity on social media shows the persistence of 
Saudi conservative nationalists on deeming women ‘carriers of tradition’ and positioning them as 
the symbolic border guards and markers of the nation and representatives of its honour and piety, 
which de facto distinguishes the pious nation from other, ungodly nations (Yuval-Davis, 1997; 
Al-Rasheed, 2013). Al-Rasheed (2013) documents the efforts of Saudi women to portray a 
different public national image through their poetry and novels. However, I push Al-Rasheed’s 
(2013) argument further by considering the activities of Saudi women on social media, an area 
which she did not study in her research. I argue that Saudi women’s engagement with social 
media is generating multiple (and often contradictory) public images of Saudi women, especially 
upon associating unconventional identities with the Saudi label. This in turn is negotiating the 
classic, ultra-religious public national image of the pious woman which has long been held by 
conservative nationalists as the only ‘true’ representation of Saudi females. Once more, this 
particular finding suggests that networked publics are counterpublics for women in Saudi Arabia, 
where oppositional interpretations of female national identity in Saudi Arabia are being 
represented and promoted. The data also suggests that the individual agency that is expressed in 
in digital cultures today is gradually emancipating women from the burden of representing the 
family’s (and by extension the nation’s) honour, which is a key theme in the collectivist 
ideologies of conservative nationalists. This finding answers the second question in the research, 
about how social media activity is impacting on the public images of Saudi women. It also feeds 
into larger discussions of the role gender plays within the nation, even though the consideration 
of this was not an original aim of this research. 
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Changing Romantic Norms – From Collective to Individualised Values 
One of the main aims of this research was to assess the ways in which increased social media 
usage is influencing Saudi women’s attitudes towards romance. Naturally, with gender 
segregation still being an issue for young Saudis offline, the data revealed that a key role of social 
media in young Saudis’ lives is to initiate and maintain pre-marital romantic relationships. The 
study has identified four processes in which the values and norms of young Saudi women in 
relation to romantic relationships are being impacted through social media engagement: 
democratisation, re-spatialisation, changing temporality, and shifts in gender etiquette towards a 
more autonomous femininity.  
 
Specifically, democratisation of romance and the shift in gender etiquette highlight a 
development of an autonomous Saudi femininity in relation to romance and the negotiating of 
intimacy. As previous states of romance were commonly bound to official marriage proposals 
(which was closely bound up with families and communities), increased social media 
engagement has facilitated a process of democratisation in which women can find a match 
independently by putting them in direct contact with a larger group of the opposite sex, thereby 
increasing their chance of meeting an eligible candidate and rendering the family’s role in 
introducing the match somewhat redundant.  
 
In addition, the data collected through focus groups and one-to-one interviews suggests a shift in 
gender etiquette when it comes to romantic relationships. Young female participants in my 
research suggest that their engagement on social media has increased their agency and 
encouraged them to be more active in initiating and managing romantic relationships. This 
implies a context of networked individualism in which digital relationships are constructed and 
managed, as argued by Wellman and Rainie (2012). Similar to Wellman and Rainie’s (2012) 
observations, social media engagement is causing a shift in the classical configuration of social 
arrangements and relations built around large hierarchical bureaucracies or tightly-knit social 
groups like the family through the use of modern communication technologies. As a result, young 
Saudis are operating less as embedded group members and more like connected individuals. The 
flexible autonomy of being a networked individual has a significant impact on young Saudi 
women’s attitudes towards love. By removing themselves from traditional kinship systems and 
administrating their sociality independently, young Saudi women have also removed themselves 
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from the obligations that arise from their role within the collectivity/kinship system, i.e. to 
represent its honour. Suspending this obligation while engaged on social media means that these 
women are able to engage in relationships that are commonly deemed improper or shameful, such 
as pre-marital romantic relationships, which is why social media engagement can facilitate such 
relationships and therefore might change women’s attitudes towards romance altogether. This 
finding answers the first question of this research in relation to how social media engagement is 
impacting young Saudi women’s attitudes towards love and romance. As for how it is impacting 
their larger intimacy practices, this will be discussed in the next and final finding. 
 
Developing wider mixed-gender intimacies  
Assessment of the way in which social media engagement impacts mixed-gender social 
relationships amongst Saudis was divided into two parts: assessment of romantic relationships 
and the assessment of social media engagement with regard to wider intimacy practises. In 
relation to the latter, this research finds that due to frequent and continuous communication 
between the two genders through social media, intimacy is becoming disconnected from its 
traditional romantic/sexual meaning for the participants in my research. The data in this research 
suggests that young Saudis are able to develop wider intimacies between the two genders that are 
detached and voided from romantic love.  
 
Social media engagement is found to be undermining gender segregation norms/values, 
developing new forms of mixed-gender intimacies and reducing the shame that surrounds pre-
marital romantic relationships. The respondents in my research convey that the development of 
wider mix-gendered intimacies is further constructing the boundaries around the romantic ones 
and distinguishing them from other relationships. The underlining outcome from all of this data is 
that young Saudis have a positive attitude towards gender integration and the mixed-gender 
relationships it produces, whether romantic or non-romantic. This finding is contrary to an 
important study by Almunajjed in 1997, which suggested that Saudi women two decades ago 
were strongly against gender integration. Thereby indicating the impact social media engagement 
is having on changing the values, norms and attitudes of young Saudi women towards love, 
intimacy and romance, and on mixed-gender relations overall.   
 
In conclusion, the findings in this research suggest that love and pre-martial romance has become 
an increasingly important part of young Saudi women’s lives. The sample group of Saudi youth 
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often expressed more understandable and less judgmental attitudes not only towards love and 
premarital romance but also towards wider mixed-gender intimacies in general, reflecting a more 
tolerant social and cultural environment than that which characterises a contemporary Saudi 
Arabia still under the influence of the Sahwa movement. This could be linked to the growing 
sense of individualism that is facilitated and promoted through social media engagement 
(Dobson, 2015; Gill, 2007; Hopkins, 2002; Aapola, Gonick, and Harris, 2005; Harris, 2004; 
McRobbie, 2007; Banet-Weiser, 2012; Ringrose, 2013; Dobson, 2014), which is encouraging 
young Saudis to move away from conservative collective values and norms towards developing 
personal and liberal values and attitudes in relation to gender integration and mixed-gender 
relationships. The data in general reflect the development of a new trend amongst Saudi women 
that is encouraging modern individualised values that do not necessarily adhere to the traditional 
collective culture/ideology. 
 
10.3 Contribution to The Body of Knowledge 
This thesis makes a significant contribution to knowledge about the changing status, roles and 
identities of Saud women in the following key ways: First, the research on Saudi women 
contributes to knowledge on the area of the Middle East and on Saudi Arabia in particular and the 
way technology is impacting on conservative societies. Second, despite the small number of 
participants preventing us from generalising from the findings, it certainly provides a useful 
roadmap for future, more extensive, research that can produce quantitative results. A third 
contribution made by this thesis is that it deals with significant trending issues in the Saudi 
society such as female micro-celebrities, mixed-gender relations online and contemporary Saudi 
femininity. In this way, my research builds knowledge on these themes, as well as providing 
important pointers for future research to be carried out.  
 
This project is amongst the first studies to utilise netnography to observe the practices, values and 
norms of Saudi women on social media networks. I personally believe that social media networks 
are an important area to study in relation to Saudi women’s identities as they are spaces where 
women can self-represent and act somewhat freely and independently from the restrictions of 
both family and law. Therefore, observing them none-intrusively through netnography has 
produced a large and rich data set to analyse and consider, which strengthens the claim that this 
research makes a significant contribution to the field.  Combining the observational methods of 
netnography with the interactive methods of focus groups and one-to-one interviews has also 
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enriched my personal understanding and interpretation of the data collected netnographically, 
while the triangulation methodology approach helped to a great extent to validate and crosscheck 
the data collected. Moreover, having a different sample in each method (micro-celebrities and 
regular women in netnography and regular users in the focus groups and one-to-one interviews) 
enabled me to capture different dimensions of the same process, i.e. identity construction/identity 
performance and to demonstrate the complex ways in which Saudi women can be in the world in 
this day and age.  
 
I drew on Mona Almunajjed’s Women in Saudi Arabia Today (1997) as the basis for a 
comparative analysis. This text allowed for an understanding of the similarities and differences 
between two points in time separated by twenty years and the advent of the widespread use of 
social media. The book was used throughout the research as an underpinning theoretical 
framework to compare the images and attitudes of the Saudi woman prior to social media 
engagement in the 1990s with the present position of high levels of social media engagement. 
Almunajjed examined the lives and social experiences of Saudi women in a traditional society 
through wide-ranging interviews with 100 Saudi women. She analysed social issues such as 
veiling, gender segregation, education and employment by focusing on women’s attitudes 
towards the values and norms in which these issues were embedded. This approach gave Women 
in Saudi Arabia Today the advantage of being a reference point through which to assess the 
changes in the values and norms of young Saudi women, their attitudes towards romance and 
their wider intimacy practices, and the changes in the public images of young Saudi women 
observed on social media today. This historical enquiring framework helped me to examine the 
identity transformation bound up with the issues I am investigating and aided me in locating the 
individualisation process within the use of social media by young Saudi females and therefore 
further build on existing individualisation theories (for example, Bauman 2000, 2001, 2003; Beck 
1992; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2003, 2010; Giddens 1991, 1992; Hansen & Svarverud 2010; 
Yan 2009, 2010a, 2010b). 
 
From a constructivist, ontological perspective I believe that the reality of who a Saudi woman is, 
what she looks like, her values and attitudes are constantly being reshaped through interaction. 
Thus, there is not a single reality of who a Saudi woman is. On the contrary, there are multiple 
versions depending on specific historical junctures (i.e. ‘the time of viewing’). I hope that this 
study will serve as a snapshot of the ever-changing, dynamic Saudi society. The analysis proves 
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that conservative Islamic communities are not as static as they are often depicted, and that if you 
look below the surface, you can realise that they are constantly evolving.   
 
 10.4 Recommendations for future research 
This research has generated a number of questions that require further investigation. By 
employing netnography, the findings reveal that some of the most successful Saudi fashionistas 
are conservative and would only appear modestly dressed in head scarf and Abayah. Not only in 
Saudi Arabia but all over the world the fashion industry is having what might be termed a 
‘modest moment’, as the activities of ‘Hijabi’ bloggers on social media (such as Dina Torkia 
@dinatokio, Ascia al Faraj @ascia_AKF, and Saufeeya Goodson @feeeeya, for example) are 
diversifying the industry and forcing it to acknowledge Muslim women, resulting in ‘modest pop-
up shops’, ‘modest fashion weeks’ and the formation of ‘modest fashion lines’ by mainstream 
brands.  This raises the question of whether the veil is a symbol of either or both faith and 
fashion.  In other words, does a fixation on ‘external beauty’ contradict the required modesty of 
the act of veiling?  It is also worth researching the modesty trend in fashion and investigating 
whether the veil is an actual site of agency in the representations of Hijabi bloggers or merely an 
empty signifier and a way to insert the image of the Muslim woman into the world of fashion and 
consumer culture (i.e. the commodification of the hijab). A closer review of this would assess 
whether Saudi fashionistas on social media are rising on their own merits as models and fashion 
influencers, or rather the urban/modern female Saudi identity is being commercialised and used 
by major global companies to market consumer products to the Saudi/Gulf market.  
 
The small number of male participants in this research is meant to be exploratory and 
complementary to the data collected on women’s development of non-traditional identities on 
social media networks and not representative of Saudi men’s engagement with the networks and 
the way it is impacting them. Therefore, I would recommend that research is conducted which 
fully explores this theme. Research on the ways in which social media engagement is impacting 
the values, norms and attitudes of male Saudis would be an insightful addition to gender studies 
on the retreat of patriarchy and would advance feminist theory. A further fruitful avenue of 
research would be to conduct quantitative studies on the subject.  The data analysis in this 
research is mainly qualitative. A quantitative social survey in future research on the topic of 
changing values may enrich the findings and generate statistical results that can be more 
confidently generalised. It might also show an indicative curve in Saudis’ conformity to tradition. 
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An interesting area for future research would be to assess the impact of the developments 
documented here on government officials and other powerbrokers in Saudi society and the 
immediate Saudi polity. While the women I observe in this research are all apolitical users of 
social media, it can be argued that their non-traditional practices online are laying the foundations 
for democratisation for Saudi women offline. From what I gathered from my participants in focus 
groups and one-to-one interviews, what is taking place online is impacting the values and norms 
and overall culture of Saudi Arabia in ways that are preparing the country to promote politico-
legal changes that balance power relations for women. Furthermore, an influential Saudi feminist 
movement has been observed on social media. ‘Nassawiat Saudiat’ (Saudi Feminists) on Twitter 
is emerging as an organised collective that is demanding change in laws and the constitution in 
favour of women’s rights. It would be informative to research the ways in which Saudi women 
are organising on social media in order to undertake more overtly politicised action such as a 
collective campaign against the ban on women driving on Twitter (#iwilldrivemycarJune15) 
(Taylor, 2016).  
 
Indeed, a flurry of legal activity began towards the end of 2017 covering several socio-cultural 
aspects of Saudi life. For instance, the ban on women’s driving was lifted in September 2017, 
women have been admitted to more public spaces such as sports stadiums, cinemas have been 
opened, and even deeper-reaching and more meaningful laws for women have been implemented 
such as a recent law granting custody of children automatically in the event of divorce without 
having to file a lawsuit (Tamara Qiblawi, 2018). However, the data in this research shows that 
certain aspects of the otherwise rising individualism of Saudi women is still shaped and halted by 
the collectivist ideologies of the Saudi state, such as the law of wearing an Abayah in public, for 
example, or the restrictions on travel without male guardian approval. It was beyond the scope of 
this research to focus on the state’s role in dictating or enforcing certain societal values or norms 
on its citizens. However, it could be argued that there is no actual potency to digital political 
activism in a totalitarian regime, and that these sudden changes are merely a reflection of having 
a young ‘reformer’, Mohammed Bin Salman, as Crown Prince who is implementing his own 
vision of 2030, i.e.: law/government, not activism/people, is driving change in Saudi. It would be 
really insightful to explore the dynamic between digital debates/activism and the current 
legislative reforms concerning women, and to determine who is leading who; are young Saudis 
modernising their society and laws are catching up to this modernity, or is it actually laws that are 
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driving change in the community and it happens to be a ‘modern’ moment in Saudi Arabia’s 
history. 
 
10.5 Conclusion 
This thesis examined the way in which social media usage impacts the values, norms and 
attitudes of young Saudi women and the way in which they perform their identity and socialise 
with the opposite sex. Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this study, it is now 
possible to state that social media engagement is facilitating Saudi women’s transition into self-
managing subjects, impacting their values, norms in relation to veiling, work and confinement to 
the public sphere, as well as impacting their attitudes towards romance and wider intimacy 
practices. Accordingly, this is bringing about significant transformation to the public images of 
young Saudi women and negotiating Saudi nationalists positioning of them as the representatives 
of the collectivity’s honour. This may suggest a movement towards revising gender roles within 
the Saudi nation. Overall, by examining how young women approach self-presentation on social 
media today, this research feeds into a broader project of exploring Saudi women’s public image 
transformation and the relation between the Saudi nation and contemporary feminine Saudi 
identities.  
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Appendix 
Social Networks Features  
Features and functionality on social networks are diverse and they vary from one platform to the 
other, while Twitter features a ‘polling’ button for example (enabling users to survey their 
followers’ opinion on a matter of interest), Snapchat do not.  However, four key features are in 
common between most of them; profiles, friends or contact lists, public communicating tools, and 
update feed (boyd and Ellison, 2007). These features play a conspicuous role in setting up social 
network platforms as networked publics and they can be thought of as the main building blocks 
of networked publics. In order to take part in a networked public, you first need to handle the first 
block and construct a profile.    
 
Profiles  
Profiles are a direct form of self-representation online. boyd even describes the act of generating 
a profile as an explicit act of writing oneself into being in a digital environment (boyd, 2006). 
Users decide how they wish to present themselves to those who view their profile, actively and 
consciously constructing their profiles accordingly. Users’ profiles can be literally public, in the 
sense that they can be viewed and accessed by anyone irrespective of whether the viewer is a 
contact on the user’s friend list or not, or they can be semi-public, i.e. visible only to those who 
are on the contact list of the user, which might include an audience of friends, family, 
acquaintances and whoever the user wishes to connect with. This brings us to the second block of 
networked publics: the contacts list.  
 
Friend Lists 
Friend lists, or more accurately contact lists, are the lists of users on a certain profile who can 
view, connect and engage with the profile owner. Users add, ‘friends’ or follow people they 
know or might want to know, comprising the potential audience that they wish to address. 
However, if a profile is ‘public’ it is important to note that the audience might transcend the list’s 
contacts to include members of the network who might not necessarily be part of the user’s 
‘imagined audience’. The notion of an imaginary audience is quite central in networked publics 
and it will  be considered throughout this study.  The imaginary audience is the intended audience 
that users have in mind and hope to reach when participating on social media networks. 
Therefore, for many users, it is important to make sure that the members of these lists are all part 
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of the same social context, as they will be communicating with them en masse. For other users, 
merging various social contexts is acceptable or even welcomed. The way a user approaches the 
issue of social context determines who might and might not be included in the friend list. boyd 
asserts that “the value of imagining the audience or public is to adjust one’s behaviour and self-
presentation to fit the intended norms of that collective” (2010, p.6).  Nonetheless, our imagined 
audience might not always be the only ones who are observing our online activity, especially if 
the profile is truly public. The repercussions of an unexpected male relative viewing the online 
activities of a young Saudi woman engaging socially with users from the opposite sex could be 
significant. Equally significant are the repercussions of a Saudi woman’s unconventional 
practises going viral. Issues of context collapse and imaginary audience will be further discussed 
in Chapter 4.         
 
Communication Tools 
Communication tools are provided by social network platforms in order to enable digital social 
engagement. Tools such as the ‘like’ button on Facebook or the ‘heart’ button on Instagram, 
commenting, retweeting and snapping a photo or a video on Snapchat are all forms of actual 
connecting or a performance of social connecting before a larger audience. The tools allow users 
to generate content which they transmit into the update feed of fellow users or in the general 
common feed of the platform 
 
Update Feed 
The update feed, or the common feed, or on some platforms the timeline, is the open public area 
of a social platform that is accessible to all users. Costa (2016) terms it “public facing” social 
media; it is the area of social media that is visible to most of the user's contacts, such as the 
Facebook wall for example or the Instagram feed, or the Snapchat story. On the other hand, direct 
messages form a private area of a social platform where accessibility is limited to certain 
contacts. The distinction between the two areas is vital in negotiating romance and wider 
intimacies between the opposite sexes in Saudi Arabia, as I shall demonstrate in the analysis. The 
open accessible and collective nature of the update feed facilitates the emergence of a cultural 
public sphere in which Saudi women are active agents and cultural producers. A trending hashtag 
on a Twitter timeline might arguably be considered a virtual cultural public sphere where the 
current debates and issues of a community are discussed and debated, for example the hashtag 
that was created when the ban on women driving was lifted in September 2017. Moreover, the 
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affordances of social media allow the manipulation of contact lists and timelines to create an area 
between public and private – a ‘semi-public space’ (discussed below). Collectively, profiles, 
contact lists, and communication tools are the pillars on which social network profiles can be 
understood as publics. Succinctly, social network platforms are publics because of their ability to 
connect people as well as their production of a social, informative, interactive space. They are 
networked publics due to the fact that they are formed and configured by networked technologies. 
 
Affordances  
Affordances are conceptualised by Norman as “the perceived and actual properties of the thing... 
that determine how the thing could... be used” (1988, p. 9). Everything we use has an affordance, 
and this includes networked technologies and social media platforms. These affordances can 
shape the networked publics, and while they do not necessarily determine users’ social practices, 
they are designed to make possible, or sometimes even encourage, a certain practice (boyd, 
2014). It is important to map the affordances of networked publics because understanding them 
highlights what users need to leverage or resist in order to attain their objectives (despite the 
affordances), ultimately enabling an understanding of why people behave in a certain way on 
these publics. For example, in the early days of the Internet before emoticons were developed, 
participants used punctuation marks in order to communicate facial expressions and tone. Even 
though chatrooms at the time did not afford facial expressions, the affordance did not predict 
users’ behaviour which ended up employing :-) to express a happy face. Tensions between 
affordances, platforms architecture design and user agency will be reviewed in Chapter 4, but 
here I will only mention the four main affordances that are common between most social media 
sites and which play a significant role in configuring networked publics and in the development 
of an online self-identity: persistence, replicability, scalability and searchability. 
 
Persistence 
Persistence is the affordance of automatically recording and archiving online communication and 
social practices on social media platforms. While the default in offline human interaction is for it 
to be ephemeral, online technologies allow for the recording, chronicling and saving of the 
content we produce on social media, whether it is a photo that we have shared, a comment that 
we have made or a ‘like’ button that we have pressed. And while we are presumably capturing 
the moment we have lived accurately by recording it (Benjamin, 1969), what we capture could be 
interpreted differently over time (boyd, 2010). boyd (2010) raises concerns over consuming these 
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recorded activities and practices outside the intended context on which they were produced. For 
example, issues of ‘revenge porn’ (where an ex-partner distributes private photos or texts once 
shared online with him/her by a former lover out of revenge), is an example of how persistence 
might be a potential hazard (Bates, 2017; Stroud, 2014). Because of this particular affordance, 
Saudi women end up grappling/dealing with issues of trust and concerns over privacy and family 
surveillance as they develop their online identities and engage socially on networked publics (see 
Chapter 4). Even though persistence has become one of the most common and normative 
affordances in social media platforms, some recent social network applications have questioned 
this affordance and challenged it, such as the case with Snapchat in 2013. Upon observing how 
social practices change once on Snapchat, we can understand how persistence influences our 
social engagement online. For example, users report sharing photos that are only humorous or 
relevant at a particular moment on Snapchat that they might not share on Facebook. These 
photographs would lose their significance when the moment passes, and so they are not meant to 
endure, or are not worthy of archiving (Miller et al, 2016).  
 
Replicability  
Replicability is the ability to duplicate and reproduce information that has been shared on 
networked publics. A user’s post on a platform can be duplicated and edited by other users before 
it gets redistributed again. Functions such as the ‘retweet’ button on Twitter or the ‘Share’ button 
on Facebook are examples of features that encapsulate this affordance. Replicability is what 
enables something to go ‘viral’ on network publics. Therefore, this affordance is key in 
explaining the ease with which people can spread gossip and undermine reputations and betray 
one another, something that Saudis are very mindful of in a shame-honour culture that values 
reputation and links it closely to women’s behaviour. On the positive side, the affordance of 
replicability is functional in building a reputation and achieving fame, something that will be 
returned to later in this chapter when the trend of micro-celebrities is addressed (Senft, 2008). 
 
3.4.3 Scalability 
Scalability is one of the central affordances that shape network publics. It is basically the 
potential visibility of the content we produce on social media platforms. A Friend list is an aspect 
of the scalability affordance (however, as mentioned above, it should be noted that the people on 
those lists might not be the only ones viewing our digital activities). The popularity of 
technologies and social network sites means that the audience that we imagine watching us could 
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easily be much broader or in some cases smaller than we think. Miller et al (2016) introduced the 
notion of ‘scalable sociality’ (which will be fully outlined in Chapter 4) to evaluate social media 
practices in relation to this particular affordance. In essence, scalable sociality is the act of 
adjusting the scale of socialising in terms of reach to accord with the user’s preference. Because 
of the scalability affordance of social media, combined with the replicability affordance noted 
above, users have the potential to reach a massive audience, thereby achieving heavy visibility 
that grants them a degree of ‘fame’. Indeed, ‘micro-celebrities’ (Senft, 2008) on social media 
platforms are a by-product of this affordance (discussed below).  However, this is true only for a 
niche group of users who are able to reach that degree of popularity.    
 
Searchability 
Finally, searchability refers to the content and information generated and shared on social media 
platforms which can be found and accessed by simply online searching. Hashtags, for example, 
comprise microdata that are commonly attached to the content generated in order for it to be 
grouped with other content on the platform that falls within the same category, making it possible 
for users to search and access a certain hashtag to view all media content that has been labelled 
by it. This makes the emergence of ‘hot topics’ and trends or even campaigns much easier as 
people can group all discussions around the topic in a single space. For instance, current events 
usually get their own hashtag on Twitter, such as #InaugurationDay2017 #WomenMarch, and are 
practically compartments where all tweets generated around these topics can be found. Similarly, 
in Saudi Arabia hashtags such as #StylishSaudis and #SaudisAgainstMaleGuardianship are 
promoting new trends both in the appearance and in the attitudes of Saudi women. Furthermore, 
searchability means that anyone who is in the networked publics could be found, and as almost 
all online activities leave trace, it is also possible to obtain the location. Some platforms even 
allow you to track your contacts’ geolocation and search where they have physically been. Just 
recently, in July 2017, Snapchat introduced Snap Map, which locates your friends and maps their 
movements live, thereby transcending the digital frame of the network public and entangling our 
digital existence with our physical one. This again has many implications for issues of privacy 
and surveillance, but it is also transferring Saudi users’ opposite-sex connections, meetings and 
intimacies from strictly a digital context to include physical ones too. A young woman could 
check which of her male contacts is physically around her in a restaurant through ‘Nearby’ 
buttons in platforms such as Swarm and Facebook, which could encourage them to physically 
greet each other and have engage in offline communication.    
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 These affordances shape the public that these actions take place in. As a result, scholars 
(Litt, 2012; boyd, 2010; Marwick and boyd, 2010; Hartley, Burgess, and Bruns, 2013) observe 
that certain dynamics are introduced which the users must contend with: the imagined or the 
invisible audience, context collapse and the blurring of the public and private. These dynamics 
end up impacting our communication and social relationships on social networks (they are fully 
explored in Chapter 4, which reviews intimate relations online). However, now that networked 
publics have been adequately discussed, the notion of identity and self-representation online can 
be reviewed .   
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C O N S E N T  F O R M 
 
Project:  Exploring Young Saudi Women’s Engagement with Social Media: Feminine 
Identities, Culture and National Image 
 
1 I have read and understood the information about 
the project, as provided in the Information sheet  
 
2 I have been given the opportunity to ask 
questions about the project and my participation 
 
3 I voluntarily agree to participate in the project 
 
 
4 I understand that I can withdraw at any time 
without giving reasons and that I will not be 
penalised for withdrawing, nor will I be 
questioned on why I have withdrawn 
 
5 The procedures regarding confidentiality (e.g. the 
use of names, pseudonyms, anonymisation of 
data, etc.) have been clearly explained to me 
 
6 The use of data in research, publications, sharing 
and archiving has been explained to me 
 
  
I consent to participate in this project YES NO 
I consent to any information I provide to the project being used in 
the writing up of the research, in publications, uploaded to websites 
and included in archives of research reports, provided that unless I 
give my express permission, my name and other identifying personal 
details will not be associated with the information I provide 
YES NO 
 
Participant 
______________      __           ________________________                  _______________ 
Name of Participant                 Signature                                                    Date 
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Research Information Sheet for Focus Groups: 
 
Research project:   
We invite you to participate in this focus group as part of our research project on Exploring Young 
Saudi Women’s Engagement with Social Media: Feminine Identities, Culture and National Image The 
project’s overall objective is to understand the way social media platforms affected Saudi women’s 
visibility in the media, society and relations with the opposite sex. This sheet provides you with 
information about why the research is being done, by whom and what is involved. This background 
information is to ensure that you are able to make an informed decision about whether or not to take 
part in the interview.  
Who are the Research Team?  
The research team members are Norah Altuwayjiri under the supervision of Deborah Chambers and Chris 
Haywood from Newcastle University.  
What is the research about?		
Our research is aimed at observing how Saudi women engage with social media today, and examines the 
effect this has on their level of comfort regarding how visible they are. While also considering the 
resulting changes in the way romantic relations and attachments are being made. 
Who are the participants?  When is the project running?  
We are running focus groups over Skype with Saudi men and women about how they engage with 
social media today and their daily practises online, their views on the accepted and appropriate level 
of engagement between the opposite sexes online and offline. We are also conducting a series of 
personal interviews with some of the participants to further explore issues that need expanding on. 
The project runs from January 2014 to January 2017.  
 
What would be involved? 
If you choose to participate, we would request you give us your Skype address (if you don’t have one, we will 
issue one for you) we will then like to ask you a series of broad questions about your attitude towards social 
media and how you engage with it. These questions include:   
a) How have social media platforms changed the level of visibility of women in the Saudi society?  
b) How did the introduction of social media change the way men and women approach marriage and romantic 
relationships in Saudi?  
c) How are social media platforms enabling women to be heard and seen in a segregated community?  
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d) What is the role that social media plays in empowering women financially, socially and politically in Saudi 
Arabia?  
 
How will the data be treated?  
The Skype focus groups and interviews will be video recorded from the researchers Skype account if 
you give us permission to do so (you can choose to not appear on video recording and only 
participate vocally during the skype call).  If not, we will take notes to record your answers and later 
transfer them into the computer. The information will then be deleted from any notebooks. Both the 
personal computer and research folder are password protected. The audio recordings will be 
transcribed into a Word document and linked with NVivo, a software package designed to assist 
researchers in managing interview data.  
 
Will everything you say to me be kept private? 
Yes, all information will be confidential. 
The requirements of Newcastle University’s ethical guidelines will be strictly observed. This means 
that at all times the researcher must observe the welfare of the research participants and respect the 
dignity and personal privacy of the individual. All data collected will also be stored securely and 
safely. All data to be published will be completely anonymous in order to protect the confidentiality of 
participants. In practical terms, this means that:  
§ All the information that is collected will be kept strictly confidential.  
§ All data will be stored and subject to usual security protocols, adhering to the requirements of the 
Data Protection Act via the use of passwords and encryption. 
§ Issues of commercial confidentiality will be respected. 
§ All data will be fully anonymised.   
§ This is achieved via the use of pseudonyms.  
§ This anonymity is extended to any other individual or organisation referred to.  
§ The data will be used to advance academic knowledge and/or professional practice only and 
will not be used for any other purpose.   
§ With this express aim, anonymised data may be incorporated into articles or presentations.  
What will you get out of it? 
You will have a chance to express your views about today’s Saudi society and changes taking place in 
in it in relation to women. You will have an opportunity engage in the current debates about women’s 
rights; and contribute your own experience with social media as a Saudi and the way it effected you 
personally. Participation involves no known or anticipated risks. 
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Is this voluntary? What if you change your mind about taking part? 
Your involvement in this research project is wholly voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the 
research at any point you wish. If you do so, you do not have to give a reason. 
What next?  
We will produce the general outcomes of our research on the attached website: insert hyperlink. If 
there are any areas that require further clarification, you are welcome to contact the team on the 
contact email address below. We will be pleased to answer any questions. If you choose not to take 
part in this research, we wish to thank you for your time. You need take no further action.  
On the next page is a Participant Consent Form. We will bring two copies to our meeting. I will ask 
you to complete and sign both copies and we will each retain a copy.  
 
Contact: Norah Altuwayjiri, Newcastle University.   
Email: n.a.altuwayjiri@ncl.ac.uk. 
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Exploring Young Saudi Women’s Engagement with Social Media: Feminine Identities, 
Culture and National Image. 
 
End-of-project debriefing document 
 
 
 The purpose of this debriefing document is to provide you with information about the findings of 
our research. At the start of our research project, we provided an information sheet that outlined our 
research plan. We explained that we are exploring the effect of social media on the visibility of women in 
Saudi Arabia. We are also studying the changing ways in approaching romantic relationships because of 
these platforms. Our aim is to assess the power of these social networks in changing attitudes towards 
women’s increased engagement in society. 
 
 With your help via the processes of gathering information, this thesis examined the way in which social 
media usage impacts the values, norms and attitudes of young Saudi women and the way in which they 
perform their identity and socialise with the opposite sex. The findings show that social media 
engagement is facilitating Saudi women’s transition into self-managing subjects, impacting their values, 
norms in relation to veiling, work and confinement to the public sphere, as well as impacting their 
attitudes towards romance and wider intimacy practices. Their participation on digital networks is 
facilitating The emergence of unconventional identities on social media platforms amongst Saudi women. 
Accordingly, this is bringing about significant transformation to the public images of young Saudi women 
and negotiating Saudi nationalists positioning of them as the representatives of the collectivity’s honour. 
This may suggest a movement towards revising gender roles within the Saudi nation. Overall, by 
examining how young women approach self-presentation on social media today, this research feeds into a 
broader project of exploring Saudi women’s public image transformation and the relation between the 
Saudi nation and contemporary feminine Saudi identities. 
 
 
We have provided our details with this document should you need to contact the research team. We 
would like to thank you for your participation in this study.  
 
Contact Details:  
Norah Altuwayjiri, Newcastle University.   
Email: n.a.altuwayjiri@ncl.ac.uk. 
 
